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BOX 70010 FEB 11 2005 
BOISE, ID. 83707 ROSE E. GEHRING 
.M!!!r:~~:RT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD~DEPU1Y 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
* * * * * 
~~/4/~ ) 
No./ F:J. '7' t?' ) Case 
Petitioner. ) 
) PETITION FOR POST-
-Vs. ) CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 




The Petitioner alleges: 
1. I am in custody south of Boise (address supra). 
2. Judgment and sentence was imposed by the second judicial 
district court judge Reinhardt, J., 
3. The sentence of fixed life without parole was imposed for 
murder in the first degree in case number 18290. 
4. The sentence date being August 5th 1982. 
5. A finding of guilt having been found after a plea of not 
guilty was entered. 
6. I appealed from the judgment of conviction and imposition 
of sentence timely. On November 30th 1984, a decision affirming 
the same was entered. 
7. The GROUNDS on which I base my application for 
post-conviction relief, include I.e. §§19-2901 {a)(1) & -4205: 
POST-CONVICTION. 1 
§I. INNEF~CTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REQUIRING REVERSAL 
OF THE SENTENCE AND CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO RAISE 
STATUTORY BAR PRECLUDING STATE JURISDICTION. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of counsel at trial, appeal, 
and in all previously filed collateral attacks upon the 
conviction and sentence. Violating Idaho Constitution 
Article 1 section 13. United States Constitutional 
Amendments 5th & 14th (rights to counsel) via., Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668, 104 s.ct. 2062, 80 L.ED.2d 
674 (1984); 
-THE STRICKLAND TEST-
(1)Counsel's assistance was unreasonable considering all 
the circumstances of the case. [That the homicide alleged 
occured on an Indian reservation and involved and Indian. 
Furthermore, that there had been no waiver of said tribal 
jurisdiction of this offense. 
(2) There is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt. ( See Strickland, at 2066 note 97.) [Because 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to try cases of homicide 
occuring in the Indian Reservation where an Indian was involved 




(a) Showing Of Prejudice via., Strickland, at 2067. 
There is more than a "reasonable probability" that 
without counsel's error { in failing to raise objection 
and request for dismissal of the charge due to lack of 
jurisdiction) the result of the trial would have been 




the verdict would have been deferent 
2068, "(a] reasonable probability is a 
a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome [of the trial]. 
(b) Appeal. 
In Evitts v. Lucey, 105 s.ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 
(1985) the Supreme Court held that the Stricklan, standard 
of ineffective assistance of counsel also applies to 
appellate counsel. My appeal number 14755 was an appeal 
as a matter of right. 
The court in Gray v. Green, 778 F.2d 350, held the 
following factors which exist in my case and entitle 
me to relief: 
-INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE PRONGS-
-i- If appellate counsel has failed to raise 
a significant and obvious issue ( failure could be 
viewed as deficient performance), and 
-ii- If [the] issue not raised may have resulted 
POST-CONVICTION. 3 
·-
in reversal of conviction, or an order for new 
proceedigns, the failure was prejudicial. 
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235-36. 
See also 
Where my trial counsel raised virtually no 
defense, the presumption of effective assistance is overcome 
by fa~ling to raise the existance of a statutory bar to 
prosecution due to lack of j lirisdiction. 
supra note 125, 778 F.2d at 352, note 128. 
See Gray v. Green, 
B. Late consideration of my application is appropriate 
in this case because, a strict application of time bar 
would result in manifest injustice and is inconsistent 
with the concept of fundamental justice. See LaFon v. 
State, 119 Idaho 387, at 390, note 5. 807 P.2d 66 (Ct.App. 
1991} reh 1 g denied (1991). 
11 The district court concluded that a strict 
application of the limitation would have 
the effect of depriving him of his claim" 
[Emphasis added] 
More importantly, the case of Olds v. State, 122 
Idaho 976, 842 P.2d 976, 842 P.2d 312 {Ct.App.1992), 
declares that, 
"where a challange to unlawful commitment exists, 
it may be brought at any time and is exempt 
from time constraints to which postconviction 
petitions are usually subject." 







I respectfully request this 
this petition as done via 
court to consider the whole 
Idaho I s Habeas Corpus Statute 
§19-4201 et seq., (inmates incarcerated in state whom complain 
of illegal confinement). 
To the extent this court may feel that I ought to suffer 
from a time bar I would be quick to submit the case before 
the Idaho State Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. 
That is if the court issues a notice of intent to dismiss. 
for failure to state a claim for relief or invoking a time 
bar. 
This presentation here is merely a forrnali ty in attempt 
to show the highier court circumstances require thier remedial 
intervention. 
9. At all times relevant counsel has failed to inform me and 
or object to the courts lack of jurisdiction to act in this 
case evolving from within the Nez-Perce Indian reservation, 
involving an Indian, for which no waiver by tribal authority 
has been given. 
The offense charged falls with the, Federal Court via, 
Indians "Major Crimes Act". 
On the face of the decision on appeal at State v. Wolfe, 
691 P.2d 1293, that court held the incident occurred, "at the. 
Silver Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho." 
I am not allowed to have relevant maps because the 




I technically have not yet discovered evidence that 
said location is reservation lands. I do seek judicial notice 
of my impediment and implications invoking the discovery rule 
overcoming the Statutory limitations period, which is 
non~jurisdictional. 
10. I am seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
11. The relief I seek is to vacate the judgment and conviction 
in this case. 
12. This petition is accompanied by my affidavit in support 
of the petition. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Signature of Petitioner 
I, ,c:::;~#'~ being duly sworn upon my oath, depose 
and say that I have subscribed to the foregoin petition; that 
I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and 
allegations therein set forth are true. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me 
2005. 
POST-CONVICTION. 
signaufe of Petitioner 
this 8:fi._/i dafr 
'/. 
6 
. 05/10./2005 14: 26 FAX 2084765159 CLW.CO.COURT l4J 002 
-- tdrn·-
'5ED Jr 1{ ~...,l AT 
~. 1 O (! • ""'- " OROFINO, IDAHO 
BY. 5rf; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE 















CASE NO. CR 18290 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
Facts 
Jn. 1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold 
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe. See, Appendix 
1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August Si 1982 to a fixed tenn oflife 
:imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in 
November 1984. 
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an 
Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction 
was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
murder of an Indian within the boundaries of the reservation. In an order signed 
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. I did not reach the 
merits ofiv.fr. Wolfe's claim at that time. 
..... 
05/10·12005 14: 26 FAX 2084 7651 CLW.CO.COURT 
On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On 
February 11, 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an 
accompanying affidavit and memorandum. 
Contentions 
Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member 
of the Ne.z Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of 
the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for 
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153) grants the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense. 
Discussion 
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 
18 USC § 1151. 
Jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on the nature oftb,e offense and status of 
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian 
country is vested in the state courts, which is known as the McBratney Rule. United 
States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez 
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians i:n 
Indian Country is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents. 
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in 
Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general 
rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes 
@ooa 
05/10/2005 14:26 FAX 208476515 CLW.CO.COURT 
over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson 
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9th Cir. 1980). The acts read as follows: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United 
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District ofColumbi~ shall 
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed 
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local 
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the ex.elusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes 
respectively. 
The Supreme Court described the Act as a "carefully limited intrusion of federal 
power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for 
crimes committed on Indian land." United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22. 
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps in Indian 
territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a 
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327 
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime 
· committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country). 
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the 
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat 588 (1953). Public Law 280 
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Country in six states and 
granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian 
[4]004 
05/1.0/2005 14: 26 FAX 20847651 CLW.CO.COURT 
' 
. .....,..· 
affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the 
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent 
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321. 
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming 
limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country. 
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning 
certain matters arising in Indian country. 
The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page 
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and 
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following 
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian 
country is defined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds 
this state to the assumption thereof: 
A. Compulsory school attendance 
B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation 
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children 
D. Insanities and mental illness 
E. Public assistance 
F. Domestic relations 
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads 
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. 
I.C. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in 
particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999), 
!41005 
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·. 
the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state 
court search warrant on the reservation were proper in a. murder case where both the 
defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in 
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of 
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the 
execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at 
311. 
There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian 
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal 
law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress." 
United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637 
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see> Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some 
states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or 
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized in 
LC.§ 67~5101. Murderisnotincluded. 
Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict him of 
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Setting aside a conviction for first-degree 
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a result I want this 
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am goin.g to 
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue. 
141006 
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·• 
Order 
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within 
forty-five ( 45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has 
jurisdiction over JY.Ir; Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim, 
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, :in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe 
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow. 
It is so Ordered thls 7- day of May, 2005. 
141007 
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WILLIAM F. WOLFE 
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VS. 











CASE NO. CV 05-36455 
ORDER 
Petitioner William Wolfe p\~titions and supporting documents seeking relief from 
his conviction for first degree murder should have been filed separately t-1s a civil case 
for rellef under Rule 35 or for post conviction relief as the fapts and law warrant. Copies 
of those pleadings &hall be flied in Case No. 18290 and the original pleading$ shall be 
filed in the civil case. 
Jeff Payne is appointed a$ spacial prosecutor and Daren Fales is appointed as 
public defender in the civil case. 
It is so ordered this ~1 _ day of May 2005 
ORDER - l 
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Mailing Certificate 
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Jeff Paynei delivered to tray 
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Boise, 10 83707 
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ROSE E. GEHRING, CLERK 
SY:~~ KathyJoson1 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO 
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CASE NO. CV2005-36455, 
and CR 1982-1-8-9-2-G- t i;i_qo 
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION 
Mr. Wolf was convicted of murder. In addition to appealing his 
conviction he also filed a Motion for relief from an illegal sentence pursuant 
to ICR 35 in his criminal case# CR 1982-18920, and a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief in case # CV 2005-36455. Both the Motion pursuant to 
ICR 35 and the Petition for Post-Conviction relief alleged, among other 
grounds, that the victim of the crime was an enrolled member of a native 
American tribe and that the crime took place within the boundaries of the 
Nez Perce Reservation. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING 1 
Mr. Wolf argues that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to try him for this crime and his conviction and sentence were 
therefore illegal. 
The Court, in an order filed May 31, 2005 directed that the issues be 
decided in one case, Case #CV 2005-36455. The Court fully addressed all 
issues raised by Mr. Wolf in both his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and 
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in its Memorandum Opinion of October 
26, 2006. All of Mr. Wolf's claims for relief were dismissed by the Court's 
Order of December 21, 2006, including his claim that the State of Idaho 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
Mr. Wolf's request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 
35 that he filed in December 2004 is DENIED on the grounds and for the 
reasons that he has already had a hearing on that Motion and it was Denied. 
Dated this 29th day of April, 2011. 
Michael J. Griffi 
District Court Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
Case No. CR-1982-18290 
S.C. Docket No. -------
NOI'ICE OF APPEAL 
(I.C.R. 35 ILLEGAL SENTENCE) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT I STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PA."<TY I S ATTORNEYS 
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals aginst the above-named respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judicial District Court in the County of 
Idaho in the above-entitled action. The Honorable Michael J. Griffin 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment or order described in paragraph l above are appealable orders under 
and pursuant to Rule l](c)(l-10),I.A.R. 
3. a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are: 
ISSUES 
On February 22, 1982, William li'volfe was charged with first degree murder 
in the District Court of Idaho County for Killing Scott Gold outside the 
Silver Dollar Bar in Stites Idaho. 
Mr. Wolfe contends that Mr. Gold was a Native American and that the 
Silver Dollar bar in Stites Idaho is located on the Nez Perce Reservation. 
Thus the State Of Idaho did NOT have Subject Matter Jurisdiction and deprived 
him of his right to liberty without due process of law. 
Dated this S- day of June, 2011. 
William Wolfe, Appellant z.; 
··-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5"" day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL for the purpose of filing with the court 
and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for processing 
to the U.S. mail system to: 
~~~U/6~ 
\iJillia'm Nolfe 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0010 
Idaho County Prosecutor 
Idaho County Courthouse 
320 West MainAve. 
Grangeville, ID. 83530 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 





STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Idaho 
Supreme Court No. 
Idaho County No. CR 82-18290 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
RE: EXHIBITS 
I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Idaho, hereby certify that the following are all the 
exhibits admitted or rejected to-wit: 
There are No Exhibits involved in this appeal. 
Dated this 15th day of June 2011. 
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk 
By:Jt\W,, LJ~JVt()Orv 
Deputy 'Q_J 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
fl":» 
I:~,· :.: .~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 





STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Idaho 
) 
)IDAHO COUNTY NO. CR 82-18290 
) 
) 




I, Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Idaho, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings 
and documents as are automatically 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
red under Rule 28 of the 
I, do further certify, that all exhibits, offered or 
admitted in the above enti.tled cause, will be duly lodged with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's 
transcript and the clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
.. . 
·' ;,, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
a the seal of said Court at Grangeville, Idaho, s 15th day 
of June 2011. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
' ,._, 
M. Ackerman, Clerk 
w~w~ 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707 
Petitioner prose 
lDAHO COUNTY D!STRiCT C-?UR.f 
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) Wo L f-'Z._ W· ; \ I\ A"'", 
) 
Defendant/Movant. ) _______________ ) 
I. 
COMES NOW 'vV riA£ \.AJ ~ , 
\ 
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO. 
Case No. \ g ~ ~ 11 
MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL 
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201 
defendant/rnovant ,:i 7herein, 
whom requests this honorable court to take judicial notice 
of certain facts via., Idaho Rule of Evidence Rule 201 , & 
I.C. §19-1421, presumptions and facts judicially noticed. 
[ESTABLISHING FACTS STIPULATED TO OR NOT]N, 1 
NOTE: The facts I wish to establish are presented under oath as sworn to by 
me, within the accompanying Affidavit in Support. 
MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL 
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TO ALL PARTIES THAT THE FOLLOWING 
FACTS AND PRESUMPTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN AS TRUE AND CORRECT: 
III. 
Judicial Notice Of Adjudicative Facts Within The Scope 
Of Article II Are Sought. 
A. Kinds Of Facts. 
The judicially noticed facts I present are not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that they are either; 
1. Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the trial court or; 
2. Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
B. Time Of Taking Notice. 
Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. ~his holds true on I.C.R. 12(b)(2) objections 
(on jurisdictional matters) and I.C.R. 35 relief from an 
illegal judgment. 
MOTION SEEKING JU])ICIAL 
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201 Page -2 
C. Whether Discretionary Or Mandatory. 
A court may take judicial notice, whether requested 
or not and shall take judicial notice if requested by a party 
and supplied with the necessary information. In instances 
where the facts are already part of the record judicial notice. 
is proper. See State, Dep I t of Law Enforcement v. Engberg, 
109 Idaho 530, 708 P.2d 935 (Ct.App.1985). 
D. Opportunity To Be Heard. 
If the court should demonstrate an unwillingness to 
take judicial notice of facts readily evidenced by the record. 
I respectfully do seek a hearing and notice the same hereby. 
I am entitled to be heard upon this timely request, 
as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor 
of the matters noticed. 
E. Facts To Be Noticed. [THE RECORDS SHOW] 
The following facts are demonstrated by the record in 
this case, which are already in the possession of the court 
and subject to mandatory notice thereof. 
1. The victim was an Indian and a member of the Nez 
Perce tribe. 
2. The crime alleged occurred in Stytes Idaho, within 
the boundaries of a known Indian Reservation. 
3. The prosecution never obtained any consent to act 
on behalf of the Nez Perce tribal authorities. 
MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL 
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201 Page -3 
4. That the crime of murder so committed is exclusively 
under law of the United States. 
5. That the state courts do have a list of crimes (other 
than murder) which they may have intended to try and 
sentence me for. Hence, the sentence now in place is 
illegal but, may be reached via., I.C.R. 35.N, 2 
IV. 
Supporting authority exists in the case of Hunsaker 
v. Hunsaker, 117 Idaho 192, 786 · P.2d 583 (Ct.App.1990)(It 
was permissible for a judge to take judicial notice of court 
clerk's records) . In State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, 832 
P.2d 1144 (Ct.App.1992)(The court is empowered to notice 
state department rules and reg's). 
In the case of Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 775 
P.2d 651 (Ct.App. 1989) (facts generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or which are 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 
In the Trautman, case judicial notice of governmental 
BUREAU extends to official reports published therefrom. 
NOTE: That is unless the state had absolutely no jurisdiction what-so-
ever. In which case they might be considered neglegent. Of course, 
a presumption toward a minimal splinter of propriety seems to be 
. '.,.L' -'.: ; .1.rnore,::,]Phe:J;l.t'ap-pE<fr>pr±ake1y. stated. -
MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL 
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201 Page -4 
uuoo:ts 
That the victim was a member of the Nez Perce Tribe is a 
matter of Indian Bureau records and is capable of notice. 
p 
The state maps and Atlas show Stttes/Idaho/USA, as being 
in the boundaries of Indian lands and a presumption of 
exclusive jurisdiction under United States law exists (absent 
some threshold showing by the state that the tribal authority 
waive or conferred said right). 
As to the instant remedy of rule 35 relief. It is widely 
understood that the defendant may have originally been 
arrested or held under suspicion of any offense capable of 
state jurisdiction. But not murder which is exclusively 
under laws of the United States. 
Therefore, the defendants remedy in rule 35 is 
appropriate and goes to require a sentence change commenserate 
with any offense originally intended. 
through a Nunc Pro Tune application. 
Even if only reached 
DONE this J..~ day of November, 2004. 
,MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL 




W; )\ ', 'f}t-J\ \ ,~J] l ~~ 
P.O. BOX 700)0 
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707 
Petitioner prose 
lDAHO COUNTY DlSTRiCT COURT 
FILED ('-,.. 
~;...:::0::...0'CLOCK __ r-> ....... M. 
0 2 2004 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SQ_ Q O I\\ 1) JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT, IN AND FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
-Vs. 












COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO. 
Case No. 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF 
FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE. 
_______________ ) 
I. 
defendant herein whom does 
now present this motion for relief from an illegal judgment 
via., I.C.R. 35 & 47, in violation of state law I.C. §67-5101 
et seq., and federal law 18 u.s.c. §1162, 28 u.s.c. §1360 et 
seq., but not limited solely to these laws. 
[AN AFFIDAVIT & MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT WILL ACCOMPANY HEREWITH] 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF 
'FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
U 'l u· <) .--, ., lJ UJ.l 
Page -1. 
II. 
BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS CONCISELY STATED: 
The subject matter of the homicide in question is now 
and at all times has been solely within the exclusive federal 
authority. Therefore, the state district court has acted 
outside of its jurisdiction to prosecute and punish this first 
degree murder charge. 
III. 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN RULE 35: 
Since federal courts generally defer to the propriety 
of state court convictions. It is presumed generally that 
the state court did have jurisdiction for some other offense. 
As is listed within Idaho Code §67-5101 et seq., or in 
accordance with laws involving indian lands. See 1 8 U.S. C. 
§1151. 
Therefore, the defendant respectfully seeks this court 
to vacate the sentence for first degree murder and affix 
whatever jurisdictional offense catagory & sentence ( even if 
only a misdemeanor) as the laws of this state and federal 
government 
district court. 
may allow for jurisdiction within the stae 
DONE this ~ay of November, 2004. 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF 
FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
0 U O O ') ",' Vil., 
Page -2. 
_____ ... _ 
!DAHO COUNTY DiSTRiCT COURT 
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) ______________ ) 
I. 
Case No. ) ~ d.:10 
NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST 
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b) 
Notice is hereby given to all parties, that I object to 
the courts lack of sentencing jurisdiction, in a homicide case 
that is exclusively under laws of the United States. 
II. 
Notice the court has proceeded against me for a crime 
of murder allegedly committed upon a Nez Perce tribe member, 
done within the boundaries of Indian lands, subject exclusively 
to laws of the United States. 
NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST 
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b) 
OUUO')';t u \." 
Page -1. 
III. 
I object to .the state courts lack of jurisdiction to try 
and sentence acts excluded by the Indian Major Crimes Act from 
state authority. 
§67-5103] 
[Exceptions from State jurisdiction I.C. 
IV. 
The state may have originally intended to charge and 
convict me with some other cognizable offense code and 
commenserate with Idaho Code §67-5103, 
"state jurisdiction for civil and criminal 
enforcement concerning certain matters arising 
in indian country" 
Whereby a motion for I.C.R. Rule 35 relief is being submitted 
contemporaniously herewith. The court may wish to adjust the 
judgment accordingly. 
v. 
I do seek time served and release from confinement if 
whatever sentence imposed is not for a term of fixed life 
without parole. A Rule 35 motion for an illegal sentence must 
issue. 
DONE this~ day of November, 2004. 
NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST 
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b) 
· ··oo,,..,,' Du J't 
Page -2 
VJ \ l I 1 f\\"\/\ \A (J lf ~ 
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VJ o L f- ~ 'vv ; I' 1 AN; 
) 
Defendant/Movant. ) _______________ ) 
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO. 
Case No. l 8 i.5--0 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
I.C.R. RULE 35 RELIEF FOR 
AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
I. 
I \i?olfz 'vv";\ 11 f:>""'- , defendant/movant herein, do hereby 
present this Memorandum In Support (juxtaposed) with Issues 
of Fact presented within the attached Affidavit In Support 
also submitted contemporaneous herewith the Motion For Rule 
35 Relief. Done pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(b), & Idaho Criminal Rule 47. [MOTIONS GENERALLY] 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -1 
nu o u ~1 .~·· 
II. 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON MY RULE 35. 
A. The Sentencing Court Has Venue To Hear My Rule 35. 
The term venue, formerly know as visne. In common law 
pleading and practice, a neighborhood; the neighborhood, place 
or county in which an injury is declared to have been done, 
or fact declared to have happened. [3 Bl.Comm. 294] 
Movant does not waive venue, nore does he concede that 
the court has venue in the original action. The matter of 
venue over a sentence must lay within the sentencing court. 
See State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 800 P.2d 128 (Ct.App.1990)~ 
CAVEAT: Do not interpret this as acceptance of venue 
by the state court regarding the case in chief, Idaho 
Code §19-301 prevents such venue in cases cognizable 
exclusively in the courts of the United States. I allege 
that this court has venue solely to hear this Rule 35 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules as promulgated by the 
state supreme court at rule 1. [SCOPE] 
N, 1 • Venue is nonj urisdictional; proof of proper venue is satisfied if 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence, direct or circumstantial 
evidence may be used to establish venue. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -2 
O) noon,--" u ,((/'', .._, ,_ 
B. The Sentencing Court Has Rule 35 Jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is a term of comprehensive import embracing 
every kind of judicial action Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 
Ky. v. Crombie, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W.2d 39, 40. The Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 expressly grants authority to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time. 
"The court may correct an 
Illegal Sentence 3.at any 
time" 
A motion for correction or reduction of sentence based upon 
imposition of an illegal sentence is not subject to the 1 20-
day time constraint. See State v. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 595, 618 
P.2d 773 (1980). 
The court has authority to correct an illegal sentence 
at any time. 
(Ct.App.1988). 
See King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 
Unlike a legal but allegedly excessive sentence, an illegal 
sentence may be corrected at any time. See State v. Lee, 116 
Idaho 515, 777 P.2d 737 (1989). 
Of course it wouldn't matter anyway because I should be 
excused from filing a timely motion pursuant to this rule under 
special circumstances or because of misleading conduct of the 
state. See State v. Hocker, 119 Idaho 105, 803 P.2d 1011 
(Ct.App.1991).N, 2 
N,2. Circumstances of special circumstances exist where jurisdictional defect 
can be raised at any time via., I.C.R. 12(b)(2). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -3 
uu 00 3·; 
The record in this case shows a homicide upon an Indian 
allegedly done within the Nez Perce reservation, at Stytes 
Idaho. I seek judicial notice of the record via., Idaho Rule 
of Evidence Rule 201 et seq., (See Seperate Motion). 
CAVEAT: Once again I am compelled to note my express 
belief that the state district court does not have 
jurisdiction to try and sentence me for an offense within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of laws of the United States. 
The state has jurisdiction to rule upon my rule 35 motion 
which is based upon an illegal sentence. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The movant herein stands ready for relief via., Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 from an Illegal Sentence. Having been tried 
and convicted before the second district court in Idaho county, 
for the offense of murder in the first degree. Sentence 
occurred on or about LIS' /198~. 
parole was imposed. 
A life sentence without 
IDTE: The issues of fact are established within my affidavit in support 
of rule 35 relief. See contemporaneous filing submitted herewith. 
Done via I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -4 
OUU03t, 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
It was on or about~/~/~~, when the defendant and an 
Indian named 5'c ill c~ ('J L D , were in an altercation at a bar 
in Stytes Idaho. Well within the boundaries of Indian lands. 
The alleged victim died while on the Nez Perce Indian 
Reservation. Police arrested the defendant as a suspect and 
later charged him with first degree murder. 
Its possible that police also charged the defendant with 
one of the crimes reachable by state jurisdiction, one that 
I don't even know about. Though they lacked authority to 
proceed upon the murder charge now in place. 
in the Indian Major Crimes Act. 
The defendant was intoxicated at the time. 
As set forth 
So that might 
have given rise to an alternative charge noticed at the 
magistrates arraignment. 
v. 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
A. The Indian Major Crimes Act. 
Federal law at 18 u.s.c. §1153 implements the "Indian 
Major Crimes Act ( I.M.C.A.) 11 • If an alleged offense is 
committed against the person or property of an Indian or another 
person. Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal courts. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
'Onn OU uJ~ 
Page -5 
The allegation of murder made against the defendant 
involving acts upon an Indian, within the boundaries of the 
reservation constitutes an offense in violation of the United 
States. The state district court lacked the requisite 
N 3 jurisdiction to try defendant for that offense • .::.:..L:::. 
B. MURDER. 
In the case of Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 Supp. 807, the 
state court lacked jurisdiction to try a murder of an Indian 
within the reservation of an inclusive settlement, just like 
Stytes Idaho_N, 4 See limits of state jurisdiction over indian 
reservation lands. (22 U.C.L.A. Rev. 535, 557 (1974)] 
N,3. Any conviction of a non-Indian of an offense uponaa10nindian of' .. · :: , 
an offense upon Indian within the reservation, are subject to federal 
jurisdiction under the Indaian Country Crimes Act. [Non-Indian Status 
Is Irrelevant J • 
N, 4. The subject matter of murder upon an Indian within the reservation 
is within the exclusive federal authority. See I.C. §67-5101; et 
seq., 25 u.s.c.A. §§1321-1326. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -6 
· 0 U O O 40 
C. Controversies Involving A Non-Indian. 
The fact that an Indian is involved in the offense charg~, 
particularly involving a non-Indian, automatically strips the 
state of all power to deal with the controversy under state 
law, and a state court does not have subject matter jurisdiction 
in this homicide case because it is within the exclusive federal 
authority. See Odenwal t v. Zaring, 1 02 Idaho 1, 624 P. 2d 383 
( 1980); and see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136, 100 s.ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980). 
D. There Has Been No Tribal Consent Conferring Jurisdiction. 
District Courts have no jurisdiction of controversies 
arising on Indian reservations unless such jurisdiction has 
been conferred by the governing bodies of the tribes occupying 
such reservation. See Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes, 
92 Idaho 257, 441 P.2d 167 (1968). 
The record in this case proves that the state never 
obtained the Nez Perce tribal governing bodies consent in order 
to try this case/crime. I respectfully seek Judicial Notice~5-
of these facts upon the record via., I.R.E. Rule 201. 
N,5. See accompanying Motion and Affidavit in Support, seeking Judicial Notice 
filed contemporaneously herewith. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Uu 'lO /-<; u 1: . .i 
Page -7 
1 . The victim was a member of the Nez Perce Tribe, whom 
died on the reservation. 
2. The conduct alleged did occur within the boundaries 
of said reservation. 
3. The state never obtained jurisdiction from Nez Perce 
Tribal governing bodies, requisite to prosecute a murder 
in this case. 
4. The state was without jurisdiction to proceed upon 
the homicide occurring on the reservation. Although they 
may have originally charged some other offense besides 
murder, which they are capable of? 
5. The sentence is therefore Illegal and must reflect 
a term commenserate with an offense ( other than murder) 
by which the state court actually ~eld jurisdiction over. 
N:>TE: A motion under rule 35 subjects only the sentence to re-examination. 
It cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to attack the validity 
of the underlying conviction. See State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 
950. P.2d 1302 (Ct.App.1997). A presumption that there may be valid 
basis for some crime charged other than murder exists! 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 




I respectfully request that this honorable court would 
grant a telephonic conference in this matter. 
That an order for said hearing be noticed to all parties 
forthwith. 
At the hearing I wish to hear exactly what sentence the 
court intends to claim it held jurisdiction on. 
Since the judgment and conviction says it is for murder 
and a term of fixed life without parole was imposed. I seek 
a declaration by this court defining a cognizable offense and 
related sentence respectively. 
DONE this~ day of November, 2004. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Page -9 
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COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO. 
Case No. lg~ ~-0 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
I WO L~<... w; l UAi'fl-. affiant/defendant/movant hereing, does 
certify and attest as sworn to under penalty of perjury that 
the following statement is true and correct to the best of 
my knowledge and recolection. 
1 /. THAT my full name is 'r,,.J:f//Arc::, feiwtt.lr:iWnL(-a and I am the 
defendant/movant/affiant in this proceeding for rule 35 relief, 
judicial notice and rule 12 objections. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
O·uou.,.,, ,,:., t,4 • ..... ,. 
Page -1. 
RE: RULE 35 RELIEF. 
2/. THAT my sentence is illegal because the district court 
only had jurisdiction to charge and punish me for offenses 
other than homicide {via., the Indian Maj or Crimes Act and 
its progeny) . 
3/. THAT the district court has jurisdiction to act on my 
rule 35 (involving an illegal sentence) now, and is therefore 
timely. 
4/. THAT the court ought to give me a lessor sentence then 
life without parole as a matter of law! 
RE: JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
5/. THAT the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 201 allows for this 
court to notice the following adjudicative facts, which aren't 
subject to reasonable dispute. 
A. The victim was a member of the Nez Perce Indian tribe. 
B. The crime alleged occurred in Stytes Idaho, within 
the boundaries of a known indian reservation land. 
C. The prosecution never obtained any authority, nore 
entered into any agreement for consent to act, on behalf 
of the governing Nez Perce tribal authority. 
D. That the crime of murder so committed is exclusively 
under law of the United States. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
Page -2. 
U, f) u·· u / .···· U I 'j: ~ 
RE: RELIEF AVAILABLE VIA., I.C.R. 35. 
6/. THAT the court has authority to correct or reduce the life 
term now in place, based upon imposition of an illegal sentence. 
7 /. THAT I presume the state court did have some kind of 
jurisdiction under some other catagory of offense (other than 
murder), which is cognizable by state courts --- even if only 
a misdemeanor, or maybe a trafic code or something ( stemming 
from intoxication of the defendant}? 
8/. THAT the court ought to adjust my judgment and commitment 
and order credit for time served via., Idaho Code §19-309. 
RE: OBJECTIONS VIA., I.C.R. 12(b)(2). 
9/. THAT the lack of state court jurisdiction is substantive 
in nature and may be raised by objection at any time via., 
I.C.R. 12(b}(2). 
10/. THAT said objection is being leveled now based upon the 
lack of jurisdiction of the district court to sentence for 
a life term in this case. 
FURTHERS SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this ~.2--day of ,#cV, 
2004. 
By, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 
4,,,.,,4wi ' 2004. 
* * 
* * * * S E A L * 
* * * 
* * 
. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
JANEL GARDNER 
Notary Publ\C 
State of Idaho 
.... -~•woo ... 
~J~~ 
thisJ~nJ. day of 
Page -3 . 
Lv ,' J I : A-M \/1212 L £, 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707 
Petitioner prose 
lDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
f) , :-15 FILED ;) 
AT ex , 0t o·cLOcK ____r::_.M. 
_L DEC O 2 2004 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Se..C.. ~ N 'D JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT, IN AND FOR ~Jo.RV COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO. 






Case No. I g cl- 1 0 






Defendant/Movant. ) _______________ ) 
I. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 
I U~l\.}JZQ~, defendant/movant/affiant herein, do 
certify delivery of; (1) Motion for Rule 35 Relief (From An 
Illegal Sentence) ( 2) Affidavit In Support (3) Memorandum 
In Support (4) Notice, Objection And Request For Relief Via., 
I.C.R. Rule 12(b), & {5) Motion Seeking Judicial Notice Via., 
I.R.E. 201, to the District Court Clerk & to the County 
Prosecutor, by placing the following documents into the hands 
of prison staff for mailing, U.S. parcel postage pre-paid 
1st class on this 11/l~ /2004 date. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 1 of 1. 
I \ (\ () 0 / f'' 
UUU 'XI 





T-883 P.003/004 F-260 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a copy 
of the foregoing document to the following persons on J;) , I l/, OL( : 
Jeff Payne, delivered to tray 
WUliarn Wolfe 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, 1D 83707 
UUU0,~8 




D~c-l.4-2004 10:42am Frcrn·!DAHO CO~·.· , _ IST COURT 








T-983 P.OOZ/004 F-260 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
. . FILED /) 
AT/{), 54_ O'CLOCK-L::t__.M. 










Case No. CR 18290 
ORDER 
The motion of William Wolfe for relief pursuant to Idaho Criminal Code Rule 35 is 
summarily dismissed as untimelr' 
!t is so Ordered this I tr". day of December 2004. 
U·,uu·o,:c ·..:.:.: , . ./ 
C:l'RDF.R • 1 
N BRADBURY 
District Judge 
AHO coUNiY DISTRICT COURT 
ID i FILED /') 
AT g; ~ dd_ O'CLOCK __c_.M. 
·w;/few't) w~ 1.,/--e_ 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID. 83707 
r;· rr 2 7 t!UIH .. t..., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
* * * * * 









Case No.(:~ 8290 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 





Defendant/Movant. ________________ ) 
COMES NOW, W~ i,J~ , defendant/movant herein 
whom does seek relief from the order denying my timely 
request for a rule 35, due to an illegal sentenee. 
This Motion is presented within ten days from the order 
denying relief. It is accompanied with AFFIDAVIT, & MEMORANDUM 
in support, based upon the courts mistake that my request 
was untimely. 
DONE this a..i_th day of December 2004. 
NJ.IE: I CBJB:!I' 'lO 'llE UISJ.R.lCI.' <IlRl.S EHtR via., I.R.C.P. 12. & ID aA1M '.lmr I 1.M 
&HERlm :amcmc:mL cr:t:F.INMNr AS A RESDr CF 'IlE IIIEGU. smEN:E,. El\9ID tB:N 'IlE 
DlSlRICI.' <D:RIS IKK CF JCRIIDI< !I'll N 'ID CINlJ.Cl'. 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. -1. 
' 10 r.: ,-o o o .)L 
'1v-_~w~ 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID. 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
* * * * * 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
-Vs. 
Defendant/Movant. ________________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) SS: 











AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
I Lv Jb L-0~ , affiant herein, whom does swear that 
the following facts are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge as sworn to under penalty of perjury as follows: 
1 /. THAT My full name is lv ~A, IJJejA, and I am the 
affiant/movant/defendant in the above referenced cause. 
2/. THAT I am basing my request for relief on factors of 
an illegal sentence and not a discretionary request. 
3/. THAT I am entitled to relief from the illegal judgment 
of Conviction against me on or about August 5th 1982. 
4/. THAT the order denying my rule 35 relief was based on 
a substantive error in fact which mislead the court as to 
its rule of law in this case, to me detriment. 





5/. THAT I am entitled to relief because the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to try or sentence me for first degree 
murder, since the crime culminated within the Indian 
reservation and involved an Indian. 
FURTHER SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this,.d:;'..Z..--th day of December 
2004. 
By, ~~~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisjjw{_day of 
December 2004. 
* * * * * * * * * ***SE AL * 
* * * * * * * * * 
JANEL GARDNER 
Notary Public 
State of ldah9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I ~~ 41//k do hereby certify mailing of my 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief, to the district court clerk, and the 
county prosection at the below ascribed address, by placing 
the same into hands of prison staff, for delivery via., U.S. 
mail postage pre-paid first class. 
Done by me this A ~ay of December 04. 
BY, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). Page -2. 
000052 
IDAHO COUNTY ~CT COURT 
·- ,1 r. "'" ~ . r\ 
W: \/;AV' \tJ (?L{~ 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID. 83707 
~RIGINAL 
~ 
:f\l - 'i' 1 Qlol U'CLOCK L .M;. 
DEC 2 7 2UU4 
ROSE E, GEHRING 
c,KO~ICT COURT () 
: · 1~ · hO<QD DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
* * * * * 













MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
________________ ) 
M E M O R A N D U M I N S U P P O R T 
This is a memorandum in support of my I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
request for relief from the courts order wrongfully denying 
an I.C.R. Rule 35 motion for relief from an illegal sentence 
based upon the courts lack of jurisdiction to try a murder 
which culminated on an Indian reservation and involved a known 
Indian tribe member. 
NOTE: I am seeking relief via., I.R.C.P. rule 60(b)(1),[for mistake 
in fact], (3) misrepresentation [the fact that my rule 35 is based 
upon an illegal sentence and not a discretionary request], and (6) 
for any other reason justifying relief. All involving issues of 
fact which are prejudicial to my case due to the error so complained. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
000053 
Page -1. 
FIRST relief via., I.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1) is proper where I can 
show (a) how the mistake was made [the court made an error 
in fact when it held that my rule 35 was untimely because 
there is no such time limits on issues of law involved upon 
an illegal sentence] and (b) the honorable judge 
,:fei&e1:RRA2>Al>le,t1 made the mistake in his December li, 2004 
order. 
In this case a reasonably prudent man would have done 
the same under such circumstances and relief from judgment 
ought to issue •. See Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709, 809 
P.2d 1188 (Ct.App.1991). 
FURTHERMORE, subsection (6) of this rule allows for 
relief for Any Other Reason Justifying Relief! See First 
Sec. Bank v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 730 P.2d 1053 
(Ct.App.1986). 
ADDITIONALLY, subsection (3) presents a vehicle for 
relief from an order based upon mistake. See Hearst Corp. 
v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 {1979). In my case there 
is a mistake of fact. Whether or not the district court abused 
its discretion in ruling on my rule 35 motion for an illegal 
sentence as a matter of discretion, raher than as a matter 
of law. 
An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. See 
King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct.App. 1988). 
THEREFORE, the District Court has abused its discretion 
and the order denying relief must be vacated due to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
OOUUJ~ 
Page -2. 
error/mistake/misrepresentation of the fact that the relief 
is not one subject to discretionary review but one of law. 
DONE this '.clJ_th day of December 
2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I \;I:)).' AM Wii L~c. do hereby certify mailing of my 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief, to the district court clerk, and the 
county prosection at the below ascribed address, by placing 
the same into hands of prison staff, for delivery via., U.S. 
mail postage pre-paid first class. 
Done by me this/2 P day of December 04. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b). Page -3. 
0 I) q u ':; U U v·~ 
vJL.i!L~/~ 
BOX 70010 " 
iDAHO COUNTY D!SIB!CT COURT 
' Ll)1:£:;igl> I\ 
'b I [5[) O'CLOCK ~ .M. 
BOISE, ID. 83707 , ROSE E. GEHRING 
~UcilSTRICTCOURT 
, , ~ • I \l'\$1 DEPUTY . , . a • . I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Petitioner. 
-Vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 










Case No./~'P:J <JO 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
The following issues of fact and law are presented in 
favor of the Defendant/Movant obtaining not only 
expedited/emergency proceedings but, also towards obtaining 
relief via., I.C.R. 35, or 47. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 1 
000056 
-STATEMENT OF THE CASE-
A charge of murder in the first degree was filed by the 
Idaho County, Idaho, State prosecutor from the February 20, 
1982, shooting of an Indian on Indian Lands. 
The State prosecutor never obtained permission or waiver 
from the Nez Perce tribal authority at any time. The State 
in fact keeps this defendant from federal authorities. 
The State in fact keeps this defendant from federal 
authorities. 
The State commits reversible error when it charged, 
convicted, sentenced and then imposed an illegal sentence of 
an offense solely under exclusive federal ·jurisdiction via., 
the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT". 
On about the end of 2004 a paralegal friend asked the 
defendant if he knew whether or not his offense occurred inside 
an Indian reservation and hence under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. 
The defendant sought to obtain a map of the area, or 
any corroberative 
incarceration. The 
proof needed to show his 
State prison perpetually forbids 
doing so, and hence precludes discovery. 






I am now filing for relief from an illegal sentence and 
the court ommitts to act. I am claiming false imprisonment 
occurs once the State prosecution becomes aware of the taint 
and fails to act. Every day hence is an aggravating factor 
denying me a quick and speedy trial in the federal court thereby 
circumventing justice illegally. 
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
The offense I am tried and convicted of by the State 
court was done in fundamental error because the federal court 
has exclusive jurisdiction of all "MAJOR CRIMES" committed 
in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho ( Nez Perce) Indian Reservation 
lands, involving an Indian protectorate. 
SUPPORT accompanying here with] 
[See AFFIDAVIT IN 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF EXPEDITED PROCEEDINGS 
do hereby plead my case 
[/egzejens/] requiring expedited proceedings. 
for 
"State of being urgent or exigent; pressing 
need or demand; a case requires immediate 
attention, assistance, or remedy; critical 
period or condition, pressing necessity." 
[State v. Rubion, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 
650, 657] 
"a sudden an unexpected happening or an 
unforeseen; occurance or condition requires 
immediate remedy". [Los Angeles County 
v. Payne, 8 Cal.2d 563, 66 P.2d 658, 663] 
"Exigence" 
Exigent circumstances exist in this situation which 
demands unusual or immediate action. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. ~-···,·0·00058 3 
RE: UNLAWFULNESS OF JUDGMENT & CONVICTION. 
1 . The conviction is against federal code via., the Indian 
Major Crimes Act" and I am wrongfully incarcerated as a result 
of said illegal incarceration. Such prejudice violates the 
State & Federal due process clauses [U.S. Amend. 5th & 14th 
& I. Const. Art. 1 § 1 3 ] I have been denied my freedom based upon 
sham jurisdiction unlawfully. 
RE: MY QUICK & SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS: 
The presuption is that county officers contacted the 
Federal prosecutors and informed them that I violated Federal 
Law back in 1982. It is further presumed that tribal 
authorities never held a timely hearing nor waived jurisdiction. 
The right of this defendant/accused to a speedy trial 
(or tribal review) is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of 
the constitution and such right is implemented by 18 U.S.C.A. 
§3161 et seq., and Fed.R.Crim.P. 50 In my case the State courts 
have interfered with that speedy trial right. 
The case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 u.s. 514, 92 s.ct. 2182, 
33 L.Ed.2d 101, lists four factors to be considered in 
determining whether delay was unreasonable: 
A. Lenght of Delay. Here it's been over twenty' year:5_X: ::i 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 4 
Uu 00 ,-n I . ;)j 
B. Governments Justification for the Delay. Due to an illegal 
unconstitutional State court conviction, done absent authority 
to act! 
C. Prejudice Caused By The Delay. I at all times have plead 
innocent! Witnesses that would have testified in my favor 
might well be dead by now. 
find! 
Surely they' 11 be impossible to 
All due to lengthened pretrial incarceration! Call it 
investigatory state if you will. I am still being denied a 
quick & speedy federal court redress. 
RE: STATE COURT INFRINGEMENT ON THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT". 
In federal courts, the Federal Act of 1974 establishes 
a set of time limits for carrying out the major events (e.g. 
information, indictment, arraignment) in the prosecution of 
my federal criminal case. [18 u.s.c.A §3161 et seq.,] 
The precursers to filing pleadings charging me in this 
homicide are subject to the Federal Act of 1974. State court 
actions outside of state court jurisdiction are extra-judicial 
in nature. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 5 
1 ! OUOOGfI 
RE: PRE-INDICTMENT INCARCERATION CREATES PREJUDICE. 
Such prejudice is not confined to merely an impairment 
of the defense but includes any threat to what has been termed 
an accused's significant stakes, psychological, physical and 
financial, in the prompt termination of a proceeding which 
may ultimately deprive me of life, liberty or property. 
U.S. v. Dreyer, C.A.N.J., 533 F.2d 112, 115] 
[See 
Prejudice is presumed in cases of extended incarceration 
imposed prior to trial or a preliminary proceeding! I declare 
a conclusive presumption exists. [People v. Sellers, 3 Dept., 
109 A.D.2d 387, 492 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128.] 
A substantive rule of law exists where post arrest 
incarceration extends beyond two decades, without a proper 
(Federal) charge being leveled! 
I am prejudice in my ability to proceed and defend. 
STATE COURTS KNOWINGLY PROCEED ABSENT 
JURISDICTION, EVEN AFTER NOTICED 
I told the trial court of the error on _-_-04, within 
my rule 35 application (for an illegal sentence). That court 
and County prosecutor continue to error by ommiting to act. 
Since my present sentence provides for a life term until 
the day I die! I hereby declare: 
The State conviction of an offense subject to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction via., the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT". 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 6 
OUOOS.1 
The perpetual life term now in place is cruel and unusual 
punishment. It must be void. 
CONCLUSION 
I am prejudiced by the inordinate delay of federal court 
process. Such prejudice is presumed as a matter of law. 
Therefore, my circumstances require . expedited proceedings and 
the State really must vacate my judgment. 
DONE this cf day of February, 2005. 
DEFENDANT/MOVANT 
-CERTIFICATE OF MAILING-
I P,:;,:.&'-.-#'4do hereby certify delivery of this document 
7 
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form 
mailing via U.S. Postal Service 1st class pre-paid this £-
_.?$'date. 
BY ME, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 7 
.wJL:w~ 
BOX 70010 FEB 11 2005 
BOISE, ID. 83707 ROSE E. GEHRING 
~A!!F~~~OORT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD~DEPlI Y 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
* * * * * 
W~w~ ) 
No./ F:J. "7 t::l ) Case 
Petitioner. ) 
) PETITION FOR POST-
-Vs. ) CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 




The Petitioner alleges: 
1. I am in custody south of Boise (address supra). 
2. Judgment and sentence was imposed by the second judicial 
district court judge Reinhardt, J., 
3. The sentence of fixed life without parole was imposed for 
murder in the first degree in case number 18290. 
4. The sentence date being August 5th 1982. 
5. A finding of guilt having been found after a plea of not 
guilty was entered. 
6. I appealed from the judgment of conviction and imposition 
of sentence timely. On November 30th 1984, a decision affirming 
the same was entered. 
7. The GROUNDS on which I base my application for 




§I. INNEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REQUIRING REVERSAL 
OF THE SENTENCE AND CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO RAISE 
STATUTORY BAR PRECLUDING STATE JURISDICTION. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of counsel at trial, appeal, 
and in all previously filed collateral attacks upon the 
conviction and sentence. Violating Idaho Constitution 
Article 1 section 13. United States Constitutional 
Amendments 5th & 14th (rights to counsel) via., Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668, 104 s.ct. 2062, 80 L.ED.2d 
674 (1984); 
-THE STRICKLAND TEST-
(1)Counsel 1 s assistance was unreasonable considering all 
the circumstances of the case. [That the homicide alleged 
occured on an Indian reservation and involved and Indian. 
Furthermore, that there had been no waiver of said tribal 
jurisdiction of this offense. 
(2) There is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt. ( See Strickland, at 2066 note 97.) [ Because 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to try cases of homicide 
occuring in the Indian Reservation where an Indian was involved 
and no written waiver by exclusive tribal authorty had 
occurred]. 
POST-CONVICTION. 
(1 U 0. o· n f JI. D'A: 
2 
-PREJUDICE PRONG-
(a) Showing Of Prejudice via., Strickland, at 2067. 
There is more than a "reasonable probability" that 
without counsel I s error ( in failing to raise objection 
and request for dismissal of the charge due to lack of 
jurisdiction) the result of the trial would have been 




the verdict would have been deferent 
2068, "[a] reasonable probability is a 
a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome [of the trial]. 
(b) Appeal. 
In Evitts v. Lucey, 105 s.ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 
(1985) the Supreme Court held that the Stricklan, standard 
of ineffective assistance of counsel also applies to 
appellate counsel. My appeal number 14755 was an appeal 
as a matter of right. 
The court in Gray v. Green, 778 F.2d 350, held the 
following factors which exist in my case and entitle 
me to relief: 
-INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE PRONGS-
-i- If appellate counsel has failed to raise 
a significant and obvious issue ( failure could be 
viewed as deficient performance), and 
-ii- If [the] issue not raised may have resulted 
POST-CONVICTION. 3 
000065 
in reversal of conviction, or an order for new 
proceedigns, the failure was prejudicial. 
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235-36. 
See also 
Where my trial counsel raised virtually no 
defense, the presumption of effective assistance is overcome 
by failing to raise the existance of a statutory bar to 
prosecution due to lack of jurisdiction. 
supra note 125, 778 F.2d at 352, note 128. 
See Gray v. Green, 
B. Late consideration of my application is appropriate 
in this case because, a strict application of time bar 
would result in manifest injustice and is inconsistent 
with the concept of fundamental justice. See LaFon v. 
State, 119 Idaho 387, at 390, note 5. 807 P.2d 66 (Ct.App. 
1991) reh'g denied (1991). 
11 The district court concluded that a strict 
application of the limitation would have 
the effect of depriving him of his claim" 
[Emphasis added] 
More importantly, the case of Olds v. State, 1 22 
Idaho 976, 842 P.2d 976, 842 P.2d 312 (Ct.App.1992), 
declares that, 
11 where a challange to unlawful commitment exists, 
it may be brought at any time and is exempt 
from time constraints to which postconviction 
petitions are usually subject." 






8. I respectfully request this court. to consider the whole 
of this petition as done via Idaho I s Habeas Corpus Statute 
§19-4201 et seq., (inmates incarcerated in state whom complain 
of illegal confinement). 
To the extent this court may feel that I ought to suffer 
from a time bar I would be quick to submit the case before 
the Idaho State Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. 
That is if the court issues a notice of intent to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for relief or invoking a time 
bar. 
This presentation here is merely a formality in attempt 
to sho~ the highier court circumstances require thier remedial 
intervention. 
9. At all times relevant counsel has failed to inform me and 
or object to the courts lack of jurisdiction to act in this 
case evolving from within the Nez-Perce Indian reservation, 
involving an Indian, for which no waiver by tribal authority 
has been given. 
The offense charged falls with the, Federal Court via, 
Indians 11 Major Crimes Act". 
On the face of the decision on appeal at State v. Wolfe, 
6.91 P. 2d 1 2 9 3, that court held the incident occurred, 11 at the 
Silver Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho." 
I am not allowed to have relevant maps because the 
I.D.O.C. policy and procedure prevents it due to security 
reasons. 
POST-CONVICTION. 
",lo· o· ,, U u . D, 
5 
' J 
I technically have not yet discovered evidence that 
said location is reservation lands. I do seek judicial notice 
of my impediment and implications invoking the discovery rule 
overcoming_ the Statutory limitations period, which is 
non~jurisdictional. 
10. I am seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
11. The relief I seek is to vacate the judgment and conviction 
in this case. 
12. This petition is accompanied by my affidavit in support 
of the petition. 
h~~~. 
Signature of Petitioner 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
I, b,.A-~~ being duly sworn upon my oath, depose 
and say that I have subscribed to the forego in petition; that 
I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and 
allegations therein set forth are true. 
S .gnaufe of Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me 
2005. 






BOISE, ID. 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JU 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO 
* * * * * 
Petitioner. 
-Vs. 










) ________________ ) 
Case No. Jg-' cl, 7 0 
NOTICE OR ERROR, OBJECTION 
AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
~ ~fendant gives writt~ NOTICE to all parties; Judge 
"~ F\ & Prosecuto~ ~ , by presenting copies to 
0 eacho his Idaho C nty ~rict Court filing. [Via., 
I.R.C.P. S(a),(d) & (e)] 
I. 
1 / • NOTICE: The above named defendant has been wrongfully 
proceeded against by the state courts because the 2-20-82 
homicide complained of culminated within the Nez Perce Indian 
Reservation and involved exclusive federal court jurisdiction 
via., the 11 INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT". 
II. 
2/. OBJECTION: The defense hereby raises this timely objection 
via., I.C.R. 12(b)(2) "that the complaint & information filed 




A. CAUSE SHOWN FOR TARDY.OBJECTION. 
Due to inadequate assistance of counsel at trial 
and on direct appeal. I was never informed about the 
state's lack of jurisdiction to try my exclusive federal 
offense. 
Furthermore, I fall under the Evionsky, discovery 
rule which tolls time limitations. I was; 
(1) Held out of State without Idaho access, & 
(2) Perpetually suffer prejudice from State D.O.C. 
rules that preclude me from obtaining any maps to 
prove Stites, Idaho, is within the Nez Perce Indian 
Reservation. A requisite to preclude State court 
jurisdiction. 
B. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
The court must find that my tardiness is excusable 
neglect because the court itself operated under a belief 
that it held jurisdiction! 
In the case of Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 
Idaho 634, 701 P.2d 254 (Ct.App.1985) 11 excusable neglect" 
is determined by examining what might be expected of 
reasonable prudent person under similar circumstances". 
Where delay is due to State imposed impediment, 
the court must fine excusable neglect ( due to perpetual 
incapacity to discover). 
III. 
3/. RELIEF SOUGHT: I respectfully request this court to grant 
expedited proceedings and hold an emergency hearing for 
determining the merits of my prompt release from State custody. 
OBJECTION. 
( 1 ri U' 0 -, r ju i u 
2 
IV. IN CONCLUSION. 
I have given Notice of the States lack of jurisdiction 
to proceed upon my offense subject to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction under the Indian Major Crimes Act. The court 
must deem the matter as being one requiring exigency and must 
grant emergency proceedings now. 
DONE this cf> day of ~ I 2005. 
MOVANT 
-CERTIFICATE OF MAILING-
I ,:;:;-e::.;~~~ do hereby certify delivery of this document 
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form 
mailing via U.S. Postal Service 1st class pre-paid this ,;Jf _ 
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[OR] EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, ________________ ) 
COMES NOW, /t#.,._A/,4, defendant/movant herein, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. Rule 7 and in accord with I.C.R. 47 (MOTIONS] whom. 
moves for EXPEDITED PROCEEDINGS on my motion done /V-~~4, 
for reconsideration from denial of Rule 35 ( for an illegal 
sentence}. Also seeking appointment of counsel. [See AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT attached hereto]. 
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF OR THEORY OF LAW TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN 
THE MEMORANDUM & SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT 
In this particular case where the court lacked 
jurisdiction to try my alleged of fens~, having took place on 
an Indian Reservation and subject to Federal Law (Indian Major 
Crimes Act) • 
EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS. 1 
000072 
There could not be a legal (nore] constitutional judgment 
& conviction as a result of that substantive error. 
Therefore, the 
defendant is illegal 




endured by this 
The very nature 
proceedings in 
conformance with Idaho Constitution Article 1 §18. (justice 
to be speedily administered). 
RE: NOTICE OF HEARING. 
I also ask the court to notice up a hearing on my motion 
(to reconsider and for expedited proceedings). 
RE: ORDER TO TRANSPORT & APPOINTING COUNSEL. 
Because I am not allowed to possess requisite form orders 
to transport inmates from the prison, due to security reasons. 
I am otherwise unable to complete the notice requirements 
in order to be heard. 
I therefore ask this court to issue an order for transport 
and granting me counsel with whom I may consult prior to the 
hearing on this matter. 
Noting that I have never waived counsel at any stage 
of these proceedings. 
RE: OBJECTION TO DENIAL OF ACCESS TO COURTS. 
The defendant herein does set NOTICE OF ERROR and 
OBJECTION to the courts prolonging of this inevitable procedure 
(see accompanying notice & objection) to quash the State 





I am prejudice by incarceration in the I .D. o. C. because 
I am denied access to maps necessary to prove discovery that 
the acts alleged within the crime alleged happened within the 
Indian reservation and are subject soley to Federal 
Jurisdiction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT: I request this court to adjust its 
calendar and schedule my case for the very next motions day 
that could be made available. Also order the State to Notice 
up the Hearing and Order Transport as I cannot do so. 
DONE this ? day of 7..d, I 2005. 
-CERTIFICATE OF MAILING-
I 4,,,~?P"~, do hereby certify deli very of this document 
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form 
mailing via U.S. Postal Service 1st class pre-paid this Z..-
EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS. 
BY ME, 
0000 "'1' ·, t 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
The following issues of fact and law are presented in 
favor of the Defendant/Movant obtaining not only 
expedited/emergency proceedings but, also towards obtaining 
relief via., I.C.R. 35, or 47. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 1 
0 0 0 O')~ 
-STATEMENT OF THE CASE-
A charge of murder in the first degree was filed by the 
Idaho County, Idaho, State prosecutor from the February 20, 
1982, shooting of an Indian on Indian Lands. 
The State prosecutor never obtained permission or waiver 
from the Nez Perce tribal authority at any time. 
in fact keeps this defendant from federal authorities. 
The State 
The State in fact keeps this defendant from federal 
authorities. 
The State commits reversible error when it charged, 
convicted, sentenced and then imposed an illegal sentence of 
an offense solely under exclusive federal jurisdiction via., 
the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT". 
On about the end of 2004 a paralegal friend asked the 
defendant if he knew whether or not his offense occurred inside 
an Indian reservation and hence under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. 
The defendant sought to obtain a map of the area, or 
any corroberative proof needed to show his illegal 
incarceration. The State prison perpetually forbids him from 
doing so, and hence precludes discovery. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 2 
0 p O 0·1 ·. U ' L 
I am now filing for relief from an illegal sentence and 
the court ommitts to act. I am claiming false imprisonment 
occurs once the State prosecution becomes aware of the taint 
and fails to act. Every day hence is an aggravating factor 
denying me a quick and speedy trial in the federal court thereby 
circumventing justice illegally. 
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
The offense I am tried and convicted of by the State 
court was done in fundamental error because the federal court . 
has exclusive jurisdiction of all "MAJOR CRIMES" committed 
in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho (Nez Perce) Indian Reservation 
lands, involving an Indian protectorate. 
SUPPORT accompanying here with] 
[See AFFIDAVIT IN 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF EXPEDITED PROCEEDINGS 
I µ.?~ ?'/~ do hereby plead my case 
[/egzejens/] requiring expedited proceedings. 
for 
11 State of being urgent or exigent; pressing 
need or demand; a case requires immediate 
attention, assistance, or remedy; critical 
period or condition, pressing necessity. 11 
[State v. Rubion, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 
650, 657] 
"a sudden an unexpected happening or an 
unforeseen; occurance or condition requires 
immediate remedy". [Los Angeles County 
v. Payne, 8 Cal.2d 563, 66 P.2d 658, 663) 
"Exigence" 
Exigent circumstances exist in this situation which 
demands unusual or immediate action. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 3 
RE: UNLAWFULNESS OF JUDGMENT & CONVICTION. 
1 . The conviction is against federal code via., the Indian 
Maj or Crimes Act" and I am wrongfully incarcerated as a result 
of said illegal incarceration. Such prejudice violates the 
State & Federal due process clauses [U.S. Amend. 5th & 14th 
& I.Const.Art.1§13] I have been denied my freedom based upon 
sham jurisdiction unlawfully. 
RE: MY QUICK & SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS: 
The presuption is that county officers contacted the 
Federal prosecutors and informed them that I violated Federal 
Law back in 1982. It is further presumed that tribal 
authorities never held a timely hearing nor waived jurisdiction. 
The right of this defendant/ accused to a speedy trial 
( or tribal review) is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of 
the constitution and such right is implemented by 18 u.s.c.A. 
§3161 et seq., and Fed.R.Crim.P. 50 In my case the State courts 
have interfered with that speedy trial right. 
The case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 s.ct. 2182, 
33 L.Ed.2d 101, lists four factors to be considered in 
determining whether delay was unreasonable: 
A. Lenght of Delay. Here it's been over twenty' yea:r;_~,t~_::, ____ _ 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 4 
00007[ 
B. Governments Justification for the Delay. Due to an illegal 
unconstitutional State court conviction, done absent authority 
to actl 
C. Prejudice Caused By The Delay. I at all times have plead 
innocent! Witnesses that would have testified in my favor 
might well be dead by now. 
find! 
Surely they' 11 be impossible to 
All due to lengthened pretrial incarceration! Call it 
investigatory state if you will. I am still being denied a 
quick & speedy federal court redress. 
RE: STATE COURT INFRINGEMENT ON THE 11 SPEEDY TRIAL ACT". 
In federal courts, the Federal Act of 1974 establishes 
a set of time limits for carrying out the major events (e.g. 
information, indictment, arraignment) in the prosecution of 
my federal criminal case. [18 u.s.c.A §3161 et seq.,] 
The precursers to filing pleadings charging me in this 
homicide are subject to the Federal Act of 1974. State court 
actions outside of state court jurisdiction are extra-judicial 
in nature. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 5 
Uu. oo· . ., t,. 1 .i ,._. 
RE: PRE-INDICTMENT INCARCERATION CREATES PREJUDICE. 
Such prejudice is not confined to merely an impairment 
the defense but includes any threat to what has been termed 
an accused's significant stakes, psychological, physical and 
financial, in the prompt termination of a proceeding which 
may ultimately deprive me of life, liberty or property. [See 
U.S. v. Dreyer, C.A.N.J., 533 F.2d 112, 115) 
Prejudice is presumed in cases of extended incarceration 
imposed prior to trial or a preliminary proceeding! I declare 
a conclusive presumption exists. [People v. Sellers, 3 Dept., 
109 A.D.2d 387, 492 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128.] 
A substantive rule of law exists where post arrest 
incarceration extends beyond two decades, without a proper 
(Federal) charge being leveled! 
I am prejudice in my ability to proceed and defend. 
STATE COURTS KNOWINGLY PROCEED ABSENT 
JURISDICTION, EVEN AFTER NOTICED 
I told the trial court of the error on _-_-04, within 
my rule 35 application (for an illegal sentence). That court 
and County prosecutor continue to error by ommiting to act. 
Since my present sentence provides for a life term until 
the day I die! I hereby declare: 
The State conviction of an offense subject to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction via., the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT". 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 6 
OUUO~G 
' . 
The perpetual life term now in place is cruel and unusual 
punishment. It must be void. 
CONCLUSION 
I am prejudiced by the inordinate delay of federal court 
process. Such prejudice is presumed as a matter of law. 
Therefore, my circumstances require expedited proceedings and 
the State really must vacate my judgment. 
DONE this ;;' day of February, 2005. 
DEFENDANT/MOVANT 
-CERTIFICATE OF MAILING-
I #~~do hereby certify delivery of this document 
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form 
mailing via U.S. Postal Service 1st class pre-paid this £-. 
~,r _P.$' date. 
BY ME, 
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STATE OF IDAHO 




I/4:t;zL,«~~am the affiant herein whom swears that 
the following information is true and correct to the · bes:!: of 
my knowledge & understanding, under penalty of purj ery, as 
follows; 
1/. THAT my full name is h.~£, and I am the 
defendant/movant/affiant herein captioned. 
2/. THAT on about February 20, 1982, I was arrested for a 
homicide offense culminating at the property of the Silver 
Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho, which I'm alleging 
is on Indian Tribal Lands. 




3/. THAT the State of Idaho did wrongfully proceed against 
me to trial, conviction & sentenced me for a fixed life without 
parole in the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC hereafter). 
4/. THAT trial & appellate counsel never told me that a 
homicide committed on the reservation is under exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal government via., the "Indian Maj or 
Crimes Act". 
5 I. THAT trial counsel never moved to dismiss the charge for 
lack of jurisdiction because they suffered from a relevant 
mis-understanding of the law/fact. 
6 I. THAT after sentence imposed I have been held in custody 
of the IDOC out of State and in State under contract with a 
private company. 
7 I. THAT I cannot get my hands on maps to show that Stites 
Idaho is on the reservation (a necessary precurser to preclude 
State jurisdiction). The IDOC simply prohibits access to maps 
period. 
8/. THAT I require counsel be appointed for the sole purpose 
of discovery of such maps establishing boundaries of the 
reservation. 
9/. THAT I also seek judicial notice of the following facts. 
A. The alleged offense of 2-20-82, involved an Indian 
(alleged victim); & 
B. It allegedly happened on reservation lands; & 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT. 2 
oouo:;: 
C. It was subject to the exclusive federal court 
jurisdiction via., "Indian Major Crimes Act". 
D. That the State court judgment & conviction are 
therefore extra judicial & must be vacated! 
E. That I fall under a discovery exception negating 
any limitations in the bringing of this matter now! 
1 0 /. THAT the court must EXPEDITE the proceedings and take 
an EMERGENCY hearing as soon as is possible in order to preclude 
further prejudice to the defendants ability to proceed to 
federal trial and defend. 
2005. 
2005. 
FURTHER SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this ..£_ day of February, 
DEFENDANT/MOVANT/ 




State Of Idaho 
~~.~~~~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING-
' do hereby certify delivery of this document 
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form 
mailing via U.S. Postal Service 1st class pre-paid this 
date. 
BY ME, __________ _ 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT. 3 
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BY. ::s:B OROFINO, IDAHO 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 















CASE NO. CR 18290 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
Facts 
Jn 1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold 
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe. See, Appendix 
1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August 5, 1982 to a fixed term oflife 
imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in 
November 1984. 
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief fro1n an 
Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction 
was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
murder of an Indian within the boun,daries of the reservation. In an order signed 
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. I did not reach the 
merits of:Mr. Wolfe's claim at that time. 
000085 
On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On 
F ebrua:ry 11 1 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an 
accompanying affidavit and memorandum. 
Contentions 
Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member 
of the Nez Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of 
the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for 
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, grants the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense. 
Discussion 
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 
18 USC§ 1151. 
Jurisdiction in fudian Country depends on the nature of the offense and status of 
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian 
coontry is vested in the state courts, which is known as the McBratney Rule. United 
States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez 
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians in 
Indian Countzy is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents. 
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in 
Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general 
rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes 
UU0086 
over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson 
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9th Cir. 1980). The acts .read as follows: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United 
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Col'Umbia1 shall 
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed 
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local 
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes 
respectively. 
The Supreme Court described the Act as a '"carefully limited intrusion of federal 
power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for 
crimes committed on fudian land." United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22. 
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps in Indian 
territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a 
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327 
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime 
committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country). 
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the 
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). Public Law 280 
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over fudians and Indian CoUJltry in six states and 
granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian 
o·u" 0 n r.1 'lr 
.. V.,;' 
affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the 
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent 
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321. 
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming 
limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country. 
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning 
certain matters arising in Indian country. 
The state ofldaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page 
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and 
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following 
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian 
country is defined by title 181 United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds 
this state to the assumption thereof: 
A. Compulsory school attendance 
B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation 
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children 
D. Insanities and mental illness 
E. Public assistance 
F. Domestic relations 
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads 
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. 
I.C. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in 
particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999), 
n u!· f'! 0 () ". -u u 0~ 
the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state 
court search warrant on the reservation were proper in a murder case where both the 
defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in 
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of 
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the 
execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at 
311. 
There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian 
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal 
law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress." 
United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637 
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some 
states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or 
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized in 
IC.§ 67~5101. Murder is not included. 
Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict h:im of 
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Settjng aside a conviction for first-degree 
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a :result I want this 
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am going to 
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue. 
I I : 
0 ·Or (' /' ''1 i' UJ0~ 
Order 
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within 
forty-five ( 45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has 
jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim, 
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe 
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow. 
It is so Ordered this 7- day of May, 2005. 
! I 
"'CJVVf 
CERTJFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM: AND 
DECISION was mailed, postage prepaid, this[ Oi h day of May, 2005, to the following: 
William Wolfe 
furnate # 18593 
ICCH211B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Kirk MacGregor 
Idaho County Prosecutor, 
Delivered to tray 
Daren Fales 
Public Defender, 
Delivered to tray 
Nez Perce Tribe 
Office of Legal Counsel 
P.O.Box305 
Lapwai, ID 83540-0305 
Clerk of the District Court 
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PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
416W.MAIN 
POB0X463 
GRANGEVILLE, ID 83530 
PHONE: (208) 983-0166 
FAX: (208) 983-39 1 9 
KIRKA. MACGREGOR· PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DENNIS ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
o COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
FILED (') 
AT id :qj O'CLOCK__s:::,M. 
MAY 11 2005 
ROSE E. GEHRING ~CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
~::tk (5~'"\CT:'O'n DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CR 18290 
) 
) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 




STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Kirk A. MacGregor, the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney and petitions the 
court, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-2603(a), for the appointment of a special prosecutor to 
prosecute the above-entitled and numbered matter. 
A Memorandum Decision and Order regarding a Post Conviction Relief filed by WILLIAM 
WOLFE has been forwarded to the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Upon review of the 
same, the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney believes there is a conflict of interest in its prosecution 
of this case due to the Idaho County Prosecutor being a member in the firm ofW. C. MacGregor, Jr. 
who has represented the Petitioner in a prior post conviction case and, therefore, has confidential 
information on the said Petitioner which was gathered during his representation of the said William 
Wolfe. 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 































The Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney requests that the Court appoint a special prosecutor 
within Idaho County to prosecute this matter and make all prosecutorial decisions regarding this case. 
DATED this / / day of May, 2005. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A. MacGREGOR, ISB #3880 
I aho County Prosecuting Attorney 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true 
and correct c.opy of the foregoing document 
was served upon the following pers7(s) in the 
manner indicated below on the /, day 
of May, 2005: 
Daren W. Fales 
204 West North 2nd 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered _x_ Courthouse Tray 
Via Facsimile 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
28 OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR - 2 
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CASE NO. CR 18290 
.lVIEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
Facts 
Jn.1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold 
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe. See, Appendix 
1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August 5, 1982 to a fixed term oflife 
imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in 
November 1984. 
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an 
Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction 
was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
murder of an Indian within the boundaries of the reservation. In an order signed · 
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the m.otion as untimely. I did not reach tlle 
merits ofMr. Wolfe's olaim at that time. 
UU0095 
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On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On 
February 11, 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an 
accompanying affidavit and memorandum. 
Contentions 
Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member 
of the Nez Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of 
the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for 
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, grants the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense. 
Discussion 
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation.'' 
1s use § 11s1. 
Jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on the nature of th.e offense and status of 
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian 
country is vested in the state courts, which is knoVV'.Il as the McBratney RuJe. United 
States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez 
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians in 
Indian Country is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents. 
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in 
Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general 
rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes 
OUUU9c 
lf!d UUJ 
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over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson 
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9th Cir. 1980). The acts read as follows: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United 
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall 
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed 
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local 
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes 
respectively. 
The Supreme Court described the Act as a "carefully limited intrusion of federal 
power in.to the otheiwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish fudians for 
crimes committed on Indian land.", United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22. 
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps :in Indian 
territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a 
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327 
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime 
committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country). 
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the 
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 {1953). Public Law 280 
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Country in six states and 
granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian 
/' 
affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the 
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent 
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321. 
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming 
limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country. 
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning 
certain matters arising in Indian country. 
The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page 
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and 
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following 
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian 
country is de.tined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds 
this state to the assumption thereof; 
A. Compulsory school attendance 
B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation 
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children 
D. Insanities and mental illness 
E. Public assistance 
F. Domestic relations 
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads 
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. 
r.c. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in 
particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999), 
/ --
the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state 
court search warrant on tb.e reservation were proper in a murder case where both the 
defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in 
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of 
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the 
execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at 
311. 
There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian 
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction llllder § 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal 
law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress." 
United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637 
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some 
states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or 
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized jn 
LC.§ 67~5101. Murder is not included. 
Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict him of 
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Setting aside a conviction for first-degree 
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a result I want this 
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am going to 
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue. 
Order 
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within 
forty-five ( 45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has 
jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim, 
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe 
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow. 
It is so Ordered this 7- day of May, 2005. 
U1iu1. 0 .. r: u ' ,, - i, 
141007 
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0 COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
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MAY 12 2005 
ROSE E. GEHRING 
~Lf~KOF~;coUITT 
0_p '!-L(Y ~nc@loEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
WILLIAM WOLFE, ) 
) Case No. CR 18290 
Petioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
) OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
The Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney's Office has, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-
19 2603, (a) filed a petition seeking appointment of a special prosecutor to continue the prosecution 
20 of the above-entitled and numbered matter and related matters. 
21 Upon considering the petition: 
22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Jeff Payne, be appointed as Special Prosecutor in the 
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By: 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
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WILLIAM F. WOLFE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











CASE: NO. CV 05-36455 
ORDER 
Petitioner William Wolfe p~~titions and supporting documents seeking relief from 
his conviction for first degree murder should have bean filed separately as a civil case 
for rellaf und~r Rule 35 or for post eonviction relief as the fapts and law warrant. Copies 
of those pf eadings shall be fiied in Case No. 18290 and the original pleadings .shall he 
filed in the clvll case. 
Jeff Payne is appointed as special prosecutor and Daren Pales is appointed as 
public defender in the civil case. 
It is so ordered this ~1 _ day of May 2005 
ORDER - l 
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POBOX463 
41 6 WEST MAIN 
GRANGEVILLE, ID 83530 
PHONE: (208) 983-01 66 
FAX: (208) 983-391 9 
KIRK A. MACGREGOR • PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DENNIS L. ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) C o [} <" ..... ~, --. 
) Case No. Q\ J-.)· =1ad-=S t_: 
' --
Plaintiff, ) 




WILLI.AM: DANIEL RITTEL, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this ·/c;.t... day of~005, Idaho County 
Prosecuting Attorney, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, who being duly sworn, on oath, complains arid says: 
On or about December 18, 2005, in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, the crime of 
V..A 'YHEM, a felony; was comJ.nitted by the above-na.i."l'led defendant, as follows: 
That the Defendant, on or about the 18th day of December, 2005, in Stites, County o~ 
21 Idaho, State ofidaho, did unlawfully and maliciously bite off a portion of the ear of 
JARROD CARTER, a human being, permanently disfiguring the said JARROD 
22 CARTER, a felony in violation- of Idaho Code Section 18-5001. 
23 contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute. in such case made and provided, and against the 
24 peace and dignity of the State ofldaho, and this Complainant, upon oath, accuses the said defendant 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of December, 2005. 
JUDGE /;f-
/ 
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(406j 338-7524 
! hereby certify that the following named individual is listed on the officia! records of this ofiice: 
GOLD. SCOTT RICHARD 
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Docket Text 
INDICTMENT (Notice sent to USP & USM) as to William D Rittel (1) 
count(s) 1. (Attachments:# l Cover Sheet# 'J_ Foreperson's signature) Ga,) 
(Entered: 07/20/2006) 
*SEALED* Arrest Warrant Issued in case as to William D Rittel. (Notice 
sent to USM) Ga, ) 
MOTION to Quash WARRANT AND ISSUE SUMMONS by USA as to 
William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
ORDER granting J_ Motion to Quash warrant and to issue summons (Notice 
sent to USM) as to William D Rittel (1). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on 
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, ) 
Summons Issued in case as to William D Rittel Arraignment/Initial 
Appearance set for 8/14/2006 03:30 PM in Moscow, ID before Honorable 
Larry M. Boyle. ( dks, ) 
Arrest Warrant Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel. (wm,) 
(Entered: 08/09/2006) 
8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
08/14/2006 Q7 Minute Entry for proceeding$ held before Judge Larry M. Boyle 
:Arraignment as to William D Rittel (1) Count 1 held on 8/14/2006 Plea 
entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM), Initial Appearance held on 
8/14/2006 Plea entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM) Jury Trial 
set for 10/10/2006 09:30 AM in Coeur d Alene, ID before Honorable 
Edward J. Lodge. (Court Reporter Nar1cy Persinger.) (le,) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 (lg CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by William D Rittel (elks,) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 (;)9 PROCEDURAL ORDER as to William D Rittel . Signed by Judge Larry M. 
Boyle. ( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses 
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks,) (Entered: 
08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 ~10 ORDER Setting Conditions of Release as to William D Rittel (1) PR (Notice -
sent to USP & USM) . Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. ( caused to be 
mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of 
Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006) 
08/14/2006 (Court only) Terminate Deadlines and Hearings as to William D Rittel: arr 
held 8/14/06 Ga) (Entered: 08/16/2006) 
08/14/2006 (Court only) ***Procedural Interval start P2 8/14/06 as to William D Rittel 
Ga, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006) 
08/16/2006 @11 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S -
DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/16/2006 @12 MOTION for Discovery GOVERNMENT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST by 
USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/16/2006 @13 Summons Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel (Notice sent -
to USP) Ga) 
08/17/2006 @14 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S -
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/21/2006 @15 MOTION CJA Appointment by William D Rittel. (Moran, Kathleen) -
08/21/2006 @16 ORDER granting 11_ Motion for CJA Counsel as to \Villiam D Rittel (1). -
CJA Attorney James Siebe substituted for Kathleen Moran. Signed by Judge 
Edward J. Lodge. ( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the 
addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by j a, ) ( emailed to 
J. Siebe by ja). 
08/24/2006. Q17 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
08/30/2006 @18 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Siebe, James) 
08/31/2006 Q19 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
f7 OUOllZ 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
nu1n1:;nnnic:; C}")() MOTION in Limine by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James) V//VV/,t...,VVV 'IVL..,V -
09/11/2006 Q21 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) -
09/11/2006 @22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial Setting by William D Rittel. (Siebe, -
James) 
09/11/2006 Q23 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) -
09/11/2006 Q24 MOTION in Lirnine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) -
09/11/2006 <J25 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua) -
09/13/2006 Q26 MEMORANDUM in Opposition by William D Rittel re 24 MOTION in -
Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine (Siebe, James) 
09/14/2006 Q27 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Motion for Vacation and Continuance of Trial -
Setting by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial 
Setting (Siebe, James) 
09/15/2006 Q2s Sealed Document (Attachments:# l # ~ # l # 1)(Siebe, James) 
09/15/2006 Q CORRECTIVE ENTRY -The entry docket number 27 Notice (Other) filed 
by William D Rittel, was filed using the incorrect docket event. The filing 
party shall re-submit their filing using "Withdrawal of Motion" located 
under Other Documents. Ga,) 
09/15/2006 Q29 WITHDRAW AL of Motion by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate -
and Continue Trial Setting filed by William D Rittel, (Siebe, James) 
09/18/2006 Q30 EX PARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 28 Sealed Document (Notice -
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga,) 
09/18/2006 (Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: subpoenas issued & 
given to USMS as per Court's Order dkt #30 Ga,) 
09/18/2006 (Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: mailed ex parte order 
dkt #30 to Jame$ Siebe Ga, ) 
09/19/2006 Q31 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S -
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
09/20/2006 Q32 REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 24 -
MOTION in Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine 
(Taylor, Joshua) 
09/21/2006 Q33 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James) 
09/22/2006 Q34 EXP ARTE ORDER (SEALED) as to William D Rittel re 33 Sealed 
Document (Notice sent to USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. 
09/22/2006 (Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: issued subpoena and 
gave to USMS for service (SEALED) Ga,) 
09/25/2006 Q35 TRIAL BRIEF by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) -
1f7 UUUll3 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
______ ..,...,. ,...,,._.,,..,v ~-,..1-'..J_v-1 
no I"! i:: r, nnt:: ~36 RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 20 MOTION in V//.t.......JJL.rVVV -
Limine (Taylor, Joshua) 
09/29/2006 Q37 Docket Entry NOTICE OF HEARING as to William D Rittel (Notice sent to 
USP & USM) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the TIME for the Jury Trial set 
for Tuesday, October 10, 2006 in Coeur d Alene, Idaho before the Honorable 
Edward J. Lodge, HAS BEEN CHANGED from 9:30 am to 1 :30pm. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on 
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cv,) 
10/02/2006 038 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S -
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/03/2006 039 Sealed Document (Attachments:# D(Siebe, James) -
10/03/2006 Q40 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Supplemental) (Siebe, -
James) 
10/03/2006 041 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) -
10/03/2006 042 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/03/2006 043 Proposed Voir Dire by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/03/2006 044 TRIAL BRJEF by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/03/2006 ()45 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/03/2006 Q46 EY..HIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/04/2006 Q47 EX PARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 39 Sealed Document (Notice -
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga) Modified 
on 10/4/2006 (ks): copy emailed to J. Siebe. 
10/04/2006 (.)43 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S -
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua) 
10/04/2006 (Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: Certified copy of Order 
#47 provided to USM; Subpoena provided to USM by J. Angelo (ks) 
10/04/2006 Q49 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) -
10/04/2006 050 Proposed V oir Dire by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) -
10/04/2006 Q51 Objection by William D Rittel to 43 Proposed Voir Dire filed by USA, -
(Siebe, James) 
10/04/2006 Q52 Objection by William D Rittel to 42 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by -
USA, (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 Q53 MOTION for Individual Voir Dire by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 Q54 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
10/05/2006 Q55 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James) 
10/06/2006 ·Q56 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) 
f7 UU011~ 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
10109/2006 @57 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/09/2006 (;}53 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/10/2006 Q59 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua) -
10/10/2006 @65 STIPULATION as to dft's Indian blood and place of offense by USA Glg,) 
~ - -""""'- (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 Q66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Pretrial -
Hearing as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006, granted 20 MOTION in 
Limine filed by Willian1 D Rittel, granted 53 MOTION for Individual Voir 
Dire filed by William D Rittel. Stipulation 65 put on the record. (Court 
Reporter Lisa Yant.) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 Q67 Sealed Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge -
:Voir Dire begun on 10/10/2006 William D Rittel (1) on Count 1, Jury 
Selection as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa 
Yant.) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/10/2006 Q68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial -
(Day 1) as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa 
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/11/2006 Q69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge: Jury -
Trial (Day 2) as to William D Rittel held on 10/11/2006 (Court Reporter 
Lisa Yant.) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 Q70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial -
(Day 3 - Final Day) as to William D Rittel held on 10/12/2006. Defendant 
found not guilty. (Court Reporter Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 ()71 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) -
10/12/2006 ()72 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 Q73 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) -
10/12/2006 Q74 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) -
10/12/2006 Q75 Jury Instructions as to William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) -
10/12/2006 Q76 JURY VERDICT as to William D Rittel (1) Not Guilty on Count I. (Notice -
sent to USP) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/12/2006 Q77 JUDGMENT of Acquittal as to William D Rittel (1), Count(s) 1, Not Guilty 
(Notice sent to USP and USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused 
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the 
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by jlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 Q60 Subpoena Returned Un-Executed, Service un-exexuted as to Bernie York 
Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 '361 Subpoena Returned Executed served Janie Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice -
sent to USM) G lg, ) {Entered: 10/16/2006) 
·7 000115 8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
1 A/1...., II"\/"\/"\/" @62 Subpoena Returned Executed served Colleen Baker on 10/4/2006. (Notice 1 V/ 1 :J/ LVVO -
sent to USM) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 063 Subpoena Returned Executed served Brian Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice -
sent to USM) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/13/2006 064 Subpoena Returned Executed served Mary Ann York on 10/4/2006. (Notice -
serit to USM) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006) 
10/23/2006 <l78 Subpoena Returned Executed served Missy Clark on 10/6/2006. (Notice sent -
to USM) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/25/2006) 
03/23/2007 Q79 CIA 20 as to William D Rittel: Appointment of Attorney James Edward -
Siebe for William D. Rittel. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. Qlg,) 
(Entered: 03/26/2007) 
UUU.i.lt 
8/3/2007 11 :40 AM 
Michael McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROVIN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 1510 
321 13th Street 
Lewistown, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
















CASE NO. CR 18290 
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL 
IDAHO JURISDICTIONAL 
ALLIANCE, AMICUS CURIAE, 
LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT 
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR 
The North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance (Alliance) submits this brief, 
amicus curiae, limited in scope, to address the reservation disestablishment issue in 
support of the position of the Idaho County Prosecutor. 
The Alliance is an unincorporated association; its members include 2 counties, 9 
cities, 3 school districts and 7 highway districts in north central Idaho, whose 
geographical boundaries include land which was within the Nez Perce Indian reservation 
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as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent (90%) owned and populated 
by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe. 
The purpose of the Alliance is to provide an organization to foster cooperation 
between its members and to focus their efforts toward obtaining a resolution of their 
jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional authority of the United States 
and the Nez Perce Tribe. 
The issue of the reservation status of the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation is 
important to the Alliance, the State of Idaho, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States. 
The Alliance supports the rationale and holding of the opinion of the District Court in the 
Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). In two Orders in that case, Presiding Judge 
Barry Wood made clear that the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished 
by a subsequent act of Congress. Order on Motion to Strike, Motion to Supplement the 
Record and Motions for Summary Judgment, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (5th Jud. Dist. 
County of Twin Falls) (Nov. 10, 1999); Order on United States' Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing, In re SRBA (No. 39576) 
(5 th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls) (Jan. 21, 2000). Further, the Alliance agrees with 
and also supports the reservation disestablishment argument set forth in the briefs of 
Respondent State ofidaho filed in that same case. 
II. 
A. In re SRBA 1s the most recent case to squarely address the Nez Perce 
Reservation status issue. In two separate Orders (in the context of addressing exclusive 
fishing and related water rights), Judge Wood details the support for his conclusion that 
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the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished by a subsequent act of 
Congress. 
Under the subheading entitled "South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux - The Subsequent 
Effect of the 1893 [cession] Agreement," Judge Wood describes the "unanimous" 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in State of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux 
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), which interpreted the "very same statute in which Congress 
approved the 1893 Agreement between the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe 
relating to the cession and sale of surplus tribal lands. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 
286." Order on United States' Motion at 41, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Jan. 21, 2000) 
(emphasis added). Judge Wood noted that the 1894 Act incorporated both "the 1892 
Agreement with the Yankton Sioux in its entirety and the 1893 Agreement with the Nez 
Perce in its entirety and, in accordance with both Agreements, Congress expressly 
appropriated the necessary funds to compensate the Tribes for the ceded lands, to satisfy 
the claims for scout pay, and to award the commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces." Order 
at 41. 
In the process, Judge Wood also stated that the United States Supreme Court in 
Yankton Sioux Tribe expressly noted that the 1894 Act which ratified the 1892 
Agreement between the United States and the Yankton Sioux, contained "'similar surplus 
land sale agreements between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribe'." 
Order at 43 (emphasis added). Judge Wood then reviewed the balance of the Supreme 
Court's Opinion in Yankton Sioux Tribe. In general terms, the Court found the analysis 
"compelling." Order at 48. 
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO 
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE, AMICUS 
CURIAE/ LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT 
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
- 3 -
UUUllS 
For a number of different reasons, Judge Wood declined to follow a previous 
federal district court decision in a District ofidaho case No. 98-80-N-ELJ (Jan. 12, 1999) 
in United States v. Webb. Judge Wood expressly noted that he disagreed substantively 
with the Webb opinion. Order on Motion to Strike at 47, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Nov. 
10, 1999). Judge Wood concluded that Webb ignored the "plain meaning of the statutory 
language and also the historical circumstances following the Treaty of 1855." For the 
convenience of the Court, the Order of Judge Wood dated November 10, 1999, is 
attached as Appendix A. 
B. Two weeks later, the United States moved the district court to alter or amend 
its judgment of November 10, 1999, regarding reservation status. In the alternative, the 
United States requested an opportunity to submit testimony, documentary evidence and 
legal authorities on the issue of reservation disestablishment. The motion of the United 
States was supported by a memorandum. The State of Idaho subsequently filed a written 
response in support of the conclusion of Judge Wood that the original 1863 Nez Perce 
Reservation was disestablished. On January 21, 2000, Judge Wood denied the motion of 
the United States. Order on United States' Motion, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Jan. 21, 
2000). This Order of Judge Wood is attached as Appendix B. 
In this twenty-nine (29) page Order, Judge Wood addressed and rejected all of the 
arguments of substance submitted by the United States. In the process, the Court 
repeatedly cited additional documentation to substantiate the validity of the original 
Order regarding reservation disestablishment. Moreover, the Court set forth a detailed 
analysis and express comparison of the Nez Perce Agreement with the "similar" cession 
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agreement recently construed in Yankton Sioux Tribe (that the United States Supreme 
Court held disestablished the original Yankton Reservation). In fifteen (15) pages, Judge 
Wood itemized ten (10) specific points in support of the conclusion that the Nez Perce 
Act and Y ank::ton Act were functional twins. The Alliance supports that conclusion. 
III. 
As background, the role of the United States in reservation status cases is 
deserving of special consideration in this case. 1 For that reason, the Brief of North 
Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of 
Idaho, filed in the Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA, that recounts, in summary 
fashion, the position of the United States in each of the reservation status cases decided 
by the United States Supreme Court is also appended to this Brief for the convenience of 
the Court. Appendix C. The points are documented with citations to the briefs of the 
United States and the transcripts of oral q.Igument in the United States Supreme Court. 
That review establishes, among other things, that the United States has repeatedly 
conceded, generally, the reservation disestablishment issue in this case. And there is 
nothing in the Nez Perce documentation to limit that general concession. In short, the 
Alliance submits that the arguments of the United States have been largely responsible 
for the conflict and confusion in this area of the law since 1962. 
The Brief of the Alliance in In re SRBA summarizes the history of the arguments 
of the United States, the history of the cases litigated and the history of the general 
1 References to the "United States" include only the Department of Justice and the Office 
of the Solicitor General in Washington, D.C., not the Offices of the United States' 
Attorneys in the individual States. 
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legislation enacted to achieve the result Congress intended. Appendix C. In this respect, 
the SRBA Alliance Brief is desirable and relevant to the disposition of this case because 
these issues are issues of the law not addressed in any other brief. The SRBA Alliance 
Brief also clearly establishes that since 1975 the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly rejected the arguments of the United States, with one exception. And the 
concession that the United States made in that case makes that exception meaningless 
with reference to the issue presented in the Nez Perce case. In other words, cessions 
disestablish Indian reservations. 
We should mention that some of the members in the Alliance have expended 
substantial time and resources on this issue of reservation status for a number of years, 
commencing in 1995. Counties and other units of local government have normally 
participated in reservation status litigation for decades. This issue is as important to the 
Alliance, as it is to the other governments participating in this litigation. In addition, the 
unusual manner in which this issue was addressed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
further supports the legitimacy of a motion to participate as amicus curiae in this case at 
the present time. It is significant that for all practical purposes, the Alliance has been 
effectively precluded by the United States from participating in the recent arguments 
regarding reservation status in the federal district court. 
To date, the role the United States has played in the Nez Perce reservation status 
litigation has been truly remarkable. For that reason, it is recounted here in summary 
fashion. 
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IV. 
A. In the beginning, the reservation status issue was presented in the federal 
district court in United States v. Scott, No. CR98-001-N-EJL (D. Idaho, May 27, 1998), 
without any notice to the State of Idaho or any of the Counties or any other local 
governmental unit within the area in dispute (except the Nez Perce Tribe).2 At that time, 
the United States told the district court that the United States Supreme Court in Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) had made an "incorrect assumption" regarding the 
significance of cession terminology. Mem. in Supp. of Resp. at 26-27, United States v. 
Scott, No. CR98-001-N-EJL (D. Idaho May 27, 1998). According to the United States, 
the 1863 Nez Perce reservation continues to exist. 
At the conclusion of the Scott hearing, the United States moved to seal the 
historical record and historical reports submitted by the United States in support of the 
1863 Nez Perce reservation. Petitioner Scott did not object. 
The federal district court granted the Motion of the United States to seal the 
historical record and the historical reports. The Scott opinion cited and relied on this 
documentation in holding that a former allotment (fee-land) was within the Nez Perce 
reservation. There was no appeal in Scott. 
B. In U.S. v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D. 
Idaho, Jan. 12, 1999), again without notice to the State or any of the local governments 
2 In the August, 1999 executive order on federalism, the President directed that "[w]hen 
an agency foresees the possibility of a conflict between State law and Federally protected 
interests within its area of regulatory responsibility, the agency shall consult, to the extent 
practicable, with appropriate State and local officials in an effort to avoid such conflict." 
Executive Order 13132 of August 4, 1999. 
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affected, the Nez Perce reservation issue was presented to the same district court. At the 
conclusion of the Webb hearing, the United States again moved to seal the historical 
record and the historical reports. And, again, Petitioner Webb did not object and the 
district comi granted the motion to seal the historical record and historical reports. 
Shortly thereafter, the district court adopted the arguments of the United States in the 
process of resurrecting the 1863 boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. 
Incredibly, following the argument of the United States, the Webb court described 
the analysis and holdings of the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) and State of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329 (1998) as "illogical." Webb, Memo Dec. at 7 (emphasis added). The 
United States obtained the "historical record" and the "reports" from the Nez Perce Tribe. 
With the exception of the lower courts in Yankton Sioux Tribe (over one dissent) (since 
reversed) no judge ever questioned the fundamental principles recognized in DeCoteau 
since 1975, when three justices initially dissented. Moreover, these principles were 
unanimously reiterated in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), repeatedly 
and unanimously concurred in and conceded in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) 
and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), and they have now been confirmed again by a 
unanimous Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe. In other words, until Webb, the only decisions 
that have held that sum certain cessions did not disestablish reservations have been 
quickly reversed. As a result, the district court in Webb could not cite even one decision 
to squarely support the argument the United States submitted, in any court, at any time. 
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After the decision of the district court in Webb, the United States adopted this 
course of action: 
1. The United States vigorously opposed every motion to unseal the historical 
record and the historical reports, both in the district court and in the court of appeals: 
The pivotal issue on appeal is the question of jurisdiction. The sealed 
exhibits and transcripts are sensitive materials that relate to the Nez Perce 
Tribe and their reservation, the very heart of the jurisdictional issue. By 
ordering the opening of these sealed documents, solely for the benefit of a 
non-party, this Court would cause a dramatic effect upon the status of the 
appeal. 
Government's Opposition to Mot. Filed July 29, 1999, at 3, United States v. Webb, No. 
CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho Aug. 20, 1999) (emphasis added). (The important 
background for the motions to unseal is set forth in the last motion to unseal, dated 
September 19, 2000, Motion ofNCIJA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Webb 
to Unseal Historical Exhibits and Transcripts for Review, US. v. Webb, No. CR 98-80-N-
EJL (D.Idaho Aug. 20, 1999) (No. 99-30155).) 
2. The United States also vigorously opposed all amicus participation including 
participation by the units of local governments directly affected by the decision. At one 
point the district court rejected the opposition of the United States, but the court of 
appeals did not. In a series of orders in the Webb case, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied every motion to unseal and every motion to participate amicus curiae. 
United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001). 
In the past, counties from other states have expressed concern over the "litigating 
position" of the United States in cases of this kind involving the resurrection of Indian 
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reservation boundaries. See also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993) 
("[g]ovemment' s litigating position"). 
Most recently, in Yankton Sioux Tribe, Charles Mix County, South Dakota, 
submitted briefs in the United States Supreme Court that summarize and track the 
conflicting reservation status arguments submitted by the United States in that Court 
since 1962 (arguments, for the most part, repeatedly rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court since 1975).3 
Significantly, in Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court granted certiorari without inviting 
the United States to submit its views, even though the United States had briefed and 
argued the case in the court of appeals as amicus curiae. On the merits, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the United States. The Alliance brief in In re 
SRBA highlights those arguments. 
The issue in Webb was congressional intent. At the very least, the United States 
should not have been allowed to seal the historical documents and historical reports 
submitted by the United States to courts in the process of resurrecting an Indian 
reservation long deemed disestablished. The district court and the court of appeals in 
3See Briefs of Charles Mix County, South Dakota, in Support of Petitioner, State of South 
Dakota, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581), May 
7, 1997, and August 7, 1997. The Brief of Cities, Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
State of South Dakota, Charles Mix County and Southern Missouri Waste Management 
District, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (No. 
99-1490), appends all of the briefs and oral arguments of the United States. The Cities 
brief also summarizes the shifting nature of the arguments submitted by the United States 
to date. The Alliance will file copies of these briefs with the Office of the Clerk. 
If the United States is requested to respond in this case, the perspective set forth in 
these briefs should be significant. The Alliance relied extensively on the same arguments 
in the SRBA Alliance brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court in, Appendix C. 
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Webb expressly relied on this documentation. The court of appeals never mentioned the 
fact that the historical records and reports relied upon in the decision were sealed and 
that a series of motions to unseal were denied. Significantly, both the result and the 
procedure in Scott and Webb are wholly unprecedented. This fact supports the motion of 
the Alliance to participate, amicus curiae, in the instant case. Moreover, the precedent 
value of Webb is undermined by the fact that the historical records and reports were 
wrongfully sealed and amicus participation was not allowed. 
C. In addition, on June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (Yankton JI). In this remand of Yankton Sioux Tribe, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the 1858 Yank.ton Sioux 
reservation had been similarly disestablished. 
The Ninth Circuit in Webb summarily rejected the Yankton II analysis in a 
footnote (one sentence). United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1134 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000). 
As a result, the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with this Yankton JI decision in 
the Eighth Circuit. See also Bruguier v. Class, 599 N.W.2d 364 (S.D. 1999), (where the 
Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota agreed with the analysis of the Eighth 
Circuit with reference to the non-reservation status of all fee lands ( and further concluded 
that the Yankton reservation had been effectively disestablished)). 
The Webb decision in the district court was decided prior to both of these cases. 
In fact, in Webb, the district court cited and relied upon the Yankton 11 opinion of the 
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federal district court in South Dakota, which was squarely reversed by the court of 
appeals in Yankton II, and rejected by the State Supreme Court in Bruguier. 
Moreover, although the Court of Appeals in US. v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1133-
1134 (9th Cir. 2000), ultimately affirmed the district court, it did expressly state that both 
Webb and the district court failed to make a "critical distinction" between "unallotted, 
surplus land ceded back to the government" - which were not directly at issue in Webb, 
and lands "allotted in severalty to the Nez Perce," - which were directly involved in 
Webb. In this respect, the holding of Webb is limited to "lands allotted in severalty to the 
Nez Perce." 
D. Although the United States consistently and successfully opposed all amicus 
curiae participation in Webb (a criminal case), the desirability of amicus curiae 
participation to support the disestablishment argument is highlighted by the wholly 
unprecedented nature of the Webb decision. In the entire history of this type of litigation, 
no court has ever been upheld when concluding that an Indian reservation, subject to a 
cession statute like this, remains intact. Nor has any court of appeals, other than the 
Webb panel, ever held that in this situation, the former allotted fee lands retain 
reservation status. See United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir. 1997). 
The only other federal district court and court of appeals decisions, all in the 
Eighth Circuit, that briefly supported the view adopted by the court of appeals in Webb, 
were immediately and squarely rejected by the United States Supreme Court. United 
States, ex rel. Feather V. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99 csth Cir. 1973), rev'd DeCoteau V. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 890 F.Supp. 
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878 (D.S.D. June 14, 1995), aff'd 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 329 
(1998). In both instances, amicus curiae support was substantial. 
E. When this issue was first presented in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho, the Hon. Edward J. Lodge, United States District Court Judge, granted 
the Alliance leave to appear as amicus curiae on the 17th of June, 1998, after the hearing, 
but before the decision. United States v. Scott, Order, Case No. CR98-01-N-EJL (June 
25, 1998). In Webb, the Alliance did not receive notice of the issue until after the issue 
was decided by the district court. Thereafter, all motions and briefs in the Ninth Circuit 
and in the United States Supreme Court were filed in a timely fashion. 
F. The Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA allowed all parties to the action to 
respond to the motion and brief of the Alliance in a timely fashion, pursuant to the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. The United States and the Nez Perce Tribe could not really claim to be 
surprised by the arguments in the Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, 
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of Idaho. The Alliance brief in In re 
SRBA simply summarized the legal arguments the United States has previously 
submitted, in briefs and in oral arguments, when similar issues of law regarding 
reservation status were presented to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, for the 
most part, every argument of substance in the SRBA Alliance brief was previously 
submitted in the amid curiae briefs in Scott and Webb, which were served on the United 
States and the Nez Perce Tribe at the time. 
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V. 
Lorraine Nightingale, former Lewis County Commissioner, also filed a motion 
and brief to participate as amicus curiae in support of Respondent State of Idaho in the 
Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA (No. 39576) (5th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls). 
in support of Respondent State of Idaho. The Alliance has also appended that brief for 
the convenience of the Court. Appendix D. Importantly, the Nightingale brief focuses 
on more specific concerns and approaches the question of reservation disestablishment 
from a different perspective. In this respect, the Nightingale brief supplements the efforts 
of the Alliance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reaffirm the conclusion of Judge Wood in In re SRBA that the 
original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation has been disestablished. 
Dated this 31st day of August, 2006. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 




(Nez Perce Tribe Instream Flow Claims) 
Case No. 39576 
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF DENNIS C. COLSON 
ORDER ON UNITED STATESD AND NEZ PERCE TRIBE OS JOINT MOTION 
TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTORS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT TRANSCRIPTION OF LETTER 
FROM GENERAL PALMER TO GEORGE MANYPENNY, COMMISSIONER 
OF INDIA.i'J AFFAIRS 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IDAHO POWER, POTLATCH CORPORATION, IRRIGATION 
DISTRICTS, AND OTHER OBJECTORS1 WHO HA VE JOINED AND/OR 
SUPPORTED THE VARIOUS MOTIONS 
There are a large number ofidaho cities (61), entities, and/or individuals who have joined and/or supported the · 
various motions for summary judgment and/or motions to strike. Because their individual identities are not relevant to 
these orders, they are not separately listed here. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 






Mr. Albert Barker, Esq., Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Boise, Idaho, for the Boise 
Kuna Irrigation District, Federal Claims Coalition, et al. 
Mr. Steven Strack, Esq., Boise, Idaho, Deputy Attorney General for the State ofldaho 
Mr. Michael Mirande, Esq., Miller Bateman LLP, Seattle, Washington, for the Ida]:io 
Power Company 
Mr. Peter Monson, Esq., Denver, Colorado, for the United States Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Mr. Steven Moore, Esq., Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colorado, for the Nez 
Perce Tribe 
Mr. Douglas B.L. Endreson, Esq., Sonosky Chambers Sachse & Endreson, Washington, 
D.C., for the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe 
n. 
MATTER DEEMED FULLY SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 
These motions for summary judgment were argued in open court on October 13, 1999, in 
Boise, Idaho. On October 15, 1999, the Court, by letter, informed counsel that it had requested a 
transcript of the hearing to aid the Court in writing this decision. The Court informed the parties 
that it had given the Reporter until November 3, 1999, to prepare the transcript. Therefore, this 
matter is deemed fully submitted for decision on the next business day, or November 4, 1999. 
Ill. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY 
OF DENNIS C. COLSON 
On September 7, 1999, a number of objectors filed a motion renewing their Motion to 
Strike the Testimony of Dennis C. Colson. The stated basis of the motion is: 
2 There are multiple counsel ofrecord representing the various parties in this consolidated subcase. Only those 
who actually argued the motions for summary judgment on October 13, 1999, are listed under the Appearances. 
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Colson does not qualify as an expert witness, and because the conclusions drawn in 
his testimony are legal, not historical, they are inadmissible under Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 702. 
The Court heard this motion on September 20, 1999. After the hearing, and by written 
order dated October 5, 1999, the Court announced that it was deferring its ruling on this motion 
until after the Court heard the oral arguments on summary judgment ( which were then scheduled 
to be heard October 13, 1999). The basis of the Court's action in this regard was that the Court 
needed to h~ar the oral arguments on summary judgment before it could determine whether the 
testimony of Mr. Colson was even legally relevant to the issues on summary judgment. If Mr. 
Colson's testimony was legally relevant, depending upon the Court's determination of the 
substantive issues on summary judgment, the Court would then rule on the issues raised in the 
motion to strike. 
Based upon the rulings which follow it is not necessary to rule on whether Professor. 
Colson's testimony and conclusions are admissible, and therefore, no further ruling under this 
motion is required. To be clear, this Court is not ruling one way or the other on whether 
Professor Colson qualifies as an expert or whether his conclusions are legal in nature and not 
historical. 
IV. 
ORDER ON UNITED STATESD AND NEZ PERCE TRIBEDS 
JOINT MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD IN RESPONSE 
TO THE OBJECTORSD MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
I.R.C.P. 56(t) 
On October 23, 1998, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe filed a joint motion 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) to supplement the record in response to the Objectors' motions for 
summary judgment. The motion was supported by a joint memorandum lodged October 23, 
1998. 
This motion was filed in response to Judge Hurlbutt's oral ruling on October 13, 1998 
(order entered October 15, 1998) to the effect that the Court granted a motion to strike Professor 
Colson's "first" affidavit. The motion to supplement seeks to add affidavits and/or documents to 
the record because Professor Colson's "first" affidavit was stricken, i.e. in place of Professor 
Colson's stricken affidavit. However, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe have now filed 
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Professor Colson's February 1999 expert report which is the subject of section III of this Order 
(Motion to Strike Testimony of Dennis C. Colson). The motion to supplement is in the 
alternative, in the event the Court strikes the "testimony" (February 1999 Report) of Professor 
Colson. See transcript of September 20, 1999, p. 88, 11. 14-24. 
Because this Court has not stricken the testimony of Professor Colson (his February 1999 
Report) as stated in paragraph III above, this alternative relief is denied. 
V. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE EXIDBIT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF LETTER FROM GENERAL PALMER TO 
GEORGE MANYPENNY, COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 
On August 31, 1999, Mr. Peter Monson, on behalf of the United States, filed with this 
Court a First Supplemental Declaration. Attached to this Declaration are three documents: 
(1) letter from James Doty to Isaac Stevens, dated March 26, 1855 (Exhibit 21); (2) a letter from 
General Joel Palmer, Superintendent of the Oregon Territory, to George Manypenny, 
Commissioner ofindian Affairs, dated April 13, 1855 (Exhibit 22); and (3) a transcript ofletter 
from Palmer to Manypenny (also marked as Exhibit 22). 
On September 10, 1999, Mr. Albert Barker, on behalf of the Objectors, comprising the 
Federal Claims Coalition and Idaho Power, filed a Motion to Strike the exhibit transcription 
(item 3 of the First Supplemental Declaration) of the letter from Palmer to Manypenny. 
The stated basis of the motion is that the transcription of the letter is not properly' 
authenticated under I.RE. 901 and is not self-authenticating under I.R.E. 902 and, therefore, 
moves that it be stricken from the record. 
Based upon this Court's ruling on the dispositive summary judgment motions as 
hereinafter stated, no ruling on this motion to strike is necessary. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
G:\ERIC\NEZ PERCE\SUMJUDG l lil 0/99 




THE ISSUES STATED IN THE MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE RESPONSES THERETO 
IDAHO POWER COMPANY (Hereinafter "IPCo") 
IPCo states this motion presents six issues: 
(1) Whether the geographic scope of the "exclusive" "on-reservation" fishing 
right reserved in the Treaty With The Nez Perce of 1855 was reduced 
commensurately with the reduction of the Tribe's reservation under the Treaty With 
The Nez Perce of 1863 and the Agreement With The Nez Perce of 1893, and if so, 
whether the "off-reservation "in common" fishing right contained in the Treaty of 
1855 is therefore the sole basis upon which the Tribe can seek in-stream flows on the 
main stem of the Snake River? 
(2) Vlhether the Tribe's right, set forth in the Treaty of 1855, to fish "in 
common" with non-treaty fishers at usual and accustomed fishing places off the 
reservation can serve successfully as the basis for the Tribe's claims for in-stream 
fisheries-flows in the Snake River? 
(3) Whether, on the basis of the legal determinations and final judgment in 
Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) 
("Idaho Power"), the Tribe and the United States should be estopped from pursuing 
their fisheries flow claims predicated on the Tribe's off-reservation treaty fishing right? 
( 4) Alternatively, whether the Tribe's 1863 and 1893 land cessions resulted 
in the cession of all water rights -- including any flow rights -- appurtenant to the 
ceded lands? 
(5) Whether recognition of the Tribe's in-stream fisheries-flows predicated 
on the off-reservation fishing right would violate the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
(6) Whether the course of the Nez Perce Tribe's legal interaction with IPCo, 
which includes the lengthy pursuit and settlement in 1980 of proceedings before the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as the ultimate resolution of Nez 
Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994), forecloses 
in whole or in part the Tribe's in-stream flow claims as against IPCo? 
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In perhaps an abundance of caution, IPCo and the objectors state at the outset 
that the foregoing issues do not embrace the question of the mutual intent of the 
parties to the 1855 Treaty regarding the Tribe's on-reservation fishing right. For 
purposes of this motion -- and solely for purposes of this motion -- we will assume 
for the sake of argument that the Tribe's original, exclusive, treaty right to fish on its 
reservation could have included a reserved fisheries flow right appurtenant to its 
reservation lands. The focus, rather, is upon the implications of subsequent actions 
for whatever rights the Tribe may have possessed under the Treaty of 1855. 
IP Co Brief at 4 and 5. 
POTLATCH CORPORATION (Hereinafter "Potlatch") 
In Potlatch's Opening Brief in Support of Summary Judgment, it states: 
The pending motion raises essentially one question: Did the Nez Perce Tribe and the 
United States, in entering the 1855 Treaty [footnote 1 cited], the 1863 Treaty 
[footnote 2 cited], and the 1893 Agreement [footnote 3 cited] (collectively, the ''Nez 
Perce Treaties"), intend that the express recognition of tribal fishing rights would, by 
implication, reserve to the Tribe preemptive federal water rights for virtually the entire 
flow of the Snake River? 
Footnote 1 provides: 
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (ratified 
Mar. 8, 1859). 
Footnote 2 provides: 
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 (ratified 
Apr. 17, 1867). 
Footnote 3 provides: 
Agreement with the Nez Perce, May 1, 1893, 28 Stat. 326 (ratified 
Aug. 15, 1894). This agreement is not labeled a "treaty," because in 
1871 Congress forbade further treaties with Indian tribes. Act of 
Mar. 31, 1871, 16 Stat. 566, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71. Thereafter, 
all dealings with tribes were in the form of agreements approved by 
Congress and the Executive in the form of statutes. 
Potlatch Brief at 6 and 7. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
states: 
In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the State of Idaho 
The issue presented is whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, the 
United States and Nez Perce Tribe are entitled to instream flow water rights, for the 
purposes stated on the face of their claims, when the claimed water rights are for 
streams that are not appurtenant to lands currently reserved by the United States for 
the exclusive use of the Nez Perce Tribe or its members. The larger issue 
incorporates the following sub-issues: 
1. Whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, federal reserved 
instream flows are implied by the provisions of the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty securing 
the right of tribal members to fish at usual and accustomed places outside the Nez 
Perce Reservation. 
2. Whether the United States otherwise intended to reserve instream flows for the 
benefit of the Nez Perce Tribe on lands outside the Reservation established in the 
1855 Treaty. 
3. Whether the lands ceded in the 1863 Treaty and 1893 Agreement ceased to be 
part of the Nez Perce Reservation, and if so, whether the fishing rights applicable to 
the ceded lands are derived from the exclusive on-reservation right provided in Article 
3 of the 1855 Treaty, or the non-exclusive, in-common right to fish at usual and 
accustomed fishing places provided in Article 3 of the 1855 Treaty. 
4. Whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, federal reserved 
instream flows are implied by the fishing rights secured to the Nez Perce Tribe for 
exercise on lands ceded in the 1863 Nez Perce Treaty and the 1893 Nez Perce 
Agreement. 
5. \Vhether the United States otherwise intended to reserve instream flows for 
the benefit of the Nez Perce Tribe on lands ceded in the 1863 Nez Perce Treaty and 
the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement. 
6. Whether under federal law and policy the United States may impliedly reserve 
water for instream flows when such water is not appurtenant to a reservation of land. 
Memorandum of the State ofldaho at 7. 
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A coalition oflrrigation Districts filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 2, 1998, 
in which they listed six (6) issues. Subsequently, on July 20, 1998, they filed a Notice of Partial 
Withdrawal of Motion and withdrew (without waiving their rights) issues 4 and 5. The Irrigation 
Districts then filed a Joint Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment with IPCo. 
Then on October 19, 1998, the Irrigation Districts filed their own Reply Brief in which they state: 
Idaho Power and Objectors' motion for summary judgment is directed only at the 
United States' and Tribe's claims for water rights outside the Tribe's present 
Reservation (off-reservation claims) [footnote 2 cited]. It is undisputed that these off-
reservation claims are claims to an environmental condition which the Tribe's current 
experts assert is necessary to "guarantee" to restore a "sustainable" fish harvest 
population. As they have described their own claims, under oath: 
The instream flow claims are ecosystem based and are focused on 
protecting and in some cases restoring habitats necessary for the long 
term propagation of fish populations. . . . These claims seek to 
guarantee available habitats of suitable quantity and quality to allow 
for the production and restoration of sustainable fish populations .... 
The amount of habitat that would be provided by the Tribe's instream 
flow claims is the amount necessary to provide the full range of 
natural variability and diversity of habitat conditions around which the 
subject species has evolved. A lesser amount of habitat would not 
provide that full range and would not fulfill the Treaty fishing rights. 
Tribe's Supplemental Responses to Idaho's Second Discovery Requests (Tucker Aff. 
Ex. 1). 
The inevitable conclusion of their position is that the United States and the Tribe have 
an ever-changing, implied water right to require the elimination of any dam, structure, 
condition or development of any kind (including agriculture and timber sales) off the 
reservation which would affect the "guarantee" of necessary habitat conditions and 
viability of every species offish, bird, mammal, plant or insect which the Tribe deems 
important. 
The issue before this Court in this motion is whether such "ecosystem-based" or 
habitat-driven water rights were legally reserved to the Tribe over 140 years ago as 
part of an off-reservation :fishing right which the Tribe held "in common" with the 
citizens of the Territories. The law is clear. The Tribe has no such off-reservation 
implied reserved water right [footnote 3 cited]. 
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Footnote 2 provides: 
The State and Potlatch motions are broader than those filed by Idaho 
Power and these objectors. Much of the factual record relied on by 
the Tribe and United States admittedly is directed to those other 
motions. Whatever factual issues might exist in those motions cannot 
be allowed to distract this Court from dealing with the more narrowly 
drawn issues in this motion. 
Footnote 3 provides: 
Objectors offer no opinion on whether on-reservation exclusive fishing 
rights are sufficient to impliedly reserve a water right. Merely for the 
purposes of this motion, Objectors will assume such a reservation is 
possible. 
Irrigation District's Reply Brief at 2 and 3 (emphasis theirs). 
UNITED STATES AND THE NEZ PERCE TRIBE 
In their Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
lodged September 18, 1998, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe state the following issues: 
1. Does Article 3 of the Nez Perce Treaty ofJune 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957, 2 Kappler 
702, (hereinafter referred to as the "1855 Treaty") [footnote omitted]contain a 
reservation by the Tribe of "[t]he exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where 
running through or bordering said reservation * * * as also the right of taking fish at 
all usual and accustomed places in common with citizens of the Territory" and is 
fishing the purpose of that reservation? 
2. Did the Tribe's reservation of the fishing right in the 1855 Treaty impliedly reserve 
a water right for instream flows? In other words, is it necessary that some quantity 
of water be left in the stream in order to fulfill the fishing purpose of the treaty 
reserved fishing right, such that without any water in the streams, the purpose of the 
fishing reservation would be "entirely defeated?" 
3. Has the reservation of a fishing right in the 1855 Treaty been abrogated, in 
whole or in part, by any subsequent treaty, agreement, or statute? 
Joint Memorandum at 6. 
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SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 
The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes lodged a Brief in Response to Summary Judgment on 
September 18, 1998. This brief does not specifically delineate the "issues" before the Court on 
summary judgment, at least not in the format set out in the briefs noted heretofore. The opening 
paragraph of the brief states: 
The present summary judgment motions involve only the rights of the United States 
and Nez Perce Tribe to instream flows for Nez Perce off-reservation treaty fishing 
rights. While they do not directly involve such rights for the Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (hereafter "Shoshone-Bannock"),' we set forth in 
this brief our response to these motions because their disposition may constitute 
precedent for resolution of similar Shoshone-Bannock rights. 
Footnote 1 indicates: 
The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are involved in this subcase as 
objectors to a portion of the rights asserted by the Nez Perce Tribe 
but have not objected to the majority of the claims. 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe Brief at 1. 
In their brief, the Shoshone-Bannock list and discuss the five (5) following assertions. 
1. Every case to consider the question has concluded that treaty fishing rights do 
imply a reserved water right to instream flows to protect the fishery. 
2. The cases relied upon by the State and other proponents of summary judgment 
do not justify denying the Nez Perce Tribe any right at all to instream flows. 
3. The preservation of off-reservation fisheries is a "primary" purpose of treaties 
with Idaho tribes. 
4. Tribes can have reserved water rights to instream flows for fishing sites 
outside reservations they do not "own." 
5. The Tribes and the State share the water and fisheries as "quasi-cotenants" and 
state action to divert the instream flow would constitute enjoinable waste. 
Shoshone-Bannock Brief, Table of Contents at v. 
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VII. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 
56 (c); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). All controverted facts 
are liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 
37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). The burden at all times is upon the moving party to prove the absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Company, 92 Idaho 865, 
452 P.2d 362 (1969). The moving party's case must be anchored on something more than 
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. R. G. Nelson, 
A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). All doubts are to be resolved against the 
moving party, and the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences 
may be drawn therefrom and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Doe v. 
Durtschi, 101 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). The court is authorized to enter summary 
judgment in favor ofnonmoving parties. Barlow's Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 
310,647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Justice McDevitt in Harris v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 
(1993), stated the standard ofreview for summary judgment this way: 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is to 
be "rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A strong line of cases weaves a tight web of authority that strictly defines and. 
preserves the standards of summary judgment. The reviewing court must liberally 
construe disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. If the record contains any 
conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, 
summary judgment must be denied. Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary 
judgement, the opposing party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
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The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the 
moving party. This burden is onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can 
create a genuine issue of material fact. However, the Court will consider only that 
material contained in affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal 
knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. Summary judgment is properly 
issued when the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's cases. 
Id. at 297-98, 847 P.2d at 1158-59 (citations omitted). 
For water rights based on federnl law, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources abstracts the claim. The abstract does not constitute prima facie evidence of the water 
right. The claimant of a water right based on federal law has the ultimate burden of persuasion on 
each element of the water right. LC.§ 42-1411A(12). 
VIII. 
SCOPE OF THESE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS 
The scope of this Court's ruling on these summary judgment proceedings is strictly limited 
to off-reservation instream water right claims for the Nez Perce Tribe or for the United States 
as trustee for the Tribe. 
This Court's ruling on these summary judgment proceedings does not involve on-
reservation water rights of any kind, nature, or description. 
"Reservation" in this context means the present boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. 
In this regard, and as the Court clarified with the parties at the oral arguments on summary 
judgment on October 13, 1999, these water right claims come before this Court as "Consolidated 
Subcase No. 03-10022." See Second Amended Case Management Order, filed April 26, 1996. In 
that order, at page 3, the following appears: 
All subcases arising under tribal instream flow claims are consolidated into the following 
categories: 
1. Nez Perce Claims. 
All instream flow claims filed by the United States as trustee for the benefit of 
the Nez Perce Tribe and all claims filed by the Nez Perce Tribe on its own behalf 
Lead subcase is 03-10022. 
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It is this Court's understanding that the parties are not in agreement as to the present 
boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. In fact, as a point of interest (and as will be discussed 
in greater detail later in this decision) the United State;' (as trustee on behalf of the Nez Perce 
Tribe) Notice of Claim to A Water Right Reserved Under Federal Law, executed on March 23, 
1993, and filed with the Court, sets forth, in paragraphs 8 and 11, the "Legal Description of the 
Nez Perce Indian Reservation" and "List of Documents Creating Reservation." Affidavit of 
Steven W Strack, Exhibit 1, pages 10 and 11. These two paragraphs in this original claim 
mention only the 1855 Treaty and the 1863 Treaty with the Nez Perce. Neither mention the 
Agreement with the Nez Perce of May 1, 1893, 28 Stat. 326 (ratified August 15, 1894). 
Also, by this Court's reading of the Standard Form 4, "Motion to File: Amended Notice of 
Claim" of the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe, this document does not address the 
reservation boundaries, past or present. Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, Exhibit 2. 
In any event, the "Summary of Amended Instream Flow Water Right Claims" contains the 
following language: 
In March of 1993, the United States submitted 1133 and the Nez Perce Indian Tribe 
submitted 1134 water rights claims in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) 
for stream reaches located within the Salmon, Cleaiwater, Weiser, Payette, and Snake 
River drainage. This submittal amends those claims. Through this amendment, the 
United States and the Nez Perce Tribe are withdrawing claims for 20 and 21 stream 
reaches, respectively and are modifying the original claims for the remaining 1113 
stream reaches. These instream flows are claimed to provide fish habitat and the long-
term maintenance of that habitat. The original flow claims that were submitted in 
1993 included three components: :fish habitat, channel maintenance, and riparian 
maintenance. These amended claims contain only the first two of these components 
with consideration for the riparian maintenance contained in the channel maintenance 
component. 
Monthly fish habitat flow claims are submitted for each of the 1113 stream reaches. 
These claims are for the instantaneous flows from the first day to the last day of each 
month. The channel maintenance claims are made-for 38 stream reaches within the 
claim area. These claims are made only when the natural unimpaired streamflow is 
at or above the identified channel maintenance flow. These two types of claims are 
not additive. The total instream flow claim in a given reach at a specific time is the 
larger of the two types of claims. 
The attached table summarizes the amended claims and provides a comparison with 
the original flow claims submitted in 1993. Further explanation of the claims and 
definitions of terms in the attached table are provided below. 
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The name of the stream section as identified on 
USGS 7.5 or 15-minute quadrangle maps. 
The name of the stream to which the subject stream 
flows 
An identifying number used by the United States and 
the Nez Perce Tribe to refer to each stream reach. 
The numbers are identical to those presented in the 
location map submitted in 1993 with the original 
claims. 
Hydrologic node identifying the upstream extent of 
the stream reach. 
Hydrologic node identifying the downstream extent 
of the stream reach. 
The Water Right Number (WRN) assigned by the 
Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to 
the corresponding 1993 flow claim made by the Nez 
Perce Tribe for this stream reach. 
The WRN assigned by the IDWR to the 
. corresponding 1993 flow claim made by the United 
States for this stream reach. 
Legal Description of upstream point of stream reach 
for which instream flows are claimed. 
Legal Description of downstream point of stream 
reach for which instream flows are claimed. 
These claims are made for instream flow to provide 
suitable fish habitat flows in the reach. The claims 
are monthly values representing the instantaneous 
flow in cubic feet per second claimed from the first 
day to the last day of each month. 
These are the amended monthly flow claims for each 
reach and channel maintenance claim if included. 
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Old Claim 
C.M.: 
For the 20 withdrawn claims, the table shows new 
claims of zero flow. 
These are the original monthly flow claims submitted 
in 1993. These claims are superseded by the 
amended "new claims." 
Channel maintenance claims are made for 3 8 stream 
reaches in the claim area. For a specific stream 
reach, a number in the C.M. column of the table 
indicates that a channel maintenance claim is made 
for that reach. The number in the column is the 
channel maintenance flow in cubic feet per second. 
The channel maintenance claim is for all of the 
natural flow in the stream when the natural flow is at 
or above the channel maintenance flow. When the 
natural flow is below the channel maintenance flow, 
no claim is made for channel maintenance. 
Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, Exhibit 2, pages 24 and 25. 
Because there is no agreement on the location of the present reservation boundaries, and 
because these water rights claims are based upon "stream reaches," this Court does not decide the 
issues presented herein on the basis of, or with reference to, individual water right claim numbers 
or the location of a particular stream reach or portions thereof. Rather, the issues presented 
herein are decided generically on the basis of whether the instream water is located off, or outside, 
the present reservation boundaries, whatever they may be. In other words, the legal concept of 
instream-flow water rights off-reservation is what is decided and not each individual amended 
claim. 
Lastly, all parties to these proceedings agree that this is the so-called "entitlement phase" 
and no issues of "quantity" are presently before the Court, i.e., "entitlement" meaning the 
existence of, or non-existence of, off-reservation instream-flow water rights of the Nez Perce 
Tribe or for the United States as trustee for the Tribe. 
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IX 
BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF TREATIES, AGREElVIENTS, LEGISLATION, AND 
LITIGATION AFFECTING THE WATER RIGHT CLAIMS AT ISSUE HEREIN 
Where the existence and scope of claimed treaty rights are not clear from the face of the 
respective treaty, they are to be determined by examining the treaties, legislative history, 
surrounding circumstances, subsequent history, and subsequent interpretative litigation. Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,471, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 1166, 79 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1984); Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587-88, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1363-64, 51 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1977). 
The Court finds the following brief chronology of the above factors helpful in determining 
the existence or non-existence of the claimed off-reservation instream flow water right claims at 
issue in this case. 
Pre-185 5 Pre Treaty Era 
In their Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, lodged September 18, 
1998, the United States and the Tribe state: "Since 'time immemorial,' the Nez Perce Indians 
occupied a large geographic area encompassing parts of what is today central Idaho, northeastern 
Oregon, and southeastern Washington." Id. at 10. 
And, "fishing provided over half of the subsistence needs of the Nez Perce Tribe and it 
was unthinkable to either the tribe or the federal negotiators that fish -- much less water -- would 
become so scarce." Id. at. 7. 
The Nez Perce aboriginal territory consisted of over 13 million acres. Ex. 12, United 
States v. Scott, et al., Case No. CR 98-01-N-EJL, (D. Idaho) (Order Re: Jurisdiction, entered 
August 12, 1998, unsealed by Order dated August 17, 1998). 
1855 Treaty of 1855 at the Walla Walla Council 
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On June 11, 1855, Isaac Stevens and other representatives of the United States entered 
into a treaty with representatives of the Nez Perce Tribe whereby the Tribe ceded approximately 
6.5 million acres to the United States in return for, among other things, being secured in 
possession of a reservation of approximately 7.5 million acres. Treaty with the Nez Perce Indians, 
12 Stat. 957, 2 Kappler 702 (June 11, 1855). This Treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United 
States on March 8, 1859, and proclaimed by the President on April 29, 1859. 
Article 3 of the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty provides in pertinent part, as follows: 
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where running through or 
bordering said reservation is :further secured to said Indians; as also the right of taking 
fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory; 
* * * 
1863 Treaty of 1863 at the Lapwai Treaty Council 
On June 9, 1863, representatives of the Unites States entered into a treaty whereby the 
Nez Perce ceded an additional 6 million acres ofland to the United States. The 1863 Treaty 
reduced the Nez Perce Reservation to approximately 750,000 acres. Article 8 of the 1863 Treaty 
provided that "all the provisions of said treaty which are not abrogated or specifically changed by 
any article herein contained, shall remain the same to all intents and purposes as formerly, -- the 
same obligations resting upon the United States, the same privileges continued to the Indians 
outside of the reservation, and the same rights secured to citizens of the U.S. as to right of way 
upon the streams and over the roads which may run through said reservation, as are therein set 
forth." i:e., as is relevant here, the "fishing in common" right, off-reservation remained intact. In 
other words, the hunting and fishing rights retained on the lands ceded in the 1863 Treaty are 
identical to the hunting and fishing rights retained outside the 1855 Reservation. 14 Stat. 647 
(ratified April 17, 1867). 
1887 Indian General Allotment Act 
In 1887 Congress passed the General Allotment Act, popularly known as the Dawes Act, 
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.) which authorized division of 
Indian reservations into separate parcels for individual Indians. The purpose of the act was to 
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encourage individual agricultural pursuits among the Indians \vith the surplus lands (non-allotted) 
to be sold to non-Indians. 
By the tenns of the General Allotment Act, each member of a tribe -- man, woman or 
child -- could be allotted one-eighth of a section of land (80 acres) for farming purposes, or one-
forth of a section ofland (160 acres) for grazing purposes. Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388; 
as amended by Act of February 28, 1891, 01, 26 Stat. 794. Following allotment, the Secretary 
of Interior was authorized to negotiate for the "purchase and release" of all reservation lands not 
allotted to tribal members. Act of February 8, 1887, § 5, 24 Stat. 388. 
Pursuant to the General Allotment Act, the Secretary of Interior ordered the allotment of 
the Nez Perce Reservation, and lands were allotted to individual Nez Perce during the years 1889 
to 1892. Thereafter a Commission was appointed by the United States which was authorized to 
negotiate an agreement for the cession of the remaining surplus lands (all unallotted lands). 
1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce 
On May 1, 1893, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States entered into an agreement 
wherein the Tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, 
right, title and interest" to the unallotted portions of the then existing Reservation, save for some 
32,020 acres of timberland to be set aside for the common use of tribal members. 1893 
Agreement, Art. 1. For the cession of their lands the Tribe received consideration in the amount 
of $1,626,222. Id., Art. 3. 
The 1893 Agreement was ratified by Congress on August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 326 and the 
unallotted lands of the fonner Reservation were opened to non-Indian settlement by Presidential 
Proclamation on November 8, 1895. Id. 
The 1893 Agreement contained Article XI, a savings clause, which provides: "The existing 
provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce Indians not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this agreement are hereby continued in full force and effect. 11 
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1905 United States v. Winans 
In 1905, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 
3 71, a case dealing with treaty language regarding "the right of taking fish at all usual and 
accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory." In part, the case held "that a 
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them -- a reservation of 
those not granted." Id. at 379. 
1908 United States v Winters 
In 1908 the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564. 
In this seminal case, the Court established the implied federal reserved water right commonly 
referred to as the "Winters" doctrine. It is arguable that this "doctrine" sets out no substantive 
rule of law, but is merely a special rule of construction used to divine original intent with respect 
to water rights on federal reservations where the organic document is silent on the subject. In any 
event, the doctrine is sensibly applied where century-old treaties, legislation, or executive orders 
left a gap which, if not filled through an implied right, would destroy an essential purpose of a 
reservation of federal land. 
1987 SRBA General Adjudication is Commenced 
In 1987, a petition was filed by the State ofidaho, ex rel. A. Kenneth Dunn in his official 
capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, for the general adjudication of 
all water rights in the Snake River Basin pursuant to LC. §§ 42-1406(A) and 42-1407. The water 
right claims at issue herein were thereafter filed in this case. 
1994 Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company 
On March 21, 1994, Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 
(D. Idaho 1994), was decided. The Nez Perce Tribe had brought an action against Idaho Power 
Company seeking monetary damages for reduction in numbers of fish in fish runs its members had 
treaty rights to fish. 
Among other things, the Court sustained the finding that: 
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(T]he tribes do not own the fish but only have a treaty right which provides an 
opportunity to catch fish if they are present at the accustomed fishing grounds. 
In the Court's view, monetary damages for loss of property cannot be awarded for 
injury to a fish run in which the plaintiff tribe owns only an opportunity to 
exploit. 
Id. at 795, 796 (emphasis added). 
1998 South Dakota v. YanI"ton Sioux Tribe 
On January 26, 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, et al., 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998). This case interpreted the Act 
of August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, the common statute in which Congress considered and ratified 
the Siletz, Nez Perce (1893 Agreement), and Yankton surplus land sale agreements. The Court 
expressly held that the unallotted, ceded lands were severed from the Yankton Reservation and 
the reservation was diminished ( diminished meaning the boundaries of the reservation as 
delineated in the previous treaties were reduced to pie lands retained in the 1894 Act). 
X. 
FINDINGS OF FACT FOR PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Although not mandatory, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are encouraged in 
Summary Judgment cases. Keesee v. Fetzck, 111 Idaho 360,361, 723 P.2d 904,905 (Ct. App. 
1986). Based on affidavits filed in this action, and talcing into account the historical background 
surrounding the Treaties, as well as the Treaty negotiations, this Court finds the following facts 
for purposes of summary judgment. These facts are either uncontroverted, or if controverted, are 
found to exist. By this the Court means that the Nez Perce assert these are the facts, and for 
summary judgment purposes only, the Court accepts these as accurate to determine whether even 
under these set of facts the Court can render summary judgment, i.e., assuming the asserted facts 
to be true, is there a water right? While several of these were mentioned in the last section, they 
have been repeated here. 
1. Since "time immemorial," the Nez Perce Indian Tribe historically occupied a 
geographic region consisting of between 13-14 million acres located in what today 
consists of central Idaho, northeastern Oregon and southeastern Washington. 
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2. Historically, Nez Perce sustenance consisted of fish, roots, berries, game, and other 
plant products. Fish comprised up to one-half of the Tribe's total food supply with 
each tribal member consuming between 300 to 600 lbs. of salmon per year. In 
addition to sustenance, fish and fishing were important to the spiritual well being, 
culture, and traditions of the Nez Perce. This importance remains to the present day. 
3. In 1848 the Oregon Territorial Act was passed creating the Oregon Territory. The 
Washington Territory Act was passed in 1853.3· Both Acts expressly recognized 
Indian title to lands. In 1850, Congress enacted the Oregon Donation Act which gave 
non-Indian settlers title to land. As a result, a conflict arose between the Indian 
inhabitants and the non-Indian settlers. 
4. In 1853, Isaac Stevens was appointed as the first governor of the Washington 
Territory. The position also carried with it the superintendancy oflndian affairs for 
the territory. In 1854, Stevens lobbied Congress for appropriations for the purpose of 
negotiating treaties with the various indigenous tribes. Stevens prepared a "model 
treaty" to be used at the various treaty councils . 
. 5. In 1855, the Walla Walla Treaty Council was convened. The Council involved 
various Indian Tribes including the Nez Perce Tribe. Minutes were kept of the 
negotiation proceedings. See Certified Copy of the Original Minutes of the Official 
Proceedings at the Council in Walla Walla Valley, Which Culminated in the Stevens 
Treaty of 1855. The Treaty was subsequently ratified by the United States Senate in 
1859. See Treaty of 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (June 11, 1855). 
6. Pursuant to the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce Tribe agreed to cede approximately 6.5 
million acres of aboriginal territory to the United States. In exchange, the Nez Perce 
Tribe reserved approximately 7.5 million acres for an Indian reservation. Various 
rights and privileges were also reserved to the Nez Perce Tribe. However, neither the 
Nez Perce Tribe or the United States government specifically intended to reserve an 
in-stream flow water right Article III of the 1855 Treaty provided, among other 
things, as follows: 
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where running 
through or bordering said reservation is further secured to said Indians; 
as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in 
common with the citizens of the Territory; * * *. 
This treaty language was not unique to the Nez Perce Treaty. The identical or 
substantially similar language was contained in other Steven's treaties, as well as the 
3 Between 1853 and 1863, the Washington Territory included portions of present day Idaho. 
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model treaty. Both the Treaty and the minutes from the Treaty negotiation were 
silent on the issue of water rights for fish preservation. 
7. In 1863, the Nez Perce entered into the Treaty of Lapwai with the United States. 
This treaty came about as a result of the discovery of gold on lands under control of 
the Nez Perce Tribe. Because of tensions between trespassing prospectors and the 
Nez Perce people, treaty negotiations were reopened. Pursuant to the 1863 Treaty, 
the Nez Perce Tribe relinquished additional lands reserving approximately 750,000 
acres of the former Reservation as the new Indian Reservation. See Treaty with Nez 
Perce, June 9, 1863, 14. Stat. 647 (ratified April 17, 1867). This Treaty was also 
silent as to the reservation of an in-stream flow water right. Article VIII of this 
Treaty also provided: 
[ A ]11 the provisions of the said treaty which are not abrogated or 
specifically changed by any article herein contained, shall remain the 
same to all intents and purposes as formerly, -- the same obligations 
resting upon the United States, the same privileges continued to the 
Indians outside the reservation. 
8. On May 1, 1893, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States entered into an 
agreement for the cession of the unallotted lands in accordance with the General 
Allotment Act. Pursuant to Article I of the 1893 Agreement, the Nez Perce agreed 
to: 
[C]ede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, 
right, title and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits 
of said reservation, saving and excepting the following described tracts 
of lands, which are hereby retained by the Indians .... 
The Nez Perce Tribe retained 32,020 acres ofland to be held in common by the 
members of the Tribe. 1893 Agreement, Art. 1. For the cession of their former 
lands, the Tribe received consideration in the amount of $1,626,222.00. 1893 
Agreement, Art. III. The agreement also provided that: 
The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce 
Indians not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are 
hereby continued and in full force and effect. 
1893 Agreement, Art. XI. 
XI 
BASIS OF THE NEZ PERCE CLAIMS: 
FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHT V. INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHT 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
G:\ERIC\NEZ PERCE\SUMJUDG 11/10/99 
OU 0.lSc 
Page22 
The Objectors (movants in these summary judgment proceedings) in this case have 
challenged or put at issue, among other things, the viability of the legal theory on which the Nez 
Perce claims are predicated. The Nez Perce Tribe and the United States ( collectively "Nez Perce" 
or "Claimants"), as the non-moving parties, must provide evidence in the record in support of 
each element comprising the Nez Perce claims. See Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 
126 Idaho 527,531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994); Snap on Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 
1045, 1052 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 
(1986)) (applying summary judgment standard to treaty interpretation) . 
1. THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE NEZ PERCE CLAIMS 
The legal cause of action on which the Nez Perce claims are predicated is referred to as an 
Indian reserved water right. The Claimant's have made it clear and explicit to the Court through 
both briefing and at oral argument that they are not claiming an implied federal reserved water 
right, sometimes referred to as the "Winters Doctrine.',4 The Nez Perce and the United States 
state in their joint memorandum "here the reservation at issue is the Tribe's reservation of a fishing 
right from those lands ceded in 1855, not a 'reservation' ofland from the public domain, as is the 
case with the non-Indian federally reserved water right." United States' and Nez Perce Tribes' 
Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Joint 
Ji.,femorandum ") at 85. The Claimant's frame the elements as follows: 
1) Did the Nez Perce Tribe reserve in the 1855 treaty the right of taking fish? 
2) Has that right been exhausted? 
3) Is some quantity of water necessary to fulfill that right? 
In setting forth the elements that comprise an Indian reserved water right, a distinction 
between the two concepts (Indian v. Federal) is necessary because unfortunately the legal 
precedent upon which this Court must rely for guidance has a tendency to blur the distinction. 
4 Again, this Court is using the term "doctrine" as descriptive of the legal precedent but recognizing that 
there is a difference of opinion as to whether the "doctrine" is a rule of law or merely the application 
of a judicial cannon of interpretation. 
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A. The Federal Reserved Water Right. 
The federal government has generally deferred to state law with respect to establishing 
water rights. Stated another way, a state generally has plenary control over water located within 
its boundaries. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86 (1907). An exception to that general 
rule is recognized when the federal government withdraws land from the public domain, either 
through legislation, executive order, treaty or other agreement. Reserved water rights may be 
either express or implied. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699-700, 98 S.Ct. 
3012, 3013-3014 (1978). Where the withdrawal of the public land is silent as to the issue of 
water rights, the law will imply that the government intended to reserve the necessary amount of 
appurtenant water so as to effectuate the purpose for which the land was withdrawn. Cappaert v. 
United'States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2069 (1976). The purpose being effectuated 
must be determined to be a primary purpose of the withdrawal as opposed to a secondary 
purpose. United States v. New Mexico at 715-716, 98 S.Ct. at 3021-3022. A federal reserved 
water right, under the prior appropriation doctrine, takes a priority date corresponding to the date 
the land was withdrawn from the public domain. Cappaert. 426 U.S. at 138, 96 S.Ct. at 2069. 
Idaho has recognized and followed this legal precedent in acting on water rights. United States v. 
State, 131 Idaho 468, 469-70, 959 P.2d 449, 450-51 (1998). 
B. The Indian Reserved Water Right. 
In contrast to an implied federal reserved water right, an Indian reserved water right is the 
recognition by the federal government of an aboriginal right (i.e. hunting or fishing) either 
reserved by the Indians or not expressly ceded by the Indians through a respective treaty or other 
agreement. The existence of the right rests on the interpretation of the treaty so as to ascertain 
the intent of the parties. Interpretation of the treaty is governed by the application of various 
I 
established canons or principles of Indian treaty interpretation. The foremost principle being the 
recognition that the Indian Tribe and the United States are independent sovereigns and that a 
treaty with an Indian Tribe constitutes a grant of rights to the United States from the Indians, not 
a grant of rights from the United States to the Indians. Thus any rights not expressly granted in 
the treaty by the Indians are reserved to the Indians. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 373, 
25 S.Ct. 662, 664 (1905); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984); State v. 
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McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 50 (1943). Any rights reserved to the Indians can only be tenninated 
by acts of Congress. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 789, 798 (1998)(citing 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). 
Another canon is that Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have 
understood them. This canon results from the disparity between the parties with respect to 
understanding the English language. Washington v. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 
658, 676, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3069, 61 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1979). Any ambiguities must be resolved in 
favor of the Indians. Id. at 675-76, 99 S. Ct. at 3069-70. Treaties are construed more liberally 
than private agreements and to ascertain their meaning courts may look beyond the writing itself 
to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. 
United States v. Washington, 135 F.2d 618, 630 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991)). Indian rights have been "confrrmed" through treaty 
interpretation based on the application of the foregoing canons. See Winans, supra, at 373, 25 
S.Ct. at 664 (reserved right of access to fishing grounds); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1983)(reserved on-reservation water right for fishing);. McConville, supra at 50. 
(recognizing reserved right to fish); Montana v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 
P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985)(distinguishing between federal and Indian reserved water rights). 
Unlike an implied federal reserved right, the priority date of an Indian reserved water right 
is predicated on the historical use by the respective Tribe and can relate back to "time 
immemorial." Adair, supra at 1414. 
C. Distinguishing Between the Two Theories. 
Although the implied federal reserved water right can apply where land is withdrawn from 
the public domain for the purpose of an Indian Reservation, the two types of rights are 
fundamentally different. The confusion results not only from the seminal case, Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207 (1908), which established the implied federal reserved water 
right, but also in the manner in which the courts have blurred the distinction between the two 
concepts. In Winters, supra, the federal government, by agreement with the Indians, created the 
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in 1888. The purpose of the reservation was to convert the 
Indians to an agrarian culture. The agreement, however, was silent as to the water rights 
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necessary for irrigation. Thereafter, conflict over water arose between the Indians and non-Indian 
settlers. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Tribe on the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation had a water right with a priority date coinciding with the date the reservation was 
created. Id. at 569, 28 S.Ct. at 212. The United States Supreme Court, however, was ambiguous 
as to how the water right was created. The Winters court first appeared to be asserting the 
reasoning set forth in an earlier 1905 decision of United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
In Wincms, the court acknowledged that a treaty was not a grant of right to the Indians, but rather 
a grant from them to the United States, thereby reserving any of those rights not expressly 
granted, which is the basis of the Indian reserved right. Winans, 198 U.S. at 373, 25 S.Ct. at 664. 
The Winters court, however, shifted its discussion to the federal government's authority to 
reserve waters at the time of the establishment of the reservation. Id. at 569, 28 S.Ct. at 212. 
Ultimately, the basis for the Supreme Court's decision turned on the federal government's implied 
reservation of the water right. Although many commentators have argued that Winters was 
merely a canon of interpretation as to the federal government's intent and was limited to the facts, 
that concept was subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Fifty years later in 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct. 1468 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the 
federal government had reserved water in the creation of five Indian reservations. The Court's 
analysis, however, focused solely on the federal government's power to reserve water for the 
Indians, rather than looking to ancient water rights that were never relinquished by the Tribes. As 
such, the tribal water rights took a priority date coinciding with the establishment of the 
respective Indian reservation. 
In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court applied the federal reserved rights doctrine beyond an Indian reservation. In 
finding a water right, the Court reviewed the basis of the implied federal reserved right: 
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from 
the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by 
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to 
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. 
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in the 
reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve 
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unappropriated and thus availabl·e water. Intent is implied if the previously 
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the 
reservation was created. 
Id. at 139, 96 S.Ct. 2069-70. 
In a subsequent case, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S. Ct 3012 (1978), a 
case involving the reservation of water for a national forest, the United States. Supreme Court 
held that federal reserved water rights could only be established for primary rather than secondary 
purposes of the reservation of land. 
In sum, the confusion arises because the reservation of water rights for Indian 
Reservations arose out of the implied federal reserved water right doctrine, rather than a 
reservation of rights by the Indians via treaty. Unfortunately, the trend in the courts is to merge 
the two concepts into the same category of implied reserved water rights despite the concepts 
being distinct from one another. 
D. The Origination of the Nez Perce Reserved Water Right Claims. 
The Nez Perce claims originate from the 1855 Treaty language together with reliance on 
the application of the principles of treaty interpretation to establish the Indian reserved water right 
claimed here. Again, both the Nez Perce and the federal government have stated in briefing and 
at oral argument that they are not contending the existence of an implied federal reserved water 
right in either party to the Treaty. In Article I of the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce ceded their 
"right, title and interest" in their aboriginal grounds subject to certain enumerated reservations. 
The reservation giving rise to the claimed water rights is contained in Article III of the Treaty, 
which states in relevant part as follows: 
The exclusive right of taking fish in all streams where running through or bordering 
said reservation is secured to the Indians; as also the right of taking fish at all usual 
and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory .... 
Treaty with Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat 957. 
The foregoing treaty provision does not expressly reserve or otherwise create a water 
right in either party to the Treaty. Further, the Nez Perce, as well as the federal government, both 
concede that neither party intended to either reserve or create a water right to protect fish habitat 
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because the degradation offish habitat was simply not contemplated back in 1855. Rather, the 
Nez Perce rely on the application of subsequently adopted principles ofindian treaty construction 
as applied to the treaty language. Such principles take into account the aboriginal importance of 
fishing to the Nez Perce culture, the history surrounding the 1855 treaty, the treaty negotiations, 
as well as the treaty language for purposes of establishing the claimed Indian reserved water right. 
The Nez Perce argue that an in-stream flow water right necessarily accompanies or is otherwise 
integral to the preservation of their reserved fishing right and without it that right becomes a 
"hollow promise."5 The argument is predicated on the reasoning that since fish require water, in 
order to give meaningful effect to that fishing right, a wat~r right must have also been necessarily 
implied, i.e. reserved to the Tribe. Further, because of the importance of fish and the act of 
engaging in fishing, to the Nez Perce culture, the Tribe would not have intentionally surrendered 
those water rights necessary to maintain its fishing right. The Nez Perce cite authority wherein it 
was held that an implied water right was reserved for maintaining a hunting or fishing right. See 
Joint Board of Control of the Flathead Irrig. Dist. v. United States, 832 F2d 1127 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1007 (1988); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. V. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. 
Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir 1983) cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (1982). 
The Nez Perce further argue that the distinction between "on-reservation11 and "off-
reservation" water rights is legally irrelevant, because the water right does not originate from a 
reservation or withdrawal of land, rather the right originates from the reservation of a fishing right 
pursuant to the 1855 Treaty. Lastly, the Nez Perce assert, that since intent is at issue and 
evidence is required for the purpose of construing intent under principles of treaty interpretation, 
that genuine issues of material fact exist and therefore the case cannot be decided on summary 
judgment. 
2. IN APPLYING THE MOTION.FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD, THE ISSUE OF INTENT 
CAN BE DECIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
5 The scope of this decision does not consider or othen,vise take into account whether or not existing instream 
flow levels have threatened the Nez Perce's off reservation fishing rights. 
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Indian Treaty Interpretation is a Question of Law, if the Terms of the Treaty 
are Clear and Unambiguous, or have a Settled Legal Meaning, then 
Summary Judgment is Appropriate. 
In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, the Nez Perce argue that this Court 
cannot rule on the issues presented on summary judgment because Treaty interpretation requires 
reliance on the consideration of the history surrounding the Treaty, an understanding of the 
importance of fishing to the Nez Perce culture, as well as examination of the Treaty negotiations 
in order to arrive at the intent of the parties. Specifically, the Nez Perce state: "[T]he Nez 
Perce's understanding of the reserved fishing right, and by extension, the right to water implied 
by that reservation, cannot be discerned without an understanding of the culture which the treaty 
negotiators represented, the history of the Tribe's reliance on its fishery, the historical context of 
the Treaty negotiations, and other purely factual issues." See Nez Perce Tribe's Joint 
Memorandum at 80. Thus the contention is that genuine issues of material fact exist. Further, 
the Nez Perce have filed affidavits in support of their opposition. The Nez Perce contend 
further that these affidavits remain uncontroverted by the Objectors, and therefore the case is 
not ripe for summary judgment. This Court disagrees. 
Treaty interpretation is similar to contract interpretation. Bonanno v. United States, 12 
Cl. Ct. 769, 771(1987). However, unlike contract interpretation, the interpretation of a treaty, 
including an Indian treaty, is a question of law for the Court to decide. Cayuga Indian Nation 
of New Yorkv. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)(citing United States ex rel. 
Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). The examination of a treaty's 
negotiating history and purpose does not render its interpretation a matter of fact, but merely 
serves as an aid to the legal determination which is at the heart of all treaty interpretation. 
Bonanno at 772. Stare decisis applies to questions oflaw. Id. at 771. Further, in the realm of 
contract law, the initial determination whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question oflaw. 
City of Pocatello v. City of Chubbuck, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899 P.2d 411,414 (1995). If the 
terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, or have a settled legal meaning, the 
interpretation of the meaning of the contract is a question oflaw. Id. In this case, since treaty 
interpretation is a question oflaw, much like statutory interpretation, the case can necessarily be 
decided on summary judgment. Additionally, however, the meaning of the subject "fishing in 
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common" treaty language has already been construed by the United States Supreme Court and is 
therefore unambiguous. Consequently, there are no genuine issues of material fact to be 
resolved by the Court. 
Finally, in drawing inferences in favor of the Nez Perce (the non-moving party) there are 
still no genuine issues of material fact. This Court's analysis begins with the premise that neither 
the United States government nor the Nez Perce Tribe specifically intended to reserve a water 
right because the issue of water was never contemplated in 1855. Both parties have identified this 
in briefing and at oral argument. Thus, this Court is not being asked to construe actual intent. 
Accordingly, nothing in the record is submitted as being probative of actual intent. Rather, this 
Court is being asked to view the history of the Treaty, the Nez Perce culture, the Treaty 
negotiations, and then imply that the Nez Perce reserved a water right as a necessary component 
of their reserved fishing right or to otherwise give effect to that right. The affidavits submitted by 
the Nez Perce are probative of the importance of fish and fishing to the Nez Perce culture, as well 
as the importance of water to the fish habitat. However, whether the Court draws all favorable 
inferences from the facts in favor of the Nez Perce, or accepts the Nez Perce's facts as 
uncontroverted, because the subject Treaty language has a well settled legal meaning and is. not 
ambiguous, resolution on summary judgment is appropriate. In sum, even if this Court assumes 
that all the Nez Perce's factual allegations are true as to the historical importance of the fish runs, 
the Court can still rule on this issue as a matter oflaw. See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power 
Company, 847 F. Supp. 79, 796 (D. Idaho 1994). 
B. The "Fishing in Common" Treaty Language Has Settled Legal Meaning. 
The heart of the issue in this case is interpretation of the 1853 Treaty language "the right 
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory .... " 
This is the only language in the Treaty which secures to the Nez Perce an off-reservation fishing 
right. However, since the meaning and scope of this language has already been interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court, the language has a settled legal meaning. In Washington v. 
Passenger Vessel Fishing Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed 2d 823 (1979), at issue 
was the scope of the fishing right reserved to various Indian Tribes created by operation of the 
following similar treaty term: "[T]he right of taking fish and all usual and accustomed grounds and 
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stations ... in common with the citizens of the territory." The subject treaty language was 
contained in a series of six Steven's treaties negotiated between various Indian Tribes located west 
of the Cascades and Isaac Stevens on behalf of the United States. Specifically, at issue in Fishing 
Vessel was whether the "fishing in common" language reserved to the Indians merely a right of 
guaranteed access across private ground to exercise their off-reservation fishing rights or whether 
the language conferred on the Indians the broader right to harvest a share of the anadromous fish 
runs. Because of the conflicting interpretations regarding the meaning of the "fishing in common" 
language as between the state and federal courts, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari "to interpret this important treaty provision." Id. at 674. 
In interpreting the Treaty language, the Supreme Court took into account the vital 
importance which fish had to the Indians. Id. at 667, 99 S. Ct. at 3065. The Court also 
concluded that because of the abundance of fish at the time the treaty was executed, neither party 
to the treaty contemplated a need for future regulation or allocation. Id. at 668-69, 99 S. Ct. at 
3066. In defining the Treaty language, the Supreme Court held: 
In our view, the purpose and language of the treaties are unambiguous; they secure 
the Indians' right to take a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal areas. 
The purport of our cases is clear. Non-treaty :fishermen may not rely on property law 
concepts, devices such as the fish wheel, license fees, or general regulations to deprive 
the Indians of a fair share of the relevant runs of anadromous fish in the case area. 
Nor may treaty fishermen rely on their exclusive right of access to the reservations to 
destroy the rights of other "citizens of the Territory. 11 Both sides have a right, 
secured by treaty to take a fair share of the available fish. That, we think is 
what the parties to the treaty intended when they secured to the Indians the 
right of taking fish in common with other citizens. 
Id. at 679, 684-85, 99 S.Ct. 3071, 3074 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court, however, also makes it clear the fishing right is a limited, rather than 
an absolute guarantee or entitlement. In setting up the percentage allocations for the fish run 
harvest, the Court set maximums, but not minimums. The Court also noted that the maximum 
could also be modified in response to changing circumstances. Id at 687, 99 S. Ct. at 3075. The 
Court stated: 
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We need not now decide whether priority for [ ceremonial and subsistence needs] 
would be required in a period of short supply in order to carry out the purposes of the 
treaty. 
Id. at 688, 99 S. Ct. at 3076. 
Although the Nez Perce were not parties to treaties at issue in Fishing Vessel, because of 
the similarities between the Steven's treaties, and the use of almost identical language, when 
interpreting Steven's treaties, the Untied States Supreme Court has looked to cases construing 
other Steven's treaties for guidance. The Ninth Circuit also follows this approach. See Nez Perce 
Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) (citing United States v. Oregon, 
718 F.2d 299, 301-02 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1983); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 573-74 (9 th Cir. 
1974). Fishing Vessel is analogous to the instant case in several important respects. First, the 
importance of fish and engaging in fishing was vitally important to the Indians in Fishing Vessel. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis with that premise in construing the parties' intent, noting 
that the religious rites of the Indians were intended to insure the return of the salmon and that fish 
constituted a major part of the Indian diet. In fact, the Indians west of the Cascades were known 
as the "fish eaters." Id. at 665, n. 6. The importance of anadromous fish runs could not have 
been of any less significance than the. fish runs were to the Nez Perce. Stated another way, the 
importance of the anadromous fish runs to the Nez Perce could not have been of greater 
significance than it was to the "fish eaters" west of the Cascades.6 
Next, the "right to fish in common" provision contained in the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty is 
essentially the same as the treaty language contained in the series of treaties at issue in Fishing 
Vessel. This language is also essentially the same language that is contained in the model treaty 
which Stevens prepared for negotiations with the various Indian Tribes in the Washington 
Territory, including the Nez Perce. Lastly, the parties to the treaties in Fishing Vessel did not 
contemplate that their fishing right would be impeded by subsequent technology (fishing wheels), 
property law concepts (right of access), or regulation (conservation laws) at the time the treaty 
was being negotiated. Likewise, the parties to the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty did not intend to 
6 Again, this Court recognizes that the extent of the fish's importance to the Nez Perce is 
disputed by the Objectors. 
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reserve an instream flow water right because neither party to the Treaty contemplated a problem 
would arise in the future pertaining to fish habitat. 
In this regard, the Fishing Vessel decision is decisive in several respects. First, the 
Supreme Court holds that the meaning of the "fishing in common language" is unambiguous. As 
such, this Court is required to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation under principles of stare 
decisis. The Supreme Court interprets the subject language as granting (reserving) an off-
reservation fishing right. The scope of that right includes the larger right to a proportionate share 
of the fish run. The contention in Fishing Vessel was that the language merely conferred a right 
of access to exercise tribal fishing rights. The Supreme Court held the right is broader and 
actually means a proportionate right to the share of the harvest. Now the Nez Perce asks this 
Court to take the additional leap and by judicial fiat declare a water right for that purpose. The 
Supreme Court's interpretation does not support that contention. Nowhere in the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the language is a water or other property right greater than an access or 
allocation right mentioned for purposes of giving effect to the fishing right, or as being within that 
scope of the fishing right. In fact, the entire decision is a remedy predicated on the assumption 
that the fluctuations in the fish population is completely out of the control of the parties. 
Second, the Supreme Court's interpretation is inconsistent with the creation of a water 
right. The off-reservation fishing right does not guarantee a predetermined amount of fish, 
establish a minimum amount of fish, or otherwise require maintenance of the status quo. Rather, 
the right extends to a proportionate share of the available fish run, whatever that run may be. 
Implicit in the ruling is the recognition the fish runs will vary or even be subject to shortages. 
This recognition is therefore inconsistent with the assertion that a water right is necessary for 
maintenance of fish habitat or fish propagation. Simply put, the Nez Perce do not have an 
absolute right to a predetermined· or consistent level of fish. In times of shortages, the Supreme 
Court noted that it may be necessary to reaUocate proportionate shares to meet the subsistence or 
ceremonial needs of the Tribe. Consequently an implied water right is not necessary for the 
maintenance of the fishing right as it has been defined by the Supreme Court. 
The Fishing Vessel decision also embraces earlier rulings of the United States Supreme 
Court which hold that off-reservation treaty fisherman are subject to state regulation imposed for 
purposes of species conservation. This regulation places further limitations on the scope of the 
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off-reservation fishing right. In Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 
392, 88 S. Ct. 1725 (1968), (Puyallup I), the Supreme Court addressed the issue regarding the 
ability of the State of.Washington to regulate the off-reservation fishing right of the Indians. The 
fishing rights at issue were derived from the "right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed 
places in common with the citizens of the territory" language contained in the Treaty of Medicine 
Creek, which was also one of the treaties at issue in Fishing Vessel. The Treaty fishermen were 
using nets for the commercial fishing of salmon, which was prohibited by state law. In 
determining the scope of the fishing right, the Supreme Court began its analysis with the 
assumption that fishing with nets by the Indians was customary at the time of the Treaty. Also, 
that traditionally there were commercial aspects to the fishing at that same time. However, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that because the right was a nonexclusive right, and because the Treaty 
was silent as to whether the Indians could exercise the right in their "usuai and accustomed 
manner," the State could regulate the manner and purpose of fishing. The Supreme Court held 
that although the "right" to fish could not be qualified by the State, "the manner of fishing, the 
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated in the interest 
of conservation by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets 
appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians." Id. at 398, 88 S. Ct. at 
1728. 
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 173, 97 S. Ct. 2616 
(1977)(Puyallup III), the Supreme Court stated that the power of the State was adequate for 
protection of the fish. Referring to an earlier case, the Supreme Court stated: 
Speaking for the Court, :Mr. Justice Douglas plainly stated that the power of the State 
is adequate to assure the survival of the steelhead: 
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead in the 
river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the time may 
come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing 
should be banned until the species regains assurance of survival. The police power 
of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the 
passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to 
pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets. 
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Id. at 176, 97 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Wash. Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49, 94 
S. Ct. 330, 333 (1973)(Puyallup II))(emphasis added). 
Consequently, the scope of the subject fishing rights is further limited in that the State can 
regulate the right for conservation purposes. In fact, the State is essentially charged with 
imposing regulations for conserving the fish. The converse is not true in that the Indians cannot 
impose regulations on the non-treaty off reservation fisherman for purposes of conservation. See, 
e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) (holding 
Crow Tribe could not regulate non-tribal hunters and fishermen on land owned in fee by non-
tribal members). 
Further support can be found in Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp 
791 (D. Idaho 1994), in which the Federal District Court ofldaho construed the scope of the 
fishing right reserved to the Nez Perce both on and off-reservation. However, unlike the treaties 
at issue in Fishing Vessel, Nez Perce Tribe involved construction of the Article III of the exact 
treaty which is the subject of this case. At issue was whether the Nez Perce Tribe's fishing rights 
were being violated by Idaho Power as a result of three dams being operated by Idaho Power 
which allegedly reduced the number of fish on the annual runs. The Nez Perce Tribe sought 
monetary damages. In holding that the Tribe was not entitled to monetary damages, the Court's 
interpretation of the scope of the fishing right is dispositive of the issues in this case. The Court 
acknowledged that the fishing rights were aboriginal in origin and confirmed by the 1855 Treaty. 
Id. at 800. 
In Nez Perce, the Nez Perce Tribe contended that without monetary damages, their treaty 
fishing rights would be meaningless.7 In concluding that the Nez Perce were not entitled to 
monetary compensation, the District Court concluded: 
[T]he .primary reason that Indian tribes have not been awarded damages for their 
treaty fishing rights in the past is because the tribes do not own the fish, but only 
have a treaty right which provides an opportunity to catch fish !f they are 
present at the accustomed fishing grounds. 
; Similarly, iri this case, the Nez Perce contend that without water rights, their Treaty rights would be 
meaningless. 
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Id. at 795(emphasis added). Further, the Court held that neither the Nez Perce Tribe nor any of 
its enrolled members have a property interest in any particular number of fish in the runs unless 
the fish are actually present in the river and can be caught . Id. at 811-12. The Court also held 
that the Tribe's fishing rights would not be meaningless or nullified because of "hatchery facilities 
and other mitigation and protection programs." Id. at 796. 
The Court went on to note that consistent with the holding in Fishing Vessel, "[I]n 
interpreting the several Steven's treaties, the courts have consistently held that the reserved fishing 
rights grant the Indians 'an opportunity to take, by reasonable means, a fair and equitable share of 
all fish from any given run."' Id at 806 (citing United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1416 
(9th Cir. 1985)(emphasis added). The Court also noted that the right is limited by the need to 
protect fish runs from over harvest through state and federal regulation. Id. ( citing Sohappy v. 
Smith, 302 F. Supp. at 908; United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d at 1416; United States v. Oregon, 
657 F.2d 1009, 1016-17 (1981); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game v. US., 433 U.S. 165, 
i 76-177, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2623 53 L. Ed.2d 667 (1977)). 
Lastly, and most importantly, the Court answered the "ultimate issue" as to whether the 
1855 Treaty provided the Tribe with an absolute right to preservation of the fish runs in the 
condition then existing in 1855, free from environmental damage caused by a changing and 
developing society. The Court held that the Tribe does not have an absolute right to the 
preservation of the fish runs in their original 1855 condition, free from all environmental damage 
caused by the migration of increasing numbers of the settlers and the resulting development of the 
land. Id. at 808. 
Further, that established treaty rights to catch and harvest fish are subject to outside 
changing circumstances. The Court stated: 
Having concluded that Indian treaties must be interpreted in light of new, and often 
changing, circumstanQes including conditions which limit the available quantity of fish, 
it is not surprising that the courts have not awarded monetary damages to Indian 
tribes for the depletion or destruction of fish and game caused by development. 
This Court is not able to agree with the Tribe's contention that if Indian treaties are 
subject to changing circumstances, the treaties are therefore 'an impotent outcome to 
negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of 
the Nation for more.'[citations omitted] 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
G:\ERIC\NEZ PERCE\SUMJUDG 11/10/99 
0 U U ... ' .·' ,".'. j_ 0 ' 
Page 36 
In the scope of this action, the Tribe's right to fish pursuant to the 1855 
Stevens treaty only guarantees access to certain off-reservation fishing grounds and 
the right to attempt to catch available fish. The treaty does, however, require 
assurance that the Tribe will have a 'fair share' of the available fish. The law requires 
the various states, and private parties in certain circumstances such as those presented 
here, to take remedial actions should their development of the rivers or the 
surrounding land injure the fish runs. The Stevens treaties require that any 
development authorized by the states which injures the :fish runs be non-discriminatory 
in nature, see Fishing Vessel 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 but 
does not however, guarantee that subsequent development will not diminish or 
eventually, and unfortunately, destroy the fish runs. 
Id. at 814 (emphasis added). This decision was never appealed. 
In taking into account the established authority defining the scope of the off-reservation 
fishing right, this Court's ruling can be summarized as follows. The Nez Perce contend that a 
water right must necessarily be implied to give effect to the Tribe's off-reservation fishing right. 
The Nez Perce admit that the Tribe did not intend to reserve a water right in 1855 because fish 
habitat was not contemplated. As such, the scope of the treaty fishing right must be ascertained 
to determine whether the application of canons of treaty interpretation imply a water right 
necessary to give effect to that treaty right. Established precedent has defined the scope of the 
right. The fishing right is non-exclusive and shared with non-Indians. The right is essentially a 
right to a share of the fish harvest. The right is not to an absolute entitlement. Nor does it 
guarantee a set amount of fish. The right is subject to State regulation for purposes of conserving 
the species. In fact, the State, not the Nez Perce, has the authority to regulate off-reservation 
fishing for purposes of conservation. The Nez Perce do not have a property interest in the fish. 
Further, fishing rights are subject to changing circumstances incurred by settlement and 
development, which is what has occurred in this case. Lastly, there are other measures in place, 
such as regulation, to protect the fish run. 
Based on the scope of the Nez Perce fishing right, there is no legitimate basis from which 
to infer that a water right is necessary to· the preservation of that limited right. The Nez Perce do 
not have anything akin to a fish propagation right. Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude, as a 
matter oflaw, that the Nez Perce or the federal government reserved an instream water right for 
fish. 
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C. The Nez Perce's (and the United States') Admission as to Intent as Well as 
the Purpose of the 1855 Treaty Is Inconsistent with an Indian Reserved 
Water Right. 
The Nez Perce and the United States agree that neither intended to reserve an instream 
flow water right in connection with its fishing right at the time the 1855 treaty was executed. This 
aspect also has independent legal significance as to whether the 1855 Treaty impliedly reserved a 
water right. Unlike the situation in Fishing Vessel, it would be repugnant to the purpose of the 
treaty negotiations to imply that the Indians reserved an off-reservation instream flow water right. 
The purpose of the Stevens Treaties was to resolve the conflict which arose between the Indians 
and the non-Indian settlers as a result of the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 which vested title to 
land in settlers. It is inconceivable that the United States would have intended or otherwise 
agreed to allow the Nez Perce to reserve instream flow off-reservation water rights appurtenant 
to lands intended to be developed and irrigated by non-Indian settlers. Although, the construction 
of a treaty focuses on what the Indians would have understood at the time the treaty was 
negotiated, the Nez Perce and the United States both admit that neither contemplated reserving an 
off-reservation water right at the tim"e the treaty was being negotiated and executed. At most, the 
Nez Perce intended that the off-reservation fishing rights (as opposed to a water right) secured by 
the Treaty would be absolute and free from impediment. However, it defies reason to imply the 
existence of a water right that was both never intended by the parties and inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Treaty. The Nez Perce submit that the issue pertaining to the quantity of water 
reserved is beyond the scope of these proceedings. However, for illustrative purposes it is helpful 
to point out that the Nez Perce's amended instream claim for the lowermost point on the Snake 
River is for 105% of the average annual flow of the Snake, Clearwater, and Salmon Rivers 
combined. It was also asserted by the State in oral argument on October 13, 1999, and as 
illustrated on demonstrative exhibits used therein, that many of the Nez Perce's claims are for 
waters outside their aboriginal territory. Tr. p. 26, L. 22, Tr. p. 27, L. 2 .. Because one of the 
admitted purposes of the Treaty was to extinguish aboriginal title to make the lands available for 
settlement, it is inconceivable that either the United States or the Tribe intended or even 
contemplated that the Tribe would remain in controi of the water. 
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Essentially, what the Nez Perce Tribe is seeking by way of a water right is a remedy for an 
unforeseen consequence which it now believes stands to threaten its fishing right. Historically, the 
right of access threatened the fishing right, then the over-allocation of fish by non-treaty fishermen 
interfered with the right, at present it is the scarcity of water (among other things), and in the 
future there will unquestionably emerge other unforeseen factors which may also pose a threat to 
fish habitat. However, at some point only so many interpretations can be exacted from the Treaty 
language. It is also a canon of treaty interpretation that Indian treaties cannot be re-written or 
expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 423,432, 63 S.Ct. 672,678 (1943). 
D. Adair and Related Authority Does Not Support an "Off-Reservation" 
Reserved Indian Water PJght. 
This Court recognizes, and the Nez Perce have cited authority wherein, some courts have 
implied a reserved water right for purposes ~f maintaining an Indian Tribe's reserved fishi.t"1g right. 
However, these cases differ in either of two respects. Either the genesis of the water right was a 
federal reserved water right and, thus, was appurtenant to the Indian Reservation -- the right was 
limited to the on-reservation, or the right was not derived from the "fishing in common" language 
which is the claimed origin of the Nez Perce's off-reservation fishing rights. See, e.g., United 
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1282, 104 S. Ct. 3536, 82 
L.Ed 2d 841 (1984)(reserving water for protection of on-reservation fishing right); Kittitas 
Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (1985) cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1032 (1985) (court does not decide issue of scope of fishing right); Coleville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9 th Cir. 1981) cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S.Ct. 
657, 70 L. Ed.2d 630 (1981) (federal reserved water right for maintaining on-reservation fishing 
right.); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (federal reserved water 
right to preserve fishing); Joint Board of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 
832 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1987) (right created by "exclusive right of taking fish in all streams 
running through and bordering reservation."); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct. 
1408 (1963) (federal reserved water right). 
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The distinction is important because this Court's ruling is limited to claimed water rights 
appurtenant to off-reservation lands, as the boundaries exist at present. The front runner case 
which appears to create an off-reservation water right for fishing is United States v. Adair, 723 
F.2d 1394 (1983). In Adair, at issue was whether hunting and fishing rights reserved by the 
Klamath Tribe in an 1864 treaty also implied the reservation of a water right. 8 Although the 
Court held that the Tribe had reserved a water right to maintain the tribe's hunting and fishing 
rights, the water rights at issue were clearly limited to on-reservation lands and, therefore, the 
decision is not applicable to this case .. The language reserving the water right reserved to the 
Tribe "exclusive use and occupancy of the lands." The Court held: 
There is no indication in the treaty, express or implied, that the Tribe intended to cede 
any of its interest Jin those lands it reserved for itself. (citations omitted] 
[We] agree with the district court that within the 1864 Treaty is a recognition of the 
Tribe's aboriginal water rights and a confirmation to the Tribe of a continued water 
right to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle on the Klamath Reservation. 
Id. at 1414 (emphasis added). 
The Court's reasoning was based on the finding that the Klamath Tribe reserved exclusive 
use and occupation on the reserved lands and that there was no express or implied indication that 
the tribe intended to cede any interest in those reserved lands. Id at 1414. 
As such, the most Adair can stand for in this case is that the Nez Perce reserved water 
rights on the reserved lands, however that issue is not before this Court and is not decided. Adair 
does not extend to off-reservation water rights. In the instant case, the Nez Perce's claim for off-
reservation water rights is predicated on the "fishing in common" language, the meaning and 
scope of which have been defined and limited to less than a water right. 
2. The Subsequent Effect of the 1863 Treaty of Lapwai. 
In 1863, the Nez Perce entered into a subsequent treaty with the United States. Pursuant 
to the 1863 Treaty of Lapwai, the Nez Perce agreed to relinquish additional lands to the United 
States. In exchange, the Tribe reserved certain defined lands for a new reservation. The 1863 
Treaty reduced the boundaries of the former reservation from approximately 7 million acres to 
Also at issue was the effect of the Klamath Tennination Act on the water right. 
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approximately 750,000 acres. The ceded land was opened up to non-Indian settlement. Article 
VIII of the 1863 Treaty provided, inter alia, as follows: 
[A]nd further, that all the provisions of said treaty which are not abrogated or 
specifically changed by any article herein contained, shall remain the same to all 
intents and purposes as formerly, -- the same obligations resting upon the United 
States, the same privileges continued to the Indians outside of the reservation .... 
Treaty of 1863, 14 Stat. 647. 
As a result, the issue is raised regarding the effect of the subsequent diminishment of the 
reservation on the Tribe's fishing rights. Stated another way, did the "exclusive" on-reservation 
fishing rights continue to apply within the 1855 reservation boundaries or did the "exclusive" 
rights extend only to the 1863 boundary of the new reservation?9 This issue, however, does not 
need to be decided because the subsequent 1893 Agreement made by the Nez Perce, a.11d the 
subsequent legislation ratifying the Agreement, essentially subsumes the issue. 
3. S.outh Dakota v. Yankton Sioux-The Subsequent Effect of the 1893 Agreement. 
In 1998, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, et al., 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998), a suit over who had regulatory jurisdiction over a 
proposed waste site (landfill), the Tribe and the United States, or the State of South Dakota. Of 
major significance to the issues before this Court on summary judgment is the fact that the United 
States Supreme Court interpreted the very same statute in which Congress approved the 1893 
Agreement between the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe relating to the cession and sale of 
surplus tribal lands. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286. 
The 1894 Act incorporated (among other things) both the 1892 Agreement with the 
Yankton Sioux in its entirety and the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce in its entirety and, in 
accordance with both Agreements, Congress expressly appropriated the necessary funds to 
compensate the Tribes for the ceded lands, to satisfy the claims for scout pay, and to award the 
commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces. Congress also prescribed the punishment for violating a 
9 This distinction is important for two reasons. First, this opinion is limited to off-reservation water rights. 
Second, because the opinion is limited to off-reservation water rights, this opinion does not interpret whether or not the 
"exclusive" fishing right confers a water right on the reservation. 
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liquor prohibition included in the agreement and reserved certain sections in each township for· 
common-school purposes. Finally, each Agreement contained a saving clause. Id. 
In Yankton Sioux, both the Federal District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the 1894 Act (1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux) did not diminish the boundaries 
of the reservation as delineated in the 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton 
Sioux Tribe and, consequently, that the subject waste site lies within an Indian Reservation where 
federal government regulations would apply, i.e., that the Yankton Sioux had sold their surplus 
lands to the government, but not their governmental authority over it. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the 
Court of Appeals and a number of decisions of the South Dakota Supreme Court which had 
declared that the Reservation had been diminished. 
The first paragraph of the Supreme Court's opinion reads: 
This case presents the question whether, in an 1894 statute that ratified an 
agreement for the sale of surplus tribal lands, Congress diminished the 
boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The reservation 
was established pursuant to an 1858 treaty between the United States and the 
Yankton Sioux Tribe. Subsequently, under the General allotment Act of 1887, Act 
of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (the Dawes Act), individual members 
of the Tribe received allotments of reservation land, and the Government then 
negotiated with the Tribe for the cession of the remaining, unallotted lands. The issue 
we confront illustrates the jurisdictional quandaries wrought by the allotment policy: 
We must decide whether a landfill constructed on non-Indian fee land that falls with 
the boundaries of the original Yankton Reservation remains subject to federal 
environmental regulations. If the divestiture of Indian property in 1894 effected 
a diminishment of Indian territory, then the ceded lands no longer constitute 
"Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), and the State now has 
primary jurisdiction over them. In light of the operative language of the 1894 Act, 
and the circumstances surrounding its passage, we hold that Congress intended to 
diminish the Yankton Reservation and consequently that the waste site is not 
in Indian country. 
Id. at 793 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court found that the land in question was deeded to a non-Indian under the 
Homestead Act of 1904, i.e., consisted of unallotted land ceded in the 1894 Act. Here, it was no 
longer on the reservation. 
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The Supreme Court also stated that the Act of Aug. 15, 1894, which ratified the 1892 
Agreement between the United States and the Yankton Sioux, contained "similar surplus land sale 
agreements between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribe." Id. at 796. 
In setting the stage for its analysis, the Supreme Court stated the rules of interpretation as 
follows: 
States acquired primary jurisdiction over unallotted opened lands where "the 
applicable surplus land Act freed that land of its reservation status and thereby 
diminished the reservation boundaries." Solem, 465 U.S., at 467, 104 S. Ct., at 1164. 
In contrast, if a surplus land Act "simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to 
purchase land within established reservation boundaries," Id., at 470 104 S. Ct., at 
1166, then the entire opened area remained Indian country. Our touchstone to 
determine whether a given statute diminished or retained reservation 
boundaries is congressional purpose. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 
584, 615, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1377, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977). Congress possesses 
plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate 
tribal rights. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S. Ct. 
1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Accordingly, only Congress can alter the 
terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, United States v. Celestine, 
215 U.S. 278,285, 30 S. Ct. 93, 94-95, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909), and its intent to do 
so must be clear and plain," United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-739, 106 S. 
Ct. 2216, 2219-2220, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986). 
Here we must determine whether Congress intended by the 1894 Act to 
modify the reservation set aside for the Yankton Tribe in the 1858 Treaty. Our 
inquiry is informed by the understanding that, at the tum of the century, Congress did 
not view the distinction between acquiring Indian property and assuming jurisdiction 
over Indian Territory as a critical one, in part because "[t]he notion that reservation 
status of Indian lands might not be coextensive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar," 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 468, 104 S. Ct., at 1164, and in part because Congress then 
assumed that the reservation system would fade over time. "Given this expectation, 
Congress naturally failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of 
legislation formally sliced a certain parcel ofland off one reservation." Ibid.; see also 
Hagen, 510 U.S., at 426, 114 S. Ct., at 973 (Blaclanun, J., dissenting) ("As a result 
of the patina history has placed on the allotment Acts, the Court is presented with 
questions that their architects could not have foreseen"). Thus, although "[t]he 
most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language 
used to open the Indian lands," we have held that we will also consider "the 
historical context surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts," and, to a lesser 
extent, the subsequent treatment of the area in question and the pattern of settlement 
there. Id., at 411, 114 S. Ct., at 965. Throughout this inquiry, "we resolve any 
ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find diminishment." 
Ibid. 
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Article I of the 1894 Act provides that the Tribe will "cede, sell, relinquish, 
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the 
unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation"; pursuant to Article II, the United 
States pledges a fixed payment of $600,000 in return. This "cession" and "sum 
certain" language is "precisely suited" to terminating reservation status. See 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445, 95 S. Ct., at 1093. Indeed, we have held that when a 
surplus land Act contains both explicit language of cession, evidencing "the 
present and total surrender of all tribal interests," and a provision for a fixed-
sum payment, representing "an unconditional commitment from Congress to 
compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land," a "nearly conclusive," or 
"almost insurmountable," presumption of diminishment arises. Solem, supra, 
at 470, 104 S.Ct., at 1166; see also Hagen, supra, at 411, 114 S.Ct., at 965. 
The terms of the 1894 Act parallel the language that this court found 
terminated the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in DeCoteau, supra, at 445, 95 
S.Ct., at 1093, and as in DeCoteau, the 1894 Act ratified a negotiated agreement 
supported by a majority of the Tribe. Moreover, the Act we construe here more 
clearly indicates diminishment than did the surplus land Act at issue in Hagen, which 
we concluded diminished reservation lands even though it provided only that "all the 
unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain. 11 See 
510 U.S., at 412, 114 S.Ct., at 966. 
Id. at 797, 798 (emphasis added). 
Like the 1892 Yankton Agreement, the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement contains nearly 
identical explicit language of cession, evidencing the "present and total surrender of all tribal 
interests" (except specifically enumerated and legally described tracts), and a fixed sum payment, 
representing "an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the [Nez Perce] tribe 
for its opened land." See Articles I, II, and III of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement. 
Turning to the savings clause in each of the two respective agreements, Article XVIII of 
the Yankton Sioux Agreement states (with emphasis): 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of April 19th, 
1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the United States. And after 
the signing of this agreement, and its ratification by Congress, all provisions of the 
said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be in full force and effect, the same as though this 
agreement had not been made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to 
receive their annuities under said treaty of April 19th, 1858. 
28 Stat.326 (August 15, 1894). 
Article XI of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement provides: 
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The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce Indians not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are hereby continued in full force 
and effect. 
In Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court, in addressing the savings clause, 
The Yankton Tribe and the United States, appearing as amicus for the Tribe, rest their 
argument against diminishment primarily on the saving clause in Article XVIII of the 
1894 Act. The Tribe asserts that because that clause purported to conserve the 
provisions of the 1858 Treaty, the existing reservation boundaries were 
maintained. The United States urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the 
agreement, which would presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty 
only insofar as necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without 
fundamentally altering the Treaty's terms. 
Such a literai construction of the saving dause as the South Dakota Supreme 
Court noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (S.D. 1997) would "impugn 
the entire sale." The unconditional relinquishment of the Tribe's territory for 
settlement by non-Indian homesteaders can by no means be reconciled with the 
central provisions of the 1858 Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the 
Tribe's "permanent" home and prohibited white settlement there. See Oregon 
Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 770, 105 S.Ct. 3420, 
3430, 87 L.Ed.2d 542 (1985) ( discounting a saving clause on the basis of a "glaring 
inconsistency" between the original treaty and the subsequent agreement).· Moreover, 
the Government's contention that the Tribe intended to cede some property but 
maintain the entire reservation as its territory contradicts the common 
understanding of the time: that tribal ownership was a critical component of 
reservation status. See Solem, supra, at 468, 104 S.Ct., at 1164-1165. We "cannot 
ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a fair appraisal, 
clearly runs counter to a tribe's late claims." Klamath, supra, at 774, 105 S.Ct., at 
3432 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement 
in which it appears, we give it a "sensible construction" that avoids this "absurd 
conclusion." See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 
1268-1269, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The most 
plausible interpretation of Article XVIII revolves around the annuities in the form of 
cash, guns, ammunition, food, and clothing that the Tribe was to receive in exchange 
for its aboriginal claims for 50 years after the 1858 Treaty. Along with the proposed 
sale price, these annuities and other unrealized Yankton claims dominated the 1892 
negotiations between the Commissioners and the Tribe. 
Id. at 799 (emphasis added). 
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In this case, the conclusion that the Nez Perce Tribe ceded all its interest in all unallotted land 
not expressly reserved by the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent ratification by Congress is equally 
compelling. The savings clause contained in Article XI of the 1893 Agreement, would be in direct 
contravention of Articles I and II of the Agreement if the Reservation boundaries were not diminished 
by operation of the savings clause. To conclude otherwise would not only eviscerate the purpose of 
the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent congressional ratification, but would also be inconsistent with 
the plain meaning of the 1855 Treaty wherein the Nez Perce Tribe also agreed to "cede, relinquish 
and convey" to the United States all of its "right, title, and interest" in its aboriginal lands. Stat~d 
another way, if the cession language contained in the 1893 Agreement is not to be given literal effect, 
then the sanctity of the of the 1855 Treaty language can also be called into question. However, by 
strongly urging the operation of the Indian reserved rights doctrine, the Tribe necessarily admits those 
aboriginal lands not reserved were ceded pursuant to the 1855 Treaty. 
In this Court's view, pursuant to the holding in Yankton Sioux, the boundaries of the Nez 
Perce Reservation was diminished to the extent of all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the 
1893 Agreement. 10 The boundaries of the reservation are important because this ruling is limited to 
claimed in-stream flow water rights outside of the current boundaries of the Reservation. Consistent 
with the savings clause of the 1893 Agreement and the 1863 and 1855 Treaties, the Tribe did reserve 
its off-reservation "right to fish in common." The scope of this right, however, does not include an 
instream flow water right. 
This Court recognizes the holding in United States v: Webb, District ofidaho Case No. 98-
80-N-EJL (January 12, 1999), which is currently on appeal. Webb raised the issue of criminal 
jurisdiction on previously allotted lands of the Nez Perce Reservation. The District Court ruled that 
pursuant to the 1893 Agreement the unallotted lands continued to be within the boundaries of the 
Reservation by operation of the savings clause. This Court declines to follow the ruling for several 
reasons. First, the matter is currently on appeal and therefore not fmal. Next, both the government 
and the defense stipulated in the case that the offense took place on previously allotted land. 
Therefore, since the status of the unallotted land was not at issue, the decision pertaining to the status 
of the same is dicta and in all likelihood may not be revisited by the Court of Appeals on that basis. 
l O Yankton Sioux specifically did not answer whether allotted lands, now in non-Indian ownership were part of the 
Reservation. 
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Further, this Court disagrees substantively with the opinion. The Court's analysis erroneously 
focuses on the intent of the Nez Perce, rather than Congressional intent. Next, the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend the cession of unallotted lands not specifically reserved to the Tribe in 
common, not only ignores the plain meaning of the statutory language but also the historical 
circumstances following the Treaty of 1855. Namely, the influx of settlers on Reservation land and 
the related policies of alleviating conflict between the Indians and the settlers, settling the west, and 
extinguishing Indian title. 
XII 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court rules as follows: 1) That pursuant to the 1855 
Treaty, the Nez Perce Tribe reserved among other things, the "right of taking fish at all usual and 
accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory;" 2) that the Nez Perce Tribe or 
the United States did not specifically intend to reserve an off-reservation instream flow water right 
for purposes of maintaining said fishing right; 3) that the scope of the "right of taking fish in 
common" does not also confer an off-reservation instream flow water right, and; 4) that pursuant 
to the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent congressional ratification, the Nez Perce Tribe ceded 
all interest in unallotted lands not expressly reserved to the Tribe, 5) that by the savings clause the 
Tribe again reserved its off-reservation in common fishing rights. Therefore, the Nez Perce do 
not have Indian reserved instream flow water rights extending beyond the boundaries of the 
present Reservation, where ever those boundaries may be. This Court makes no ruling on the 
extent of on-reservation water rights of any kind. Summary judgment is therefore granted. 
Additionally, based upon the ruling herein, the Court determines that it is unnecessary to 
address other/additional issues raised in some of the Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED November 10, 1999. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 




Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022 
Nez Perce Tribe Instream Flow Claims 
Case No. 39576 
) 
) ____________ ) 
ORDER ON UNITED STATES' 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY 
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
I. 
Brief Procedural Background 
On November 24, 1999, the United States of America moved this Court to alter or 
amend its Judgment entered November 10, 1999, in this consolidated subcase to clarify 
the extent of its ruling as to the boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation 
diminished to the extent of all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the 1893 
Agreement. Specifically, the motion sought to amend the Judgment by revising the 
second paragraph on page 2 of the Judgment, to read as follows: 
In accordance therewith, and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 58(a), this 
judgment grants those motions for summary judgment, limited in scope to 
the rulings eontained in the Order of November 10, 1999: Specifieally as 
deciding that the Nez Perce Tribe, and/or the United States of America on 
behalf of the Tribe as Trustee, are not entitled to an off-reservation 
instream flow water right as claimed. 
(i.e., sought to eliminate :from the Judgment the lined-through material, which line is 
theirs). 
The Motion was made pursuant to Rule 59( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In the alternative, the United States moved that if the Court intended by its 
November 10, 1999, Judgment to rule upon the jurisdictional boundaries of the Nez Perce 
ORDER ON UNITED STATES' MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY 
FOR AN EYIDENTIARY HEARING 
G:\Orders Pending\03-10022 Nez Perce alter amend Yankton.doc0!/21/00 
uuu··; ci--:: ..l v ,-1.. 
Pagel of29 
Indian Reservation, the United States requested an opportunity to submit testimony, 
documentary evidence and legal authorities on that issue. The United States' Motion was 
supported by a Memorandum, lodged of equal date, but no oral argument was requested 
at the time of the filing of the Motion. 
On December 7, 1999, the State ofidaho filed a written response to the United 
States' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing. 
The State did not ask for oral argument. 
On December 15, 1999, the United States lodged its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of United States' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement or Alternatively for an 
Evidentiary Hearing. Also on December 15, 1999, the United States filed a written 
request that a hearing on its Motion be set for December 21, 1999. This request for a 
hearing was made pursuant to T.A.R. 13(b)(4) (which rule grants the District Court the 
power and authority to rule upon a motion to amend the judgment during the pendancy of 
an appeal). The Motion did not specifically request oral argument on the original Motion 
to Alter or Amend. 
No other party responded to the Motion of the United States. 
At this Court's regular monthly status conference (akin to a law and motion 
calendar) held on December 21, 1999, the following discussion took place: 
THE COURT: Mr. Campbell? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I note for purposes of 
proceeding with the 54(b) appeal and also the pending 59(e) motion to 
alter or amend at the present time it's not my -- I don't have any 
understanding as to when that motion to alter or amend is going to be set 
for consideration by the court, if there's going to be a hearing or the court 
will just render a decision based upon the papers filed. 
And the reason that our clients are concerned, given the potential 
ramifications depending upon how the court decides the issue of 
jurisdiction,. we don't want to be in a position of dragging things out too 
long. So. from the standpoint of resolution of the 59(e) motion, it would be 
in our client's interests to have that set for hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, the reality is we're trying to get a number of 
other things done, come up for air, if you will, before we even get a 
chance to look at it, which hopefully will be in the next few days. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I understand, Your Honor. I'm not trying to 
pressure the court unduly, I just raise the issue from the standpoint of the 
context of the various matters. 
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THE COURT: Do I have a sense that all parties involved want it set 
for oral argument? 
MR MONSON: Your Honor, Peter Monson. As the court is aware, 
we did file with our reply brief a motion for a hearing. However, we don't 
have a strong preference that it be set for oral argument. 
We would be willing to - given the court's calendar particularly in 
January, I know it's quite heavy. If the court prefers to decide it on the 
briefs, that would be amenable to us as well. 
MR STRACK: Your Honor, the State was the only party that filed 
an objection. And we would be glad to waive hearing if it would expedite 
the court's consideration of it. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll take a look at it in the next few days and 
make a decision one way or the other. · 
MR STRACK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MONSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Then we'll be in recess. Thank you. 
(PROCEEDil~GS ADJOURNED) 
Reporter's Transcript of Regular Monthly Status Conference Re: Nez Perce Motions, 
December 21, 1999, p. 47, 1. 5 -p. 48, I. 25. 
II. 
Matter Deemed Fully Submitted for Decision 
The last filing in this matter occurred on December 15, 1999. The last hearing in 
this matter was December 21, 1999. Following that hearing, the Court was to initially 
determine whether it would grant/request oral argument on the Motion to Alter or Amend 
(Alternative Motions) of the United States filed November 24, 1999. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
Based upon the above colloquy that neither party insists on oral argument on the Motion 
to Alter or Amend and the Court having decided oral argument is not necessary to 
resolution of the Motion, the matter is determined to be fully submitted for decision the 
next business day, or December 22, 1999. 
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Ill. 
Standard of Review 
In Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,263,646 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1982), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals stated: 
A Rule 5 9( e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the 
discretion of the court. Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d 974 (8th 
Cir. 1964): An order denying a motion made under Rule 59(e) to alter or 
amend a judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there 
has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Walker v. Bank of America 
National Trust and Savings Association, 268 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied 361 U.S. 903, 80 S.Ct. 211, 4 L.Ed.2d 158 (1959). Rule 59(e) 
proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of 
fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a 
mechanism for corrective action short of an appeal. First Security Bank v. 
Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276 (1977). Such proceedings must of 
necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of the case as it existed when 
the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based. 
However, where as in this case - the motion for 
"reconsideration" raises new issues, or presents new information, not 
. addressed to the court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment, 
the proper analogy is to a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b ). That rule requires a showing of good cause and specifies particular 
grounds upon which relief may be afforded. Hendrickson v. Sun Valley 
Corporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133,559 P.2d 749 (1977). As with Rule 59(e) 
proceedings, the right to grant, or deny, relief under the provisions of Rule 
60(b) is a discretionary one with the trial court. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 
Idaho 414,599 P.2d 985 (1979). 
In essence, the motion of the United States' is in the alternative, the first being a 
Rule 59( e) motion to alter or amend the judgement entered on the summary judgment, or 
in the alternative a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) to present 
information to the Court which the United States previously failed to present. 
IV. 
Issues Presented 
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In its Memorandum in Support of United States' Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing, the following issues/points are 
identified. 
1. The Judgment, When Read In Conjunction With the Orders On 
Summary Judgment, Is Ambiguous. 
2. The Question Whether the 1893 Agreement Diminished the Nez Perce 
Reservation is a Disputed Fact and Cannot Be Decided on Motions for 
Summary Judgment. 
3. In the Alternative, The United States Moves the Court for An 
Evidentiary Hearing to Present Testimony, Documentary Evidence, and 
Legal Argument on the Diminishment Issue. 
A. Only a Clear Expression of Congressional Intent Will Diminish 
an Indian Reservation. 
B. The 1893 Nez Perce Agreement and its Legislative History 
Evidence a Clear Intent to Recognize and Continue the 1863 
Reservation Boundaries. 
C. Subsequent Jurisdictional History Also Supports a Finding of 
No Diminishment. 
V. 
[Whether] The Judgment, When Read In Conjunction With the Orders On 
Summary Judgment, Is Ambiguous. 
The United States of America first argues that this Court's Judgment, when read in 
conjunction with the Order on Summary Judgment, is ambiguous. The first assertion is 
that it is unclear whether this Court intended to incorporate into the Judgment the 
statement: 
In this Court's view, pursuant to the holding in Yankton Sioux, the 
boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation was diminished to the extent of 
all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the 1893 Agreement. 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, Etc. ("Order"), at 46 (November 10, 1999). 
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This Court does not find the Judgment to be ambiguous, but if there is any doubt 
by anyone, this Court intends the above quoted language to be a part of the Judgment. 
The United States next asserts that it interprets the above quoted statement 
regarding diminishment not to be this Court's holding, but instead to be obiter dicta; i.e., 
not necessary for the decision as to whether the off-reservation right of taking fish carries 
with it a water right to instream flows as claimed off-reservation. The finding of 
diminishment by this Court is not obiter dicta, but for reasons different than the one cited 
by the United States' immediately above. 
The United States is technically correct in one very narrow sense in that a finding 
of diminishment is not absolutely necessary to make the decision as to whether the off-
reservation right of taking fish carries with it a water right to instream flows off-
reservation (and, as will be discussed in more detail later, whether this Court is correct or 
incorrect as to diminishment, the issue of whether there is an off-reservation instream 
flow water right is not affected, i.e., there is no off-reservation water right as claimed, 
diminishment or not). 
However, by asserting it is obiter dicta, the United States apparently misinterprets 
this Court's November 10, 1999, ruling regarding diminishment in several major 
respects. First, one of the direct issues variously presented by some of the different 
motion~ for summary judgment was whether the geographic scope of the "exclusive" 
"on-reservation" fishing right reserved in the 1855 Treaty was reduced commensurately 
with the Tribe's Treaty of 1863 and the 1893 Agreement and/or whether the Tribe's 1863 
and 1893 land cessions resulted in the cession of water rights. See issues 1 and 4 raised 
by Idaho Power Company; issue addressed in Potlatch Corporation's Brief at pages 6 and 
7; issues 3 and 5 raised by the State ofidaho; issue addressed in Reply Brief ofirrigation 
Districts at pages 2 and 3; and issue 3 stated in the Joint Memorandum in Opposition to 
Objector's Motions for Summary Judgment, lodged by the United States and the Nez 
Perce Tribe on September 18, 1998. Thus, there is no legitimate question of whether the 
legal effect (relating to reservation boundaries) of both the Treaty of 1863 and the 
Agreement of 1893 as so enacted by Congress in 1894 were raised as material issues in 
this case. Hence, the United States' assertion that it did not understand that the question 
of diminishment was an issue pending before the Court on the Motions for Summary 
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Judgment does not pass muster. See also pages 6 and 60-65 of the United States' and 
Nez Perce Tribe's Joint 1vfemorandum, lodged September 18, 1998. 
Secondly, because this Court's holding expressly distinguishes between on-
reservation and off-reservation water rights, it was necessary to address the effects of the 
subsequent Treaty of 1863 and the Agreement of 1893. 
Lastly, and as noted above, while a finding of diminishment is not necessary to the 
legal conclusion that there is no off-reservation instream flow water right, the holding in 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 188 S.Ct. 789 (1998), and a finding of diminishment, 
clearly bolsters this Court's determination of the non-existence of the claimed off-
reservation water rights; i.e., it is inconceivable that the government would buy the ceded 
land for the primary purpose of opening it up to settlement but intended to allow the 
Tribe to reserve what would essentially be most of the water. 
The United States also asserts that a ruling of diminishment would have profound 
jurisdictional implications - both civil and criminal - within the affected area and is in 
conflict with two recent decisions of the United States District Court, which held to the 
contrary. See United States v. Webb, Case No. CR 98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho) (January 12, 
1999) on appeal, No. 99-30155 (9th Cir.)-; United States v. Scott and Crowe, Case No. CR 
98-01-N-EJL (D. Idaho) (Order Re: Jurisdiction entered August 12, 1998). 
With respect to the profound implications a finding of diminishment may have is a 
factor beyond the realm of this Court's control. It would necessarily be presumed that 
Congress took this into account when the Agreement of 1893 was ratified in 1894. Many 
Congressional Acts carry profound implications - both criminal and civil; but such a fact 
cannot defeat what Congress intended. 
Secondly, this Court is well aware of other Courts' holdings regarding a finding of 
no diminishment under the Agreement of 1893 ratified by Congress in 1894. With all 
due respect (and as will be explained in greater detail later in this Order) to these courts, 
it seems to this Court that the Supreme Court of the United States of America has the 
final say on the issue of diminishment and the affect of the Act as ratified by Congress in 
1894. The 1998 Yankton Sioux decision would supercede all previous court decisions on 
the topic, including (ifthere were one) previous United States Supreme Court decisions. 
(And as pointed out by this Court in its November 10, 1999 Order on Summary 
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Judgment, Yankton Siouxwas a unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court 
in January of 1998, and it interpreted this very piece oflegislation passed by Congress in 
1894 which not only dealt with the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe but 
also the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce Tribe). 
VI. 
The Question Whether the 1893 Agreement Diminished the Nez Perce Reservation 
is a Disputed Fact and Cannot Be Decided on Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The question of whether the 1893 Agreement diminished the Nez Perce 
Reservation boundaries is a question of Congressional intent, which in turn is a question 
of law if eit.lier t.lie terms of the Agreement are clear and unambiguous, or if it has a 
settled legal meaning; and can be properly decided on summary judgment. 
First, as noted both above and in this Court's Order of November 10, 1999, the 
question of what Congress intended regarding the purchase of these lands and whether 
there was a diminishment of the reservation has been recently answered by a unanimous 
United States Supreme Court. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 188 S.Ct. 789 (1998). To 
the contrary and to be very explicit, this determination is not some new or previously 
unanswered issue which this Court decided as a case of first impression. More precisely, 
Justice O'Connor wrote in this first paragraph of the Yankton Sioux decision: 
This case presents the question whether, in an 1894 statute that 
ratified an agreement for the sale of surplus tribal lands, congress 
diminished the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South 
Dakota. The reservation was established pursuant to an 1858 treaty 
between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe. Subsequently, 
under the General Allotment Act of 1887, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 
388, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (the Dawes Act), individual members of the Tribe 
received allotments of reservation land, and the Government then 
negotiated with the Tribe for the cession of the remaining, unallotted 
lands. The issue we confront illustrates the jurisdictional quandaries 
wrought by the allotment policy: We must decide whether a landfill 
constructed on non-Indian fee land that falls within the boundaries of the 
original Yankton Reservation remains subject to federal environmental 
regulations. If the divestiture of Indian property in 1894 effected a 
diminishment of Indian territory, then the ceded lands no longer 
constitute "Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. s 1151(a), and the 
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State now has primary jurisdiction over them. In light of the operative 
language of the 1894 Act, and the circumstances surrounding its passage, 
we hold that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and 
consequently that the waste site is not in Indian country. 
Id. at 793. (emphasis added). 
Secondly, in Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court held in part: 
By March 1893, the Commissioners had collected signatures from 255 
of the 458 male members of the Tribe eligible to vote, and thus obtained 
the requisite majority endorsement. The Yankton Indian Commission 
filed its report in May 1893, but congressional consideration was delayed 
by an investigation into allegations of fraud in the procurement of 
signatures. On August 15, 1894, Congress finally ratified the 1892 
agreement, together with similar surplus land sale agreements 
between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribes. Act of 
Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286. The 1894 Act incorporated the 1892 
agreement in its entirety and appropriated the necessary funds to 
compensate the Tribe for the ceded lands, to satisfy the claims for scout 
pay, and to award the commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces. Congress 
also prescribed the punishment for violating a liquor prohibition included 
in the agreement and reserved certain sections in each township for 
common-school purposes. Ibid. 
President Cleveland issued a proclamation opening the ceded lands to 
settlement as of May 21, 1895, and non-Indians rapidly acquired them. 
By the tum of the century, 90 percent of the unallotted tracts had been 
settled. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 62, 623 F.2d 
159, 171 (1980). A majority of the individual allotments granted to 
members of the Tribe also were subsequently conveyed in fee by the 
members to non-Indians. Today, the total Indian holdings in the region 
consist of approximately 30,000 acres of allotted land and 6,000 acres 
of tribal land. Indian Reservations: A State and Federal Handbook 
260 (1986). 
Id. at 796 (emphasis mine). 
This same text, cited as persuasive authority by the United States Supreme Court 
as noted immediately above, states with respect to the current Nez Perce Reservation 
( current meaning following the 1893 Agreement as ratified by Congress in 1894 ): 
NEZ PERCE RESERVATION 
Nez Perce, Lewis, Clearwater, and Idaho Counties 
Nez Perce Tribe 
Tribal Headquarters: Lapwai, Idaho 
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Land Status. Tribally-owned land: 33,642 acres. Allotted land: 
54,237 acres. Total area: 87,879 acres. 
Indian Reservations, A State and Federal Handbook 88, Compiled by The Confederation 
of American Indians (1986). 
The United States also asserts that.the record is clear that there is a disputed issue 
of fact as to whether the 1893 Agreement diminished the exterior boundaries of the Nez 
Perce Reservation, citing as support for this assertion the following colloquy between this 
Court and Mr. Strack during oral argument on summary judgment, October 13, 1999, Tr. 
at 44: 
THE COURT: * * * So do the parties agree or disagree as to what the 
current reservation boundaries are, number one? And if that's true, is 
there an agreement that all of these claim numbers are on the ground or 
relate to land or water off the reservation? Do you understand? 
MR. STRACK: Yeah, I do, your honor. As I believe I've suggested 
in the briefing, is that this would probably have to be a two-step 
proceeding; that this court rule - if it does rule that off-reservation claims 
are denied as a matter of law, then we would have to probably proceed 
either by agreement or litigation, if necessary, to decide what claims are 
on the reservation and what claims are off the current reservation. As you 
noted, there is disagreement ---
Transcript of Hearing of October 13, 1999, p. 44, 11. 2-15. 
As correctly pointed out by the State, however, this was not all of the discussion. 
The remainder of the discussion was: . 
THE COURT: So the answer to the question, then, simply is, as to the 
ruling legal principle, we're not deciding each of these individual claims 
because they may or may not be on or off the reservation. 
MR. STRACK: That's entirely correct. I think we have to have a separate 
proceeding in order to go through claim number by claim number and decide 
which are on-reservation claims and which were ceded. 
Transcript of Hearing of October 13, 1999, p. 44, 11. 16-24. 
This Court readily recognized that the parties had no agreement on the location of 
the present reservation boundaries, and that is, in part, why the issue regarding 
diminishment was decided. However, as noted earlier, this is a legal determination. The 
factual determination yet to be made is specifically where on planet earth are the 
respective water right claims located. In other words, because the claims which are at 
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issue are based upon 1,113 different "stream reaches," the factual question is whether a 
particular stream reach ( or portion thereof) is in or out of the present reservation 
boundaries. 
vn. 
In the Alternative, The United States Moves the Court for An Evidentiary Hearing 
to Present Testimony, Documentary Evidence, and Legal Argument on the 
Diminishment Issue. 
A. Only a Clear Expression of Congressional Intent Will Diminish an Indian 
Reservation. 
B. The 1893 Nez Perce Agreement and its Legislative History Evidence a 
Clear Intent to Recognize and Continue the 1863 Reservation Boundaries. 
C. Subsequent Jurisdictional History Also Supports a Finding of No 
Diminishment. 
Because the remainder of the assertions raised by the United States essentially 
relate to this Court's interpretation of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, they will be 
addressed without trying to separate them by topic category. 
One legal principle the United States is absolutely correct about is that only a clear 
expression of congressional intent will diminish an Indian Reservation. Id. at 798. 
The United States Supreme Court found such a clear expression of Congressional 
intent with respect to the Yankton Sioux Agreement of 1892. Thus, in reality, a 
comparison between the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux and the 1893 
Agreement with the Nez Perce is helpful. 
This Court having already compared the two Agreements in its November 10, 
1999, Orders on Summary Judgment, that discussion is incorporated herein by reference. 
However, some additional comments may be helpful in clarifying this Court's reasoning 
on the determination of diminishment of the reservation boundaries. 
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The United States asserts at page 6 of its Memorandum in Support of United 
States' Motion to Alter or Amend, lodged November 24, 1999, that in this case there has 
been no review of the history and of the negotiations of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez 
Perce. That statement simply is not true, as this Court has read and reviewed a significant 
amount of historical documents included in the affidavits submitted by the various 
counsel. 
In Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the 
1892 agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe and focused its attention on different 
provisions of the Agreement. The Supreme Court also noted that the Act of Congress of 
August 19, 1894, which ratified the Yankton Sioux Agreement of 1892 also ratified 
"similar surplus land sale agreements between the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribes." Id. at 
796. One must keep in mind, there was but one Act of Congress that ratified and 
approved these respective land purchases. 
The Annual Report of the Commissioner oflndian Affairs for 1894 (to the two 
houses of Congress), contained in Exhibit 16 of the Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, page 
320 (citing volume 3306 of the Congressional Serial Set, published by the United States 
Government Printing Office) states in relevant part: 
AGREEMENTS WITH INDIANS. 
Siletz, Yankton, and Nez Perces. -The agreement concluded with the 
Siletz Indians in Oregon, October 1, 1892, that with the Yankton Sioux in 
South Dakota, concluded December 31, 1892, and that with the Nez 
Perces in Idaho, concluded May 1, 1893, referred to in my last annual 
report, were ratified by the act of Congress approved August 15, 1894-
the Indian appropriation act. Under these agreements some 880,000 
acres of land will be restored to the public domain for disposition as 
provided in said act. 
(Emphasis on last sentence is added). 
As such, it is difficult to perceive that "under these agreements" that "some 
880,000 acres of land will be restored to the public domain for disposition," and yet 
assert that Congress intended to keep those lands (and waters) as part of the respective 
reservations. How could the land (and water) be both "restored to the public domain" of 
the United States, yet still be part of the Reservation; two totally different sovereigns? 
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By restoring the land to the public domain of the United States, one must fairly conclude 
that this evidences a present and total surrender of anr tribal interest therein. 
In any event, a comparison between the respective Agreements with the Yankton 
Sioux of 1892 and the Nez Perce of 1893 is again helpful. It should also be noted that the 
Congressional Act of 1894 which ratified these two very similar agreements (Yankton 
Sioux and Nez Perce) incorporated the two agreements in their entirety and appropriated 
the necessary funds to compensate the respective tribes for the ceded lands. 
How similar are the two Agreements (Yankton Sioux and Nez Perce) and related 
documents? 
Compare the following: 
1. Purpose of the Agreement. One must fairly keep in mind the underlying 
purpose of the respective Agreements, which in each case was the same: for the United 
States to acquire the surplus non-allotted lands, restore them to the public domain and 
open them to settlement by non-Indians. These respective Agreements were ratified by 
Congress in one common statute, not separate statutes. 
2. The respective cession language. Article I of the 1892 Yankton Sioux 
Agreement provides: 
The Yankton tribe of Dakota or Sioux Indians hereby cede, sell, 
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, 
and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the 
reservation set apart to said Indians as aforesaid. 
( emphasis added for illustration). 
Article I of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement provides in relevant part: 
The said Nez Perce Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and 
convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in 
and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of said reservation, 
saving and excepting the following described tracts oflands, which are 
hereby retained by the said Indians, viz: (legal descriptions omitted). 
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(emphasis added for illustration). 
Thus, the cession language is not just similar, it is identical in the two agreements. 
3. Sum certain language. Article II of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton 
Sioux provides: 
In consideration for the lands ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed 
to the United States as aforesaid, the United States stipulates and agrees to 
pay to the said Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians the sum of six hundred 
thousand dollars ($600,000), as hereinbefore provided for. 
Article III of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides in relevant part: 
In consideration for the lands ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed 
as aforesaid the United States stipulates and agrees to pay to the said Nez 
Perce Indians the sum of one million six hundred and twenty-six thousand 
two hundred and twenty-two dollars. 
Again, this sum certain language of the two agreements is essentially identical. 
Keeping in mind that each of these respective agreements were for the sale of 
land, the Supreme Court stated: 
Article I of the 1894 Act provides that the Tribe will "cede, sell, 
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and 
interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the 
reservation"; pursuant to Article II, the United States pledges a fixed 
payment of $600,000 in return. This "cession" and "sum certain" 
language is "precisely suited" to terminating reservation status. See 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S., at 445, 95 S.Ct., at 1093. Indeed, we have held that 
when a surplus land Act contains both explicit language of cession, 
evidencing "the present and total surrender of all tribal interest," and 
a provision for a fixed-sum payment, representing "an unconditional 
commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its 
opened land," a "nearly conclusive," or "almost insurmountable," 
presumption of diminishment arises. Solem, supra, at 470, 104 S.Ct., at 
1166; see also Hagen, supra, at 411, 114 S.Ct., at 965. 
The terms of the 1894 Act parallel the language that this Court found 
terminated the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in DeCoteau, supra, at 
445, 95 S.Ct., at 1093, and as in DeCoteau, the 1894 Act ratified a 
negotiated agreement supported by a majority of the Tribe. Moreover, 
the Act we construe here more clearly indicates diminishment than did 
the surplus land Act at issue in Hagen, which we concluded diminished 
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reservation lands even though it provided only that "all the unallotted 
lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain." See 
510 U.S., at 412, 114 S.Ct., at 966. 
Id. at 798 ( emphasis added). 
Thus, the Nez Perce Agreement of 1893 contains identical "cession" language, 
nearly identical "sum certain" language, and evidences the present and total surrender of 
all tribal interest in the ceded lands. 
4. Payment. Again referring to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs for 1894, referenced in the record before this Court as Exhibit 16 of the 
Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, page 319, appears the following relevant language by the 
Commissioner to the Two Houses of Congress: 
For the fiscal year 1895 the total amount appropriated is 
$10,750,486.03. This includes the following items: 
Payment of damages to settlers on Crow Creek and 
Winnebago reservations ............................. . 
Payment to Yankton tribe for lands ............... . 
Payment to Yakama tribe for lands ................... . 
Payment to Coeur d'Alenes for lands ................ . 
Payment to Siletz Indians for lands ............... . 
Payment to Nez Perces for lands ................... . 
Capitalization of Shawnee funds ...................... . 
Face value of certain State bonds assumed by United 











5. Liquor Prohibition. Article XVII of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton 
Sioux provides: 
No intoxicating liquors nor other intoxicants shall ever be sold or given 
away upon any of the lands by this agreement ceded and sold to the United 
States, nor upon any other lands within or comprising the reservations of 
the Yankton Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the treaty between 
the said Indians and the United States, dated April I 91h, 1858, and as 
afterwards surveyed and set off to the said Indians. The penalty for the 
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violation of this provision shall be such as Congress may prescribe in the 
act ratifying this agreement. 
Article IX of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides: 
It is further agreed that the lands by this agreement ceded, those 
retained, and those allotted to the said Nez Perce Indians shall be subject, 
for a period of twenty-five years, to all the laws of the United States 
prohibiting the introduction of intoxicants into the Indian country, and that 
the Nez Perce Indian allottees, whether under the care of an Indian agent 
or not, shall, for a like period, be subject to all the laws of the United 
States prohibiting the sale or other disposition of intoxicants to Indians. 
In regards to the liquor prohibition language in the Yankton Sioux Agreement of 
1892, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The State's position is more persuasively supported by the liquor 
prohibition included in Article XVII of the agreement. The provision 
prohibits the sale or offering of "intoxicating liquors" on "any of the lands 
by this agreement ceded and sold to the United States" or "any other lands 
within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton Sioux or Dakota 
Indians as described in the [1858] treaty," 28 Stat. 318, thus signaling a 
jurisdictional distinction between reservation and ceded land. The 
commissioners' report recommends that Congress "fix a penalty for the 
violation of this provision which will make it most effective in preventing 
the introduction of intoxicants within the limits of the reservation," 
Report, at 21, which could be read to suggest that ceded lands remained 
part of the reservation. We conclude, however, that "[t]he most 
reasonable inference from the inclusion of this provision is that 
Congress was aware that the opened, unallotted areas would 
henceforth not be 'Indian country."' Rosebud, supra, at 613, 97 S.Ct., 
at 1376. By 1892, Congress already had enacted laws prohibiting 
alcohol on Indian reservations, see Cohen 306-307, and "[w]e assume 
that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation," 
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 325, 112 
L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). 
Id. at 801 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the same reasoning applies to the liquor prohibition in the 1893 Agreement 
with the Nez Perce. 
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6. Other similarities. Each agreement also provided for money to satisfy 
disputed claims for scout pay, to award commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces, and 
reserved certain sections in each township for common-school purposes. 
7. Savings Clause. Article XVIII of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton 
Sioux provides: 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of 
April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the 
United States. And after the signing of this agreement, and its ratification 
by Congress, all provisions of the said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be 
in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not been 
made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their 
annuities under the said treaty of April 19th, 1858. 
Article XI of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides: 
The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce 
Indians not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are hereby 
continued in full force and effect. 
With respect to the savings clause language in the 1892 Yankton Sioux 
Agreement, the United States Supreme Court stated in part: 
The Yankton Tribe and the United States, appearing as amicus for the 
Tribe, rest their argument against diminishment primarily on the saving 
clause in Article XVIII of the 1894 Act. The Tribe asserts that because 
that clause purported to conserve the provisions of the 1858 Treaty, the 
existing reservation boundaries were maintained. The United States 
urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the agreement, which would 
presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty only 
insofar as necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without 
fundamentally altering the Treaty's terms. 
Such a literal construction of the saving clause, as the South Dakota 
Supreme Court noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (S.D.1997) 
would "impugn the entire sale." The unconditional relinquishment of 
the Tribe's territory for settlement by non-Indian homesteaders can 
by no means be reconciled with the central provisions of the 1858 
Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the Tribe's "permanent" 
home and prohibited white settlement there. See Oregon Dept. of Fish 
and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 770, 105 S.Ct. 3420, 3430, 
87 L.Ed.2d 542 (1985) ( discounting a saving clause on the basis of a 
"glaring inconsistency" between the original treaty and the subsequent 
agreement). Moreover, the Government's contention that the Tribe 
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intended to cede some property but maintain the entire reservation as its 
territory contradicts the common understanding of the time: that tribal 
ownership was a critical component of reservation status. See Solem, 
supra, at 468, 104 S.Ct., at 1164-1165. We "cannot ignore plain language 
that, viewed in historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs 
counter to a tribe's late claims." Klamath, supra, at 774, 105 S.Ct., at 
3432 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the 
agreement in which it appears, we give it a "sensible construction" 
that avoids this "absurd conclusion." See United States v. Ganderson, 
511 U.S. 39, 56, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 1268-1269, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The most plausible interpretation of 
Article XVIII revolves around the annuities in the form of cash, guns, 
ammunition, food, and clothing that the Tribe was to receive in exchange 
for its aboriginal claims for 50 years after the 1858 Treaty. Along with the 
proposed sale price, these annuities and other unrealized Yankton claims 
- dominated the 1892 negotiations between the Commissioners and the 
Tribe. The tribal historian testified, before the District Court, that the loss 
of their rations would have been "disastrous" to the Tribe, App. 589, and 
members of the Tribe clearly perceived a threat to the annuities. At a 
particularly tense point in the negotiations, when the tide seemed to tum in 
favor of forces opposing the sale, Commissioner John J. Cole warned: 
"I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the 
Great Father to-day for a living. Let the Government send out 
instructions to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the 
Government instruct your agent to cease to issue your clothes .... Let 
the Government instruct him to cease to issue your supplies, let him 
take away the money to run your schools with, and I want to know 
what you would do. Everything you are wearing and eating is gratuity. 
Take all this away and throw this people wholly upon their own 
responsibility to take care of themselves, and what would be the result! 
Not one-fourth of your people could live through the winter, and when 
the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust of all the 
balance of your noble tribe." Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 
10, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 74. 
Given the Tribe's evident concern with reaffirmance of the Government's 
obligations under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners' tendency to 
wield the payments as an inducement to sign the agreement, we conclude 
that the saving clause pertains to the continuance of annuities, not the 
1858 borders. 
The language in Article XVIII specifically ensuring that the "Yankton 
Indians shall continue to receive their annuities under the [ 185 8 Treaty]" 
underscores the limited purpose and scope of the saving clause. It is true 
that the Court avoids interpreting statutes in a way that "renders some 
words altogether redundant." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,574, 
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115 S.Ct 1061, 1069, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). Butin light of the fact that 
the record of the negotiations between the Commissioners and the 
Yankton Tribe contains no discussion of the preservation of the 1858 
boundaries but many references to the Government's failure to fulfill 
earlier promises, see, e.g., Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 3, 
1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 54-55, it seems most likely 
that the parties inserted and understood Article XVIII, including both the 
general statement regarding the force of the 1858 Treaty and the particular 
provision that payments would continue as specified therein, to assuage 
the Tribes' concerns about their past claims and future entitlements. 
Id. at 799 and 800 (emphasis added); See also Article II of the 1855 Treaty with 
the Nez Perce (containing a similar provision that the reservation was for the 
exclusive use and benefit of the tribe and white settlers were prohibited). 
The two respective savings clauses set out in full above are obviously somewhat 
different. However, several observations are easily made. First, the Supreme Court 
found that the Government's negotiations with the Yankton Sioux in the 1892 Agreement 
were dominated by the Government's failure to fulfill earlier promises, primarily annuity 
payments which were part of the 1858 Treaty. However, by Article IV of the 1855 
Treaty with the Nez Perce, and Article IV of the 1863 Treaty with the Nez Perce, all 
annuity payments were due and payable long before the negotiations of 1893, and, 
therefore, clearly would not be expected to be any part of the negotiations in 1893. 
More importantly, however, is the actual language of the two respective savings 
clauses. In this Court's view, the language in the Nez Perce Agreement of 1893 is much 
stronger in support of diminishment than is the Yankton Sioux savings clause. The reason 
being the plain, simple and explicit language of the clause. More specifically, and as 
pointed out throughout this decision, a continuation or preservation of the then-existing 
reservation boundaries (pre-1893 Agreement) would be wholly inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Agreement, "would eviscerate the agreement in which it appears," and 
would lead to an "absurd conclusion." 
Lastly, according to the record of negotiations with the Nez Perce (see 
Proceedings relating to the 1893 Treaty negotiations, entitled: Organization of the 
council of the Nez Perce tribe of Indians in the State of Idaho and on Nez Perce 
Reservation, Lapwai Agency, Idaho, December 2, 1892, transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 
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31, pp. 26-61; in this Court's record as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit of James C. Tucker 
Dated - July 17, 1998, filed July 20, 1998), the dominant theme, as read and interpreted 
by this Court, was whether members of the Tribe would sell the surplus land or not in the 
first instance. 
8. Record of negotiations on discussions of preservation of reservation 
boundaries. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux held that the record 
of the negotiations between the Commissioners and the Yankton tribe contains no 
discussion of the preservation of the 185.8 boundaries. Id. at 800. 
A reading of the record of negotiations with the Nez Perce in 1893, however, does 
reveal at least a minimal discussion of changing reservation boundaries (the following 
quotes taJr..en from: Proceedings relating to the 1893 Trear; negotiations, entitled: 
Organization of the council of the Nez Perce tribe of Indians in the State of Idaho and on 
Nez Perce Reservation, Lapwai Agency, Idaho, December 2, 1892, transcribed in S. 
Exec. Doc. No. 31, pp. 26-61; in this Court's record as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit of James 
C. Tucker Dated-July 17, 1998, filed July 20, 1998). 
First, it was clearly understood by all at the negotiations that the Government's 
sole purpose was to purchase the surplus (unalloted) lands with the exception of certain 
timber lands. For instance, the following excerpts are from the First Day of Council at 
Lapwai, Idaho, December 5, 1892: 
Commissioner ROBERT SCHLEICHER. You have known for several 
years, since the special agent was sent to allot your lands, that a 
commission would be sent to buy your lands. Your allotments were 
completed several months ago, and commissioners have now come to treat 
for your surplus lands, you reserving enough timber land for yourselves 
and children. 
p.26,and 
JAMES LAWYER. Is the sale ofunallotted lands the only object? 
Commissioner JAMES F. ALLEN. Yes; the land you do not require 
after your allotments are made and what timber and wood land you 
need. The commission has your interest at heart. I was selected by the 
Secretary of the Interior as your special friend. We are authorized to 
treat, arrange terms, and no other business. The Government believes 
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000:. L 
that if you cede these lands at a fair and reasonable price you will receive 
a payment for them, the balance to be invested, drawing 5 per cent 
interest, which will be paid to you every year or expended for your benefit 
as agreed upon. These lands can be of small benefit to you. The 
Government tries too [sic] keep trespass~rs off and cattle off, but is 
not always able. If you have the money from this sale you v.,ill be sure of 
receiving it. 
p. 27 ( emphasis added). 
Second, and as alluded to immediately above with respect to trespassers, there were 
discussions on the Sixth Day of Council about the difficulties in keeping trespassers off 
the then-existing (pre-1893 Agreement) Reservations. 
JAMES LA WYER. That provision of the treaty only had reference to the 
time being and did not expect them to keep the land altogether. It was a 
small piece of land and the land was to be used as a stage station. 
Wbether it is there, in the treaty, or not, it should have been that the agent 
should have authority, if he overstepped the privilege of remaining there, 
to remove his cattle and horses. He can get them as far up as to the 
canyon - and they go that far - and bring them back. Not only that, in 
going there he is not particular, but gets some of ours too. Last year I had 
a cow and a calf and a yearling, and this man took them from us, and only 
with considerable trouble I was enabled to get them back again. 
Commissioner JAMES F. ALLEN. My friend Lawyer has given a far 
better argument than I can give why you should sell the land. As I have 
said before, the Department has ordered Caldwell off the reservation. 
It was supposed he was off. If he is back again with his cattle and 
horses it only shows the great difficulty the Department labors under 
3,000 miles from here in keeping such men off the reservation and 
keeping it clear of cattle and horses so that it would be of some use to you. 
If you will sell the surplus lands and have the money for it, it won't 
then make any difference if white men's cattle roam over it. But they 
will not, for settlers will come and take up land and fence their farms, and 
that will keep cattle not only off their lands but it will help to keep them 
off your lands, for before the cattle can get on your farms they will have to 
come over white men's farms. The white men will be interested in 
keeping them off their lands and so help to keep them off your lands. I 
said the other day that when the land is settled up with farms and 
settlers all round inside and outside and mixed among you there will 
be no difficulty in keeping cattle off your land. Now, this is a strong 
argument why you should dispose of this land, and is one of the reasons 
why the Secretary and the President are anxious you should do so. 
p. 45 (emphasis added). 
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A fair reading of the above discussion also reasonably leads to the conclusion that 
if sold, the land would no longer be a part of the reservation, i.e., "If you will sell the 
surplus lands ... it won't then make any difference if white men's cattle roam over it." In 
other words, white men's cattle on land was only a trespass problem if it was on-
reservation. 
Next, on the Seventh Day of Council, held on December 13, 1892, the following 
breakdown of the subject lands was stated. 
Commissioner ROBERT SCHLEICHER. My friends, we have spoken a 
great deal, and you have spoken a great deal else, and you and we think 
now the time has come not to make such long speeches, but devote 
ourselves to business. 
We were requested yesterday by some speakers to bring you this 
morning a list of the number of acres in the whole reservation, and the 
number of acres that was allotted and the number of acres that is left for 
you to dispose of. This we are prepared to do. And we will now read it 
out and ask that the interpreter shall translate it slowly, so that every one 
can understand it, as follows: 
Acres 
The reservation contains .................................................. 756,968 
The allotments comprise ................................................... 182,234 
Leaving a surplus oflands .................................................. 574,734 
Reserved for wood and timber. ............................................. 64,820 
509,914 
If the amount of timber land is reduced to 34,820 acres it 
will add to surplus ..................................................... 30,000 
And the surplus to be sold will amount to ........................ 539,914 
p. 47 (emphasis added). 
And finally, on the Tenth Day's Council, held on December 15, 1892, the following 
was stated in regards to the understanding that at least some members of the Tribe 
possessed; that is by selling the land the reservation boundaries would change. 
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SALMON RIVER BILLY. You see me, and you see, too, I am left of the 
number who helped to make the first treaty with Governor Stevens in '55, 
as also the treaty of 1863, made by Mr. Hale. I learned then, and know 
what I learned then was true. And I was one of the speakers at both 
treaties, all of which that was spoken of. I remember well Mr. Hale told 
us that the former treaty made by Governor Stevens was, as it were, 
fenced in and all right, and I was also told by him at same time that the 
country had been inclosed [sic] according to the treaty and prevented 
the entrance on the reservation of any white man and any who should 
try to set aside or break down the boundaries of that reservation. 
Should it be done by us Indians, we should take the matter in hand, but if 
by the white men the Government should be appealed to. In case your 
agent would not take cognizance of the matter, it would be for you to push 
that agent out of office and refer the matter to the Government. Perhaps 
it may be on account of having another President, who is a Democrat; 
perhaps it is he who has made the edict for breaking down the lines of 
the reservation. 
p. 56 (emphasis added). 
9. Preamble language in the Congressional Act of 1894. The Act of August 
15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, contains preamble language to the Articles of Agreement for both 
the agreements with the Yankton Sioux and the Nez Perce. The preamble Yankton 
language is as follows: 
Whereas the Yankton tribe ofDacotah-now spelled Dakota and so 
spelled in this agreement - or Sioux Indians is willing to dispose of a 
portion of the land set apart and reserved to said tribe, by the first 
article of the treaty of April (19th) nineteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-
eight (1858), between said tribe and the United States, and situated in the 
state of South Dakota. 
Now, therefore, this agreement made and entered into in pursuance of 
the provisions of the act of Congress approved July thirteenth (13th), 
eighteen hundred and ninety-two (1892), at the Yankton Indian Agency, 
South Dakota, by J.C. Adams of Webster, S. D., John J. Cole of St. Louis, 
Mo., and I.W. French of the State of Neb., on the part of the United States, 
duly authorized and empowered thereto, and the chiefs, headmen, and 
other male adult members of said Yankton tribe of Indians, witnesseth: 
(emphasis mine). 
Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290 (53d Cong. 2d Sess. 1893), p. 314. 
The preamble Nez Perce language is as follows: 
Whereas the said Nez Perce Indians are willing to dispose of a 
portion of the tract of land in the State of Idaho reserved as a home 
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for their use and occupation by the second article of the treaty 
between said Indians and the United States, concluded June ninth, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-three: 
Now, therefore, this agreement made and entered into in pursuance of 
the provisions of said Act of Congress approved February eighth, eighteen 
hundred and eighty-seven, at the Nez Perce Agency, by Robert Schleicher, 
James F. Allen, and Cyrus Beede, on the part of the United States, and the 
principal men and male adults of the Nez Perce tribe oflndians located on 
said Nez Perce Reservation, witnesseth: (emphasis mine). 
Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290 (53d Cong. 2d Sess. 1893), p. 327. 
An examination of the above language reveals some important matters. First, 
Congress expressly found and stated in the statute that the respective Tribes were willing 
to dispose of a portion of the lands previously reserved to the respective tribes; i.e., a 
clear expression of congressional intent. Second, as it relates to the Nez Perce, note that 
the language (bolded by this Court for emphasis) provides that the Tribe is willing to 
dispose of part of the lands reserved to the Tribe by the Treaty of 1863 (not t.1-ie Treaty of 
1855). Thus it is clear that at least Congress thought that the Reservation of 1855 had 
been diminished by the Treaty of 1863 and that Congress intended to further diminish it 
by the ratification in 1894 of the Agreement of 1893. 
With the above in mind, this Court then considers the respective cession language 
in each of the Treaties/Agreement with the Nez Perce. Article I of the Treaty of 1855 
provides in relevant part: 
ARTICLE I. The said Nez Perce tribe of Indians hereby cede, relinquish 
and convey to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and 
to the country occupied or claimed by them, bounded and described as 
follows, to wit: 
( emphasis mine). 
Articles I and II of the Treaty of 1863 provide in relevant part: 
ARTICLE I. The said Nez Perce tribe agree to relinquish, and do 
hereby relinquish, to the United States the lands heretofore reserved 
for the use and occupation of the said tribe, saving and excepting so 
much thereof as is described in article II. for a new reservation. 
ARTICLE II. The United States agree to reserve for a home, and for 
the sole use and occupation of said tribe, the tract of land included 
within the following boundaries, to wit: 
ORDER ON UNITED STATES' MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR AL TERNA TIVEL Y 
FOR AN EVJDENTIARY HEARING 
G:\Orders Pending\03-10022 Nez Perce alter amend Yankton.doc0J/21/00 Page 24 of29 
( emphasis mine). 
And again the cession language of Article I of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez 
Perce provides: 
The said Nez Perce Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to 
the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the 
unallotted lands within the limits of said reservation, saving and excepting 
the following described tracts of lands, which are hereby retained by the 
said Indians, viz: (legal descriptions omitted). 
Therefore, an examination of the above quoted language of the three agreements 
with the Tribe reveals the following logic. No one contends that by the 1855 Treaty that 
the Tribe did not cede, sell, and relinquish to the United States approximately 7 million 
acres and reserved an approximate 7 million acres. Or, therefore, if the cession language 
in the 1855 Treaty has any legal effect, then the near identical language in the Agreement 
of 1893 must be consistently interpreted in a like fashion. Furthermore, no one seriously 
contends that the Treaty of 1863 had not diminished the Reservation created in the 1855 
Treaty from about 7 million acres to about 750,000 acres (at least as noted above in the 
Nez Perce Preamble, Congress speaks of the Tribe disposing of lands reserved in Article 
II of the 1863 Treaty, p. 327). 
10. Presidential Proclamations Following the Congressional Act of 1894. 
As further clear evidence of "contemporary interpretation" by the federal 
government regarding _the interpretation that the 1893 Agreement ( specifically the 
"cession" and the "sum certain" language) had the effect of diminishing the Nez Perce 
Reservation, an examination of the respective Presidential Proclamations opening the 
Reservations for settlement is useful. 
President Grover Cleveland's Proclamation of May 16, 1895, opening for 
settlement the ceded lands of the previous Yankton Sioux Reservation, provides in 
relevant part: 
Whereas, all the terms, conditions and considerations required by said 
agreement made with said tribes of Indians and by the laws relating 
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thereto, precedent to opening said lands to settlement, have been, as I 
hereby declare, complied with: 
Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United 
States, by virtue of the power in me vested by the Statutes hereinbefore 
mentioned, do hereby declare and make known that all of the lands 
acquired from the Yankton tribe of Sioux or Dacotah Indians by the 
said agreement, saving and excepting the lands reserved in pursuance of 
the provisions of said agreement and the act of Congress ratifying the 
same, will, at and after the hour of twelve o'clock, noon (central standard 
time), on the twenty first day of May, 1895 and not before, be open to 
settlement, under the terms of and subject to all the conditions, 
limitations, reservations, and restrictions contained in said agreement, 
the statutes hereinbefore specified and the laws of the United States 
applicable thereto. 
The lands to be so opened to settlement are for greater convenience, 
particularly described in the accompanying schedule, entitled "Schedule of 
lands within the Yankton Reservation, South Dakota, to be opened to 
settlement by Proclamation of the President", and which schedule is made 
a part hereof. ( emphasis_ added). · 
Likewise, the President's Proclamation of November 8, 1895, opening for 
settlement the ceded lands of the previous Nez Perce Reservation provides in relevant 
part: 
Whereas all the terms, conditions, and considerations required by said 
agreement made with said tribe oflndians hereinbefore mentioned, and 
the laws relating thereto, precedent to opening said lands to settlement 
have been, as I hereby declare, provided for, paid and complied with: 
Now, therefore, I Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, 
by virtue of the power in me vested by the statutes hereinbefore 
mentioned, and by said agreement, do hereby declare and make known 
that all of the unallotted and unreserved lands acquired from the Nez 
Perce Indians, by said agreement, will, at and after the hour of 12 
o'clock, noon, (Pacific Standard time) on the 18th day of November 1895 
and not before, be opened to settlement under the terms of and subject 
to all the conditions, limitations, reservations, and restrictions 
contained in said agreement, the statutes above specified and the laws 
of the United States applicable thereto. 
The lands to be so opened to settlement are for greater convenience 
particularly described in the accompanying schedule, entitled "Schedule of 
lands within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, Idaho, to be opened to 
settlement by Proclamation of the President", and which schedule is made 
a part hereof. ( emphasis added). 
In Yankton Sioux, t.11.e United States Supreme Court stated in this respect: 
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Finally, the Presidential Proclamation opening the lands to settlement 
declared that the Tribe had "ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed to the 
United States, all [its] claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the 
unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation set apart to said tribe 
by the first article [of the 1858 Treaty]." Presidential Proclamation (May 
16, 1895), reprinted in App. 453. This Court has described substantially 
similar language as "an unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement by the 
Nation's Chief Executive, of a perceived disestablishment." (citation 
omitted). 
Id. at 803. 
The operative language in the respective Presidential Proclamations cited above is 
nearly identical and is legally indistinguishable. As such, and consistent with the holding 
in Yankton Sioux, the language in the Presidential Proclamation regarding the ceded lands 
of the former Nez Perce Reser.ration must likewise be construed as "an unambiguous, 
contemporaneous, statement by the Nation's Chief Executive, of a perceived 
disestablishment." 
More fundamentally, the purchased land was "opened to settlement under ... the 
laws of the United States applicable thereto." Therefore, the land was clearly 
contemplated to be a part of the United States and not the Reservation. 
VIII. 
Court's Declaration For Clarification Of Ruling Regarding Diminishment And The 
Claimed Instream Flow Water Rights On Appeal, i.e., Even If This Court Is Wrong 
Regarding Diminishment Of The Reservation, There Is Still No Off-Reservation 
Instream Flow Water Right. 
In light of the present motion to alter or amend the judgment and the 
pending/imminent appeals, the Court desires to clarify its prior ruling regarding the 
asserted reservation of any off-reservation in-stream flow water rights. As previously 
discussed, this Court ruled that the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent Congressional 
ratification diminished the boundaries of the Reservation and that such diminishment also 
would have necessarily included any then existing off-reservation in-stream flow water 
rights. However, it needs be clarified that irrespective of the effect of the 1893 
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Agreement on the boundaries of the Reservation, the Nez Perce did not impliedly reserve 
in-stream flow water rights extending outside the current boundaries of the Reservation, 
wherever those boundaries are ultimately detennined to exist. Simply put, based on the 
Court's interpretation of the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce did not reserve any in-stream 
flow water rights outside the boundaries of the Reservation. 
Contrary to the assertion made by the United States, this does not make the 
Court's ruling on the effect of the 1893 Agreement on the boundaries of the Reservation 
"orbiter dicta." The basis for the Nez Perce Tribe's reserved water right claims 
originated in conjunction with the fishing rights reserved in pursuant to Article ill of the 
· 1855 Treaty. Article III of the 1855 Treaty distinguished between the nature of the 
fishing rights reserved by the Nez Perce Tribe both on and off the Reservation. 
Specifically, the Nez Perce reserved "exclusive" fishing rights on t.lie Reservation and "in 
common" fishing rights extending outside of the Reservation. The "in-common" 
language contained in Article ill is the only express language contained in the Treaty that 
arguably supports the claim for a reserved in-stream flow water right outside the 
boundaries of the Reservation. Therefore, it belies the plain language of the Treaty to fail 
to distinguish between the nature of the fishing right reserved by the Nez Perce Tribe 
both on and off the Reservation. 1 As this Court previously discussed in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order, the nature and extent of the off-Reservation :fishing right reserved 
pursuant to "in-common" fishing language, as that language has been previously 
interpreted in both the subject treaty and in other Steven's Treaties, does not give rise to 
the implication that a reserved water right necessarily accompanied the fishing right. The 
Court did not rule on the whether the "exclusive" fishing rights reserved by the Nez Perce 
Tribe also implied an in-stream flow water right on the Reservation because the scope of 
the motion was limited to claims outside the boundaries of the Reservation. Since, based 
on this Court's analysis, there is a difference between the on and off reservation :fishing 
rights which in turn ultimately form the basis for the claimed water rights, and since this 
Court ultimately must adjudicate the in-stream flow claims, the present boundaries of the 
1 Although the Nez Perce Tribe argues that the distinction between claimed water rights on and off the 
Reservation is irrelevant, this Court disagrees. Again, the claimed basis for the water rights is the fishing 
rights reserved in Article III of the 1855 Treaty. Article III clearly does not reserve the same fishing rights 
both on and off the Reservation. 
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Reservation are clearly at issue. Accordingly, the effect of the 1893 Agreement is both 
integral to the determination of the boundaries of the Reservation and also the alternative 
conclusion that even if the Nez Perce Tribe has previously reserved in stream flow t1ghts 
outside the boundaries of the Reservation, those rights were ceded. Although the physical 
boundaries of the Reservation have not yet been determined, if it is later resolved that the 
Nez Perce Tribe, or the Federal Government on behalf of the Tribe, reserved in-stream 
flows on the Reservation, the boundaries will ultimately have to be particularly described 
so that the water rights can also be properly described. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
This Court reaffirms its rulings made in the November 10, 1999 Orders on 
Summary Judgment and also adopts as additional grounds the matters stated herein. 
For all of these reasons, the United States' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
is denied. Likewise, the alternative motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED: 
DATED: JANUARY 21, 2000. 
ORDER ON UNITED STATES' MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY 
FOR Al"! EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
G:\Orders Pending\03-10022 Nez Perce alter amend Yankton.doc0l/21/00 
BARRY WOOD 
Administrative District Judge and 
Presiding Judge of the 
Snake River Basin Adjudication 
Page 29 of29 
000;:Qc 
v 
Nos. 26042 & 26128 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN RE: SRBA CASE NO. 39576, SUBCASE NO. 03-10022, NEZ PERCE TRIBE 
OFF-RESERVATION INSTREAM FLOW CLAIMS 
NEZ PERCE TRIBE; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO; et al., 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE, 
AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO 
Appeal from the SRBA District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
In and for Twin Falls County, Honorable R. Barry Wood, Presiding District Judge 
Tom D. Tobin 
Tobin Law Offices, P.C. 
422 Main Street 
P.O. Box 730 
Winner, SD 57580 
(605) 842-2500 
Michael McNichols* 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 7 43-6538 
*Counsel of Record 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
(See next page for list of Respondents' counsel and Appellants' counsel) 
ADDITIONAL RESPONDENTS' AND APPELLANTS' COUNSEL 
Josephine Beeman 
Beeman & Associates 
409 W. Jefferson 




P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Roger D. Ling 
Ling, Neilsen & Robinson 
P.O. Box 396 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Jeffrey Fereday 
Givens Pursley LLC 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Albert Barker 
John K. Simpson 
Travis Thompson 
Barker, Rosholt & Simpson 
P.O. Box 2139 
Boise, ID 83701-2139D. 
K. Heidi Gudgell 
Office of Legal Counsel 
P.O. Box 305 
Lapwai, ID 83540-0305 
Jerry Hoagland 
HC 79, Box44 
Melba, ID 83641 
Michael Mirande 
Miller Bateman LLP 
1426 Alaskan Way Ste 301 
Seattle, WA 98101 
IDWR Document Depository 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 82720-0098 
Brandelle Whitworth 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 
P.O. Box 306 
Fort Hall, ID 83203 
Charles Honsinger 
Daniel Steenson 
Ringert Clark Chtd. 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
HW Rettig 
Rettig Rosenberry & Lovan 
P.O. Box 729 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Michael B. White, Hecla Mining 
6500 Mineral Drive 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Lary C. Walker, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 248 
Burley, ID 83318 
James C. Tucker 
Idaho Power Company 
Steven C. Moore P.O. Box 70 
Native American Rights Fund Boise, ID 83707 
1506 Broadway 
Boulder, CO 80302 
E. Ann Peterson 
Peter C. Monson 
U.S. Dept. of Justice-ENRD 
P.O. Box 23795 
L'Enfant Station 
Washington, DC 20026 
D. Marc Haws 
Assistant US Attorney 
District ofidaho 
877 W. Main Street Ste 201 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jerry Rigby & Ray W. Rigby 
Rigby Thatcher et al 
P.O. Box250 
Rexberg, ID 83440-0250 
Douglas Endreson 
Attorney at Law 
1250 Eye Street NW 
Washington, DC 20005 
000211 
Bruce Smith 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 
225 N. 9th Street Ste 420 
Boise, ID 83702 
Norman Semanko 
Attorney at Law 
205 N. 1 Oth Street Ste 530 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dana Hofstetter 
Hofstetter Law Office 
608 W. Franklin 
Boise, ID 83702 
. Terry Uhling, JR Simplot Co. 
P.O. Box27 
Boise, ID 83707-0027 
Lawrence Wasden 
Attorney General 
Clive J. Strong, Steven W. Strack 
P.O. Box 44449 
Boise, ID 83711-4449 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................. . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ................................................. . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................. . 
ARGUMENT ........................................................ . 
I. 
II. 
THE PRECEDENT VALUE OF UNITED STATES V. WEBB, 219 F.3D 1127 
(9th Cir. 2000) IS UNDERMINED BY THE FACT THAT THE HISTORICAL 
RECORDS AND REPORTS WERE WRONGFULLY SEALED AND 
AMICUSPARTICIPATIONWASNOT ALLOWED .................... . 
THE RESERVATION STATUS ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT .......................................... . 
A. An Overview of the Arguments Submitted in the United States 
Supreme Court Establishes Three General Themes ................. . 
B. A Review of the Arguments Previously Presented and Rejected in the 
United States Supreme Court Establishes Clear Principles that 

















Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) .................. . 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) ............................ . 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) ............ . 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) ................ . 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) .......................... . 
Ha~en v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) ............................ . 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (Yankton 1) .. 
(a). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Mana~ement 
District, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) ..................... . 
(b). South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) 















The Remand in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), Confirms the 
1863 Boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation Should Not Be 
Recognized ............................................... . 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) ................................. . 
(a). Boundary Extinguishment ............................. . 
(b). 18 U.S.C. ~ 1151. .................................... . 
(c). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) 
rev'd 188 FJd 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 
(2000) ............................................. . 
(d). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) ...................... . 
United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 1200 (2001) .......................................... . 
III. THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN 
MINNESOTA v. MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 526 U.S. 








PRESUMPTION OF DISESTABLISHMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
CONCLUSION......................................................... 41 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: Page 
Alaska v. Native Villa}<e ofVenetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).... 36 
Antoine v. Washin}<ton, 420 U.S. 194 (1975)............................. 7 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908)....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Ha}<en v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) ................................. 4, 16, 23, 24, 27 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172(1999)...... 40 
New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972)...... 29 
Ore}<on Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) . . . . . 4, 23 
Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914).............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) ................................ 4, 6, 21, 23, 41 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996)........... 26, 28 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
State v. Gre}<er, 559 N.W.2d 854 (1997)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 30 
United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985)...................... 6, 23 
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
United States v. Gre}<er, 98 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 1996)....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914)............................ 7, 36 
United States v. Scott, Case No. CR98-01-N-EJL (D. Idaho, Aug. 12, 1998)... . 2 
United States v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. 
CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho Jan 12, 1999)......................... 3, 38 
United States v. Webb, 219 F. 3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 53 l U.S. 
1200 (2001 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 38, 39, 40 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 
1996) ...................................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, No. 98-4042 (D.S.D. Oct. 5, 1998) (order 
denying motion for new trial) ................................. . 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) ........... . 




530 U.S. 1261 (2000) ....................................... 32, 36, 37, 38, 39 
STATUTES: 
Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (General Allotment Act) ............ . 
Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989 .................................. . 





Act of March 22, 1906, 34 Stat. 80 ............................... . 
18 U.S.C. ~ I 151 ............................................ . 
CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS: 
H.R. Rep. No. 791, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) ....................... . 
S. Rep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892) .......................... . 
PUBLIC LAND DECISIONS: 
54 ID 560 (1934) ................................................ . 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148) ...................... . 
Joint Brief of Respondent, State of South Dakota & United States as Amicus 
Curiae, DeMarrias v. State, 319 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1963) (No. 17200). 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Erickson v. Feather decided with DeCoteau v. 
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148) ......... . 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ha5<en v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281) ....................... . 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Ha5<en v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) 
(No. 92-6281) ............................................ . 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 
(1973) (No. 71-1182) ...................................... . 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) 
(No. 71-1182) ............................................ . 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
430 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-562) ............................ . 
Memorandum of the United States, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 
584 (1977) (No. 75-562) .................................... . 
Brief for the Tribe, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) 
(No. 75-562) ............................................. . 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 
(1977) (No. 75-562) ....................................... . 
Brief for the Petitioner, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) 
(No. 62) ........................................... · ·. · · · · 
Memorandum for the United States, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 
(1962) (No. 62) .......................................... . 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Solem v. 





















Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Manaf(ement District, 
99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 26, 27, 29 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, South 
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581) . . . 31, 33 
Brief of Respondent, Southern Missouri Waste Management District, South 
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581)... 16 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-52, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581)............................ 32 
Opening Brief for the Federal Appellant, United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 
1261 (8th Cir. 1985) (Nos. 83-2353, 2538, 2543, 2544)..... . . . . . . . 22 
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 
2000) (No. 99-30155)................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Summary Judgment Brief for the United States, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. 
Gaff~y, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) (No. 98-4042)........... 38 
Brief of Plaintiff-Intervenor/Appellee United States of America, Yankton 
Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-3893, 
3894, 3896, 3900).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Brief for the United States in Opposition, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. State of 
South Dakota, 796 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1436).. . . . . . . . 6 
Brief for the United States in Opposition, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 
483 U.S. 1005 (1986) (No. 86-1436)........................... 23 
James M. Bek.ken, Comment, lndians--Reservations-Jurisdictional Effect of 
Surplus Land Statute Upon Traditional Boundaries of an Indian 
Reservation, 52 N.D. L. Rev. 411 (1975)............ . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Susan D. Cai.upbell, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts and the Question 
of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 57 (1984)..... 35 
V 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Although the issue in this case centers around a tribal water claim, the scope of this brief is 
limited to the primary question of law involving the status of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation: 
whether the ceded area of the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation, now 90% owned and populated by non-
members of the Nez Perce Tribe, was properly considered by the district court to be within the 
purview of the almost irrebuttable presumption of cession reservation disestablishment repeatedly 
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, and whether the overall conclusion of the district court 
that the Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished by this 1894 cession legislation should be affirmed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard ofreview set forth by Respondent State ofldaho at 1-2 is adopted in this amicus 
curiae brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 8 (I.A.R.), the North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance 
(Alliance) submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of Respondent State ofidaho. The Alliance 
is an unincorporated association; its members include 3 counties, 8 cities, 3 school districts and 7 
highway districts in north central Idaho, whose geographical boundaries include land which was 
within the Nez Perce Indian reservation as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent 
(90%) owned and populated by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe. The purpose of the Alliance 
is to provide an organization to foster cooperation between its members and to focus their efforts 
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toward obtaining a resolution of their jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional 
authority of the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe. 
The United States and the Nez Perce Tribe can not claim to be surprised by the arguments 
in this amicus curiae brief. For the most part, every argument of substance was previously submitted 
in the amici curiae briefs in United States v. Scott, Case No. CR98-0l-N-EJL (D. Idaho, Aug. 12, 
1998) and United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), which were served on the United 
States and the Nez Perce Tribe at the time. 
I. THE PRECEDENT VALUE OF UNITED STATES V. WEBB, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), 
IS UNDERMINED BY THE FACT THAT THE HISTORICAL RECORDS AND REPORTS 
WERE WRONGFULLY SEALED ANDAMICUS PARTICIPATION WAS NOT ALLOWED. 
Although this brief focuses generally on the merits of the litigating position of the United 
States, the efforts of the United States to seal the historical records and the historical reports relied 
on by the courts in Webb bears special emphasis. Brief of Respondent State ofidaho has highlighted 
these specific Nez Perce historical records and reports that confirm disestablishment in the traditional 
sense. Initially, the amicus curiae motion of the Alliance in the court of appeals in Webb was not 
accompanied by a proposed amicus curiae brief because the entire historical record and transcript 
in the district court regarding the jurisdictional issue was inexplicably under seal ( at the insistence of 
the United States). Rather, in order to fairly brief the important jurisdictional question regarding 
congressional intent and reservation status, the Alliance respectfully submitted that amicus curiae 
should first have been allowed access to this historical evidence, including the expert testimony that 
evaluated that evidence. The district court expressly relied upon this historical evidence and 
·2 
testimony. UnitedStatesv. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL(D. Idaho 
Jan. 12, 1999). 
For that reason, pursuant to Cir. R. 27-13(c), a motion to unseal the historical record and 
transcript accompanied the initial motion for leave to appear amicus curiae. Although amicus was 
not a party entitled to submit a motion to unseal pursuant to Cir. R. 27-13(c), Petitioner Webb did 
not oppose this motion to unseal ( or any other motion to unseal). And, in any event, the Alliance 
pointed out that the court of appeals could, in the interests of justice, enter an appropriate Order on 
its own motion. The Alliance further noted that the previous Order that set the briefing schedule need 
not have been modified. 
By Order of September 30, 1999, the court of appeals denied both motions without prejudice 
to renewal following the filing of the opening brief. The Alliance submitted a renewed Motion to 
Unseal pursuant to that Order. That renewed motion was denied as moot three (3) days before the 
decision on the merits (because the court of appeals denied the motion to file an amicus curiae brief 
at the same time). United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1200 (2001). 
Public officials throughout the Nez Perce area are still dumbfounded. What legitimate 
interests could have been advanced by keeping historical records sealed when the issue was 
congressional intent? A satisfactory answer to that question has not been forthcoming to date. The 
decision of the court of appeals does not mention the issue of the sealed historical record and sealed 
historical reports. 
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II. THE RESERVATION STATUS ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
A. An Overview of the Arguments Submitted in the United States Supreme Court 
Establishes Three General Themes. 
A fair reading of the reservation status cases, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 
(1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 
(1975); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); 
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); and South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 
(1998), clearly undermines the views set forth by the court of appeals in Webb. The State highlights 
these important principles and, for that reason, they will not be repeated here. 
However, a proper perspective regarding the history of this reservation status litigation is also 
important in order to accurately assess the issue in conjunction with the principles set forth in these 
decisions. This brief is intended to serve that purpose and provide that perspective. The Alliance 
starts with a brief review of the primary arguments presented and rejected in each case decided by 
the United States Supreme Court, as well as the historic perspective available or established at the 
time. 1 Such a review advances three overriding themes. 
1 This brief does not address the decision of the Court in Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. 
Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985), only because itisnottrulyareservation status case. However, 
Oregon does involve a cession agreement and the Oregon opinion sheds considerable light on 
understanding the cession process. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Greger, 559 
N.W.2d 854 (S.D. 1997), cited and discussed Oregon in several instances. For all of these reasons, 
Oregon is important and merits consideration. · 
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First, as one would expect, each time the United States Supreme Court was presented with 
this issue, more primary sources were available from which a proper historical perspective could be 
reconstructed and the intent of Congress more conclusively ascertained. The opinions reflect this 
documentation. 
Second, the views of the United States are especially noteworthy. The United States rarely 
failed to advocate the resurrection of original reservation boundaries, presumably because of a 
perceived obligation to support the tribal position. The shifting, but very sophisticated arguments of 
the United States, (for the most part repeatedly rejected by the United States Supreme Court) have 
. served to perpetuate the confusion and conflicts in this area of federal Indian law, fueling the prospect 
of additional litigation. 
The central arguments of the United States are therefore closely examined for a third reason. 
As will be seen, the United States repeatedly has made a number of important concessions in the 
United States Supreme Court, subsequent to DeCoteau, regarding the effect of cession agreements, 
like this one, on Indian reservations. The United States conceded that these cessions disestablished 
reservations. These cession concessions, made in conjunction with submissions that urged the 
continued recognition of other original reservation boundaries, cannot be explained away. The views 
of the United States in this regard, submitted to the United States Supreme Court, merit continued 
consideration.2 
2 Because Yankton Sioux Tribe is the most recent reservation boundary case decided by the United 
States Supreme Court, this brief should also mention, in chronological order, the specific concessions 
5 
U' •l O <) ' '; u .::;,::.1. 
B. A Review of the Arguments Previously Presented and Re.iected in the United States 
Supreme Court Establishes Clear Principles that Undermine Any Argument Supporting a 
Resurrection of the 1863 Boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. 
I. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). A reservation status issue was first 
presented to the United States Supreme Court in Seymour. Although we now know that the 1906 
Colville Act (Act of March 22, 1906, 34 Stat. 80) at issue in that case was one in a series of surplus 
land statutes enacted pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act)-a routine matter 
for Congress by 1906-neither the General Allotment Act of 1887 nor the limited legislative history 
of the 1906 Act played any real role in the resolution of the question. Act of February 8, 1887, 24 
Stat. 388. The Seymour opinion does not cite the General Allotment Act or the legislative history of 
the 1906 Colville Act. The briefs are similarly silent with respect to the General Allotment Act and 
the few citations to the 1906 legislative history are set forth almost as an afterthought. 
of the United States regarding the disestablisr..ment of the 1858 Y ar.u.1<.ton Sioux reservation effected 
by the passage of the 1894 Yankton Sioux cession act. In 1984, the United States formally submitted 
this Yankton disestablishment concession in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v. 
Dion, 752F.2d 1261 (1985),rev'd,476U.S. 734(1986). TheUnitedStatesdidsoinordertomain-
tain a cession distinction in Solem essential to its argument there supporting original reservation 
boundaries. See Solem discussion infra. Moreover, in other litigation also pending at the same time, 
and also involving the 1858 Yankton Sioux reservation and the 1894 Yankton Sioux cession act, the 
United States acknowledged that Court's decision in DeCoteau considered "a similar and 
contemporaneous cession agreement" with "the same language" and "purpose" as the Yankton 
cession. Brief for the United States in Opposition, at 11, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 796 · 
F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1436). Significantly, the unusually expansive saving clause of the 
1858 treaty that the United States subsequently insisted was so important in Yankton Sioux Tribe (to 
preclude disestablishment), was not mentioned in any of this. Yankton Sioux Tribe, of course, 
unanimously rejected that savings clause argument and the litigating position of the United States. 
6 
In short, Seymour was decided almost without the benefit of any historical perspective. 
"Almost" is used because, although neither the General Allotment Act nor the legislative history of 
the specific act in question played any role in the decision, Petitioner Seymour did rely on the contrast 
between·the 1906 Act and the earlier 1892 "public domain" legislation that concededly disestablished 
the North Half of the Colville Reservation. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Seymour v. Superintendent, 
368 U.S. 351 (1962) (No. 62). At best, this was a limited perspective, but certainly one that 
benefited Petitioner by simple contrast. More important matters were not briefed, i.e. the argument 
that the public domain format of the 1892 Act was the result of a refusal by Congress to ratify a 
previously negotiated 1891 cession agreement due to the questionable nature of the title to the 
Colville Executive Order Reservation and the argument that the language was added to deal with a 
congressional concern that undesirable precedent might be established. Antoine v. Washington, 420 
U.S. 194,216 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); S. Rep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892); See 
also US. v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914). In any event, it is doubtful whether any of the above 
would have altered the fixed views of the United States, which argued in support of the reservation 
boundaries of the South Half of the Colville Reservation ("Solicitor General has urged this 
construction upon the Court"). Seymour, 368 U.S. at 357. 
The Solicitor General's three page argument in Seymour was based predominantly on the 1948 
statutory definition of Indian country which, of course, begs the question. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. It was 
also based upon subsequent congressional materials purportedly constituting a "recognition," pri-
marily in 1956, that the reservation continued to exist. Mem. for the United States at 3, Seymour v. 
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Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (No. 62). Neither the General Allotment Act nor the historical 
perspective of the 1906 Act played any role in the brief for the United States. In this light, Seymour 
concluded, without further citation, that: 
The f Seymour l Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land 
on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and 
trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards. 
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356. 
The United States later seized on this statement from Seymour and tied it to the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 (which, as previously noted, was not even mentioned in Seymour). In effect, 
the United States attempted to attribute to both Seymour and the General Allotment Act, a new 
congressional plan or purpose consistent with a new argument. That new argument stated that no 
surplus land statute, passed pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, was ever intended by 
Congress to disestablish portions of Indian Reservations-a "whole cloth 11 argument: the revisionist 
theory of the General Allotment Act.3 
The United States focused on the General Allotment Act of 1887 for more than one reason. 
Prior to 1887, Congress routinely utilized treaties, cession agreements and other similar 
3 Now, this principle that Congress did not intend to disestablish the Reservations is 
not one that the government has made up out of whole cloth. It is supported both by 
history and by the previous decisions of this Court. 
Tr. Oral Argument at 22, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-562). 
The Court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe squarely rejected the "history" and the analysis of the 
United States in support of this revisionist view of the General Allotment Act in a manner similar to 
the rejection of the same argument by the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
8 
arrangements, some of which contained allotment provisions, to disestablish reservations and open 
territories throughout the United States to settlement for decades: 
ftlhe policy of the Government from its earliest days has been to restore Indian 
reservations or portions thereof to the public domain as the exigencies of advancing 
population required it .... 
H.R. Rep. No. 791, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1888). 
No one had ever attempted to even formulate an argument that Congress never intended these 
actions to disestablish the limits or boundaries oflndian reservations. If similar cession agreements, 
passed subsequent to 1887, were not intended to have the same effect, the General Allotment Act of 
1887 was the only point in history that Congress could have even arguably intended to have altered . 
such a fundamental historical process. This is especially so in the absence of some affirmative evidence 
that Congress specifically intended to depart from that historical format, either generally or in a certain 
case. (The United States could not produce such evidence at the time--or, as a matter of fact, ever. 
And it will not do so in this case.) 
The first opportunity for the United States to advance the new revisionist theory of the General 
Allotment Act argument in the United States Supreme Court came in Mattz v. Arnett, supra. 
2. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). Although the United States argued forcefully for the 
broad sweep of Seymour tied to the General Allotment Act, this argument met with only limited 
success in Mattz. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-12, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 
481 (1973) (No. 71-1182). The history of the Klamath River Reservation at issue in Mattz was so 
9 
tortuous and fact specific, isolated and atypical, that the Mattz dicta regarding the General Allotment 
Act, while all that the United States could have hoped for, did not really seem pivotal to the decision. 
Certainly, the United States repeatedly told the Mattz Court: 
The Act of 1892 can properly be understood only in light of the General Allotment Act 
which Congress had recently passed. 
In our view, the Act of June 17, 1892, can properly be understood only in light of two 
considerations: (1) what Congress had done five years earlier in the General Allotment 
Act .... 
The policy of the Act was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of 
Indian land .... 
This Court's more recent decision in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, is, in 
our view, controlling here .... 
Id. at 8, 12, 13, 24 (emphasis added). See also, id. at 9, 14 n.9. 
And at oral argument, the United States squarely placed this issue "into a little bit of historical 
perspective": 
This sa.111e policy 1s recognized more recently by tliis Court m Seymour v. 
Superintendent .... 
Tr. Oral Argument at 19-20, Mattz (No. 71-1182). See also, id. at 13, 14, 15, 21. 
At the same time, to shore up this new General Allotment Act argument and supplement this 
"little bit" of historical perspective for the Court, the United States also discussed certain statutes that 
concededly disestablished Indian reservations. According to the United States, the Court could, by 
contrast, look to these examples in determining when congressional action was really intended to 
disestablish an Indian reservation-an instant historical perspective. Brief for the United States at 17-
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18, Mattz (No. 71-1 I 82). Following Petitioner's lead in Seymour, and especially in light of this aspect 
of the Seymour opinion, the controlling example cited by the United States of a congressional 
mandated disestablishment was the 1892 Colville statute, where the operative language restored the 
north half of the reservation to the public domain. As the United States told the United States Supreme 
Court in Mattz, among other things: 
This Court's more recent decision in Seymour v. Superiniendent, 368 U.S. 351, is, in 
our view, controllin~ here .... Inholding that the Act did not terminate the reservation 
there at issue, the Court emphasized the absence from the Act oflanguage abolishing 
the reservations or "restoring that land to the public domain" (368 U.S. at 355). 
Id. at 24 ( emphasis added). 
Other examples of express termination were also listed by the United States to support this 11by 
contrast" argument, including a typical cession. Id. at l 8a-19a. The cession example merits special 
attention in the text at 14-15, infra. 
At oral argument, the United States repeated the "by contrast" point: 
MR. SACHSE ... In closing, since I assume I am out of time, I refer the Court to 
page 17 of our brief where we have samples oflanguage that Congress used when it 
did want to discontinue a portion of a reservation. 
Tr. Oral Argument at 20-21, Mattz (No.71-1182). (Except for the cession example, the text infra 
also establishes that the others on the lis! were representative of atypical situations enacted by 
Congress only on rare occasions and decades apart.) 
Without question, the Mattz opinion reflects both arguments made by the United States. First, 
with respect to the General Allotment Act: 
11 
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Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, 
.... See~ 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390; United States Department 
of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 115-117, 127-129, 776-777 (1958) .... 
. . . This Court una.11imously observed in an analogous setting in Seymour, id., at 356, 
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496,497 (emphasis added). 
Secondly, with respect to the "by contrast" argument, the Court in Mattz noted: 
More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were 
introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the reservation and did so 
in unequivocal terms .... 
Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired. 
See, for example .... 
Id at 504, n.22 (emp~asis added). 
The success of the United States in Mattz was short-lived. Two years later, the United States 
Supreme Court was actually presented with a typical su.."J)lus land statute specifically patterned and 
enacted pursuant to the terms of the General Allotment Act. With the supporting documentation of 
both the specific act, as well as the General Allotment Act, the General Allotment Act dicta in Mattz 
did not dissuade the Court, including the author of the Mattz opinion, from correctly concluding that 
surplus land statutes passed pursuant to the General Allotment Act were intended and routinely 
passed by Congress to disestablish Indian reservations. De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 
425, 447-449 (1975). Predictably, the United States again argued forcefully for a different result in 
De Coteau. 
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3. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). In DeCoteau, the surplus land 
statute at issue was one of eight similar cession agreements jointly ratified in an 1891 Appropriation 
Act. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989. Each of these agreements was specifically tailored to the 
provisions in the General Allotment Act, which had recently been passed after nearly a decade of 
focused debate. For these two reasons, fortuitous in retrospect, the historical record consisted of 
hundreds of pages directed to this aspect of the General Allotment Act (Section 5) and the effect the 
cession agreements were understood and intended to have. 
Moreover, for the first time, all of this primary documentation was excerpted and presented 
to the DeCoteau Court in several hundred pages of briefs, setting forth a complete and proper 
historical perspective. That perspective established that although simple allotment per se (Section 6 
of the General Allotment Act) was only intended to disestablish reservations at some point in the 
foreseeable future, a separate and distinct surplus land statute, in a cession format, opening the 
reservation or a portion thereof to settlement pursuant to Sec. 5 of the General Allotment Act, was 
intended to disestablish the affected reservation pro tanto (on the date of the opening set forth in the 
Presidential Proclamation). This was precisely the manner that pre-1887 cessions had disestablished 
reservations for decades, when Congress and/or the President authorized similar legislation. 
The United States elected to ignore the force of this documentation, and instead urged the 
DeCoteau Court to recognize the continuing existence of the original reservation boundaries on the 
basis of Seymour and Mattz and the United States' revisionist theory of the General Allotment Act. 
While agreeing that the focal point of the issue had to be the General Allotment Act of 18 8 7, the 
13 
United States pressed the point that Seymour and Mattz were both openings pursuant to that act, and 
that no act pursuant to the General Allotment Act was ever intended to effect reservation 
disestablishment, except at some future point in time. (Again, as in the Brief for the United States in 
}vfattz, the United States blurred the distinction between allotment per se (Section 6 of the General 
Allotment Act) which eventually resulted in some non-Indian ownership within the limits oflndian 
reservations, but was never intended to immediately disestablish the reservations, and surplus land 
statutes enacted pursuant to Sec. 5 of the General Allotment Act, which repeatedly accomplished this 
result). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-17, DeCoteau v. District County Court, 
420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148).4 
In addition, the United States submitted a series of very sophisticated arguments drawn from 
little scraps of language found in Seymour and Mattz to support this general proposition. No degree 
of sophistication, however, could overcome the problem the United States never addressed: namely, 
the fact that all of the contemporary historical evidence irrefutably pointed to the opposite conclusion: 
reservation disestablishment. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 432,434,436,438 and 441. 
Further, the cession format utilized by Congress in previous decades-with the end result never 
questioned in terms ofreservation boundaries-was only slightly modified at this point in time (1887 
through the early l 900's). As a result, the United States could only argue that the cession format itself 
was probative of nothing because it was not within the list of self-serving "by contrast" examples the 
4 See also Tr. Oral Argument at 11, 13, 17, 21, Erickson v. US. ex rel. Feather, (No. 73-1500), 
decided with DeCoteau. 
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United States now said Congress utilized when Congress "clearly" intended to effectuate this result 
(the list noted previously was compiled by the United States and noted in Mattz, 412 U.S. at 497, 
n.19).5 
Even without a specific historical point ofreference, it is difficult to believe that the DeCoteau 
Court would have found this argument credible when actually presented with a real cession agreement. 
\1/hen all of the DeCoteau documents conclusively established that the De Coteau cession format was 
still the rule at this point in time i.e., after the General Allotment Act, rather than the exception, this 
argument was soundly rejected. Cession terminology was "precisely suited" to disestablishment and 
the remainder of the sophisticated arguments of the United States were noted and rejected for that 
reason. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445.6 
5 In the original version of the list presented to the Court in Mattz, the United States had included 
representative cession language as evidence of express termination. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (No. 71-1182). When that cession 
language did not appear in the Mattz opinion, the United States omitted any mention of this fact to 
the Court, simply adopted the Mattz list an.d argued tliroughout DeCoteau that the cession la..'1.guage 
was meaningless. Id. at 40a-41a. At the time, the State of South Dakota evidently overlooked this 
aspect of the original list and the fact that the typical cession example submitted by the United States 
in the Brief for the United States in Mattz ( as "direct and unambiguous language" of disestablishment) 
was actually ratified in the same statute as the cession agreement presented in DeCoteau. To the 
extent that the United States was making the opposite argument in DeCoteau, this oversight was 
fortuitous for the United States in that this contradictory position was never brought to the Court's 
attention. 
6 As the Court in DeCoteau noted, as recently as 1963, the United States had joined with South 
Dakota in the argument that cessions disestablished reservations. Joint Brief of Respondent State of 
South Dakota and United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, DeMarrias v. State, 319 F .2d 845 (8th Cir. 
1963) (No. 17200). DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 443. 
Not surprisingly, in every way that is arguably significant, the Yankton and Nez Perce 
documents mirror and reflect the same terminology, discussions, considerations, policies, and 
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4. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The United States subsequently 
resisted the force of DeCoteau, i.e., that, as a general rule, the intended effect of surplus land statutes 
after 1887 was reservation disestablishment. In 1977, in Rosebud, the United States Supreme Court 
considered three Sec. 5 surplus land statutes considered by Congress a decade after the DeCoteau 
surplus land statutes were passed. The United States again argued that, after adopting the General 
Allotment Act, Congress never intended this type of statute to disestablish portions of Indian reser-
vations. As in the past, reliance for this argument was placed almost entirely upon Seymour and Mattz. 
In its brief, the United States specially emphasized that Mattz noted: 
Placing the 1892 Act into the historic context of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 
24 Stat. 388, the fMattzl Court further observed that the Allotment Act "permitted the 
President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal 
consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system ... 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 
(1977) (No. 75-562) (first emphasis added).7 
generalities presented in DeCoteau. In fact, the Yank.ton Commissioners repeatedly referred 
specifically to the terms of the DeCoteau Agreement. Br. ofResp't District at 18-19, South Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581). See also South Dakota Representative 
Pickler's remarks in the Congressional Record ("same kind of a treaty we have always made" ... 
"procure these lands in the same way" ... "we make no departure from our past policy" ... "just as 
all other cessions ofland" ... ). Id. at 36-37. As a result, in all instances the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior also acknowledged that both reservations were "restored to 
the public domain." Id. at 9. See generally Hagen 510 U.S. at412-414 (public domain). These same 
points are further substantiated in the Nez Perce documentation discussed in Brief of Respondent 
State. 
7 The United States ignored the fact that the author of the Mattz opinion joined in DeCoteau. 
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In its discussion of DeCoteau, the United States failed to mention the role played by Sec. 5 of 
the General Allotment Act and the cessions in the DeCoteau process. Id. According to the United 
States, DeCoteau was important primarily because of the differences between the cession act there and 
the Rosebud legislation, i.e., the unilateral nature of the congressional action in Rosebud and the un-
certain payment in trust for the Rosebud land. 
At oral argument, the United States repeatedly stressed its revisionist theory of the General 
Allotment Act. The United States maintained that after this act, Congress never intended reservation 
disestablishment. DeCoteau was mentioned only in passing and then primarily to somehow support 
continued reservation boundaries throughout this period. Tr. Oral Argument at 20, 21, 27, 29, 
Rosebud (No. 75-562). 
The Rosebud Court proceeded, in the most definitive opinion to date, to squarely address each 
and every argument-sophisticated argun1ents to be sure ( and there were ma..•-iy )--adva.."'lced in support 
of the Court restoring the original boundaries of the Rosebud Reservation. Although one or two minor 
exceptions might exist, a careful reading of Rosebud, together with De Coteau as recognized historical 
background, and with Yankton Sioux Tribe as the final word, establishes that the United States and 
the Nez Perce Tribe, can not advance any argument of substance that has not already been made and 
answered. (And, as in DeCoteau, the public domain concept, whether expressed on the face of the act 




Unquestionably, as time went on, the cession format of the earlier period was modified, but 
these changes in format reflect no change in congressional intent. Thus, it ultimately mattered little that 
the 1904 Rosebud Act was technically not a "cession." As the Court in Rosebud explained: 
As a matter of strict English usage, petitioner is undoubtedly correct; "cession" refers 
to a voluntary surrender of territory or jurisdiction, rather than a withdrawal of such 
_jurisdiction by the authority of a superior sovereign. But as Mr. Justice (then Judge) 
Holmes commented, we are not free to say to Congress: "We see what you are driving 
at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v. United 
States, 163 F. 30, 32 (CAI 1908) .... 
The use of the word "cession" in the 1904 Act, which was not consented to by the 
required extraordinary majority of the Tribe, does not make the meaninR of the Act 
ambiRUous as between diminution of the Reservation boundaries on the one hand, and 
merely opening up designated lands for settlement by non-Indians, on the other. The 
word is technically misused, but the meaninf< is quite clear. It was intended to 
accomplish, in 1904, precisely what it was intended to accomplish in 1901. 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 597-598 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, of course, the word "cession" is not technically misused. A11d the United 
States' arguments regarding real cessions in Rosebud (alternatively, in an attempt to distinguish 
Decoteau) bear repeating now: 
The court of appeals, however, failed to recognize the crucial difference that in 
DeCoteau the United States itself purchased the land in the reservation pursuant to an 
f cession l agreement with the Indians; this, the Court held, restored the land to the 
public domain and extinguished the reservation. 420 U.S. at 446-447. 
Memorandum of the United States at 13, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 
75-562) (emphasis added). 
The 1891 Act fDeCoteaul had ratified an agreement in which the Tribe expressly 
ceded to the United States all its "right, title and interest" in the land for a lump sum. 
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The Court contrasted this transaction with the Acts involved in Seymour and Mattz . 
. . . The differences identified by the Court are important to the present case. The 1891 
Act was aner<otiated ar<reement with the Tribe, whereas the Acts involved in Seymour 
and Mattz were "unilateral" Acts of Congress not agreed to by the Tribes .... 
The 1891 Act f DeCoteau l was a strair<htforward cessionfor a sum certain in amount 
.... These distinctions led to the conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation was 
extinguished and the land restored to the public domain .... 
In DeCoteau (but not in Seymour or Mattz) the United States itself purchased the land 
in the Reservation pursuant to an aweement with the Indians; this, the Court held, 
restored the land to the public domain and extinguished the Reservation. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Rosebud (No. 75-562) (emphasis added). 
The United States also reminded the United States Supreme Court of the 1934 Interior 
Department Opinion which they continued to rely upon for traditional confirmation that real cessions 
disestablished reservations: 
In this way fby cession disestablishment l the exterior boundaries of a reservation were 
further reduced. The lands thereby separated from a reservation were no longer looked 
upon as being part of that reservation. 
54 Interior Dec. 560 (1934) (emphasis added) cited and quoted in part in Memo. of the United States 
at 19-21, Rosebud (No. 75-562) and Brief for the United States at 29-30, Rosebud (No. 75-562) 
("The Secretary noted that many reservation lands had been ceded for a sum certain and concluded 
that' [t]he lands thereby separated from a reservation were no longer looked upon as being a part of 
that reservation' " (54 I.D. at 560) ). Id. at 29-30. 
It is beyond dispute that the Sisseton cession agreement [DeCoteau], the Yankton cession 
agreement [Yankton Sioux Tribe] and the Nez Perce cession agreement are within the purview of this 
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analysis. For this reason, as the United States pointed out, the list ofreservations in the 1934 Interior 
Department Opinion included some 26 "reservations." It did not include the Sisseton Reservation 
[DeCoteau], the Yankton Reservation [Yankton Sioux Tribe] or the Nez Perce reservation. Id. at 31. 
In oral argument, the United States reiterated, by negative implication, this same dominant 
point: 
fWlhenever Congress without a binding agreement opens lands to white settlers, it 
does not pay for them and does not guarantee any payment but only agrees to act as 
trustee for future uncertain sales and leaves the property interest in the Indians-as they 
did in this case-that act does not remove the lands from the boundaries of the 
Reservation. 
Tr. Oral Argument at 22, Rosebud (No. 75-562) (emphasis added). 
A few minutes later, the same cession distinction was stressed in a different context: 
filn DeCoteau, which distinguishes both cases in a case where sale was made for a sum 
certain and an agreement was made, as counsel for the Tribe has discussed .... 
Id. at28.8 
Until the United States at least offers some explanation to purportedly distinguish the 
representations, made before the United States Supreme Court, that this so-called traditional 
8 See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe's Brief in Rosebud that tracks this position and confirms that same 
understanding regarding the traditional view that real cessions disestablished reservations. Tribe's 
Brief at 12, 13 and 16, Rosebud (No. 75-562). Counsel for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe had decades of 
experience in this area of the law. At oral argument, he unequivocally stated: 
A cession is a sale. It is a high-class sale. It is a sale between sovereigns .... The 
Court assumed there was a cession. That is the fundamental error of the Court Below. 
Tr. of Oral Argument at 12-13, Rosebud, (No. 75-562). 
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distinction, this "crucial" difference, (that real cessions disestablished reservation boundaries), the 
arguments of the United States to the contrary (in support of a recognition of reservation boundaries 
somehow surviving a traditional cession) are wholly undermined. 
5. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). In Solem, the United States combined and restated 
so many variations of earlier arguments that even a summary review is difficult to present here. 
Moreover, since the United States did not participate in oral argument, that source is not available. 
In short, however, it can be fairly stated that the United States in Solem argued whatever was 
necessary to resist reservation disestablishment. 
Most important for the present case are the concessions of the United States regarding 
cessions, which were adopted in the Court:s Opinion. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470,473 n.15, 474,476, 
478. 
For example, ti1ie United States said: 
(CJritically different from the situation in DeCoteau and Rosebud in at least the 
following respects: (1) the releva.-rit legislation contains no language of "cession11 ; (2) 
there was no prior tribal agreement to cede the relevant area .... 
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent ( opposing Pet. for Cert.) at 4 n.3, 
Solem, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (No. 82-1253) (emphasis added). 
On the merits, the cession theme was restated with unmistakable clarity: 
The critical question remains whether the statute invoked worked an immediate and 
irrevocable cession .... 
To be sure, as DeCoteau and Rosebud illustrate, there are instances in which a 
Reservation must be found to have been irrevocably terminated or diminished .... In 
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the climate of the times, the oniy meanineful question is whether the legislation meant 
to accomplish a present, unequivocal and irrevocable transfer of Reservation lands 
from the Tribe to the United States. 
The critical fact in all these cases is that Congress exacted a present and total 
surrender of all tribal interest in the ceded land in return for an unconditional 
commitment by the United States to an agreed payment .... 
fTlhe clear line between outri~ht cession and mere opening up of tribal lands was not 
always observed .... But we do not read Rosebud as erasing the traditional 
distinction. 
What is relevant, however, is that, at the end of the day, no cession resulted. 
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, 11, 13, 14, 24, Solem, 465 
U.S. 463 (1984) (No. 82-1253) (emphasis added). 
In this light, it is not surprising that Solem repeatedly made these same cession observations. 9 
9 Similar cession concessions made by the United States in Rosebud are discussed supra. In 
order to maintain the cession distinction essential to the argument in Solem, the United States had to 
make similar concessions in other cases then pending. As a result, at about the same time ( 1984), the 
United States recognized that cession disestablishment was the dominant factor in the history of the 
1858 Yankton reservation and forJier, that the 1858 Yankton reservation had in fact been 
disestablished by the 1894 Yankton cession act at issue in the Yankton case. Opening Brief for the 
Federal Appellant at 16, 17 n.10, United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985) (Nos. 83-
2353, 2538, 2543, 2544). This submission by the United States was made in the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals sitting en bane in conjunction with the appeals of federal prosecutions ofY ankton Sioux 
tribal members and others for unlawfully killing bald eagles, as the United States acknowledged. Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18 n.8, Yankton Sioux 
Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). 
Eight other briefs were filed in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dion. No one disagreed 
with the United States' disestablishment assessment of the 1894 Y an.kton cession act or the 
controlling federal and state law. The en bane majority opinion in the Eighth Circuit in Dion 
acknowledged this 18 94 Yankton cession act disestablishment, and the dissent did not disagree with 
this conclusion. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985). 
Apart from Dion, the United States has only had one opportunity since DeCoteau (but before 
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6. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). Hagen recaps the views of the United States Supreme 
Court in resolving reservation status issues. Due to the history of the Utah legislation, the United 
States devoted most of its arguments in Hagen-naturally in favor of a recognition of original 
reservation boundaries-to "public domain" terminology. These arguments were generally rejected in 
DeCoteau. Again, in Hagen the Court squarely rejected them. 
More importantly, in order to belittle the significance of Utah "public domain" terminology, 
the United States unequivocally recognized the force of all true cessions as set forth in DeCoteau. 
the Yankton Sioux Tribe litigation) to tell the United States Supreme Court specifically about the 
Yankton statute and how it compared to the DeCoteau statute. In that instance, involving a lakebed, 
the cession comparison is also telling: 
[T]he United States' right to control Lakes Andes and its bed, to the exclusion 
of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, is in any event secured by the 1892 Cession Agreement 
.... First, Article I is framed in terms that this Court has repeatedly characterized as 
"express language of cession." Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian 
Tribe, No. 83-2148 (July 2, 1985), Slip op. 15 n.19; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 
469 (1984). In DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975) 
( emphasis added), this Court, in considering a similar and contemporaneous cession 
agreement, found that the same language was "precisely suited" to the purpose of 
conveying to the United States, "for a sum certain, all of[the Jndians1 interest in all 
of their unallotted lands." 
Second, the retention of the lake bed by the Tribe would have been inconsistent 
with the purposes of the 1892 Cession Agreement. Those purposes consisted not only 
of opening additional lands for non-Indian settlement, but also of paving the way for 
the anticipated end of the tribal way of life .... 
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10-11, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 483 U.S. 
1005 (1986) (No. 86-1436) (emphasis added). 
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The United States also repeatedly conceded and strongly argued that a cession and sum certain 
agreement was broadly understood to effect disestablishment: 
Language that "f e lxplicitriy l referf s l to cession" or otherwise "evidencef es l the present 
and total surrender of all tribal interests" in the opened area suggests that Congress 
meant to sever it from the reservation. Ibid. When such language is buttressed by an 
unconditional commitment to compensate the tribe, "there is an almost insurmountable 
presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's reservation to be diminished." In the 
presence of both of those factors, the Court found .a reservation to have· been 
extinguished in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 431-449 (1975) . 
But the statute at issue in Rosebud contained explicit language of cession .... 
That language does not refer to a 11 cession," or otherwise "evidencf el the present and 
total surrender of all tribal interests" in the opened land .... fClontrasts sharply with 
that of the statutes at issue in DeCoteau and Rosebud, the two recent cases in which 
the Court has found that reservation boundaries were altered by Congress. See 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445 (statute provided that the Indians did "cede, sell, 
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in 
and to all the unallotted lands," Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1036); Rosebud, 
430 U.S. at 596597 (statute provided that Indiai.7.s did "hereby cede, surrender, grant, 
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that 
part of the Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted." Act of Apr. 23, 
1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254) . In su..1n, t.½.e 1905 Act contains neit.J.ier a..ri "If e lxplicit 
reference to cession" nor any other "language evidencing the present and total· 
surrender of all tribal interests" in the portion of the Reservation opened to non-Indian 
settlement. Accordin~ly, under Solem, it fails to demonstrate a clear congressional 
intention to alter the boundaries .... ruanguage demonstrating that Congress 
provided for the total surrender of all tribal interests in the portions of the Reservation 
.... Act does not refer to any cession .... 
As the Rosebud Court explained, a ruling that the Rosebud Sioux Reservation was not 
diminished by the 1904 Act at issue there could only have frustrated congressional 
intent. The statute used unequivocal lan5<ua5<e of cession, and adopted an agreement 
of the Indians that unequivocally approved the cession (albeit with modifications 
approved by only a simple majority of the adult male Indians) .... 
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!Nlone of the relevant documents ... uses the indisputable lan1<ua1<e of cession that 
was a feature of all of the relevant documents in Rosebud. Moreover, in our view, the 
requirement in Solem that the "understanding" be "widely held" requires proof that the 
Indians shared in an understanding that alteration of the Reservation's boundaries was 
at hand; the onfy obvious manifestation of such an understanding on the part of the 
Indians is an agreement of cession, like the one approved in Rosebud. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, 14, 15-16, 22, 23, Hagen 
v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, in this instance the United States also participated in oral argument and made 
explicit representations as to the effect of the use of cession language: 
MR. MANN: Well, the language in DeCoteau said that the Indians cede, sell, 
relinquish and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in the 
land in question, and the statute in Rosebud stated that the Indians cede, surrender, 
grant, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to 
all the land in question. 
It would be rather difficult, I think, to construe that language as language that 
allowed the Indians to retain sovereignty over the land. 
QUESTION: I think you're probably right .... 
MR. MANN: ... fTlhe lan1<ua1<e of cession. That seems to be-that phrase seems to 
be the phrase Congress used when it intended to alter the boundaries of a reservation. 
QUESTION: Well, when it intended to alter the boundaries of the reservation by 
cession. That much is clear. But still, isn't it the case that in deciding what to make of 
the less explicit language, the reference to f271 returns to public domain, that we 
should construe that in light of the overriding congressional policy, which at the time, 
as I understand it, was to end the reservation system? 
Tr. Oral Argument at 25-26, Hagen (No. 92-6281) (emphasis added). 
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The Alliance would not attempt to improve upon this exchange. Cession results m 
disestablishment. Nothing more need be said on this point. 
7. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (Yankton I). 
(a). YanktonSiov.:x Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management District, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th 
Cir. 1996). The United States did not participate in this litigation in the district court. In the court of 
appeals, the United States, as amicus curiae, told the court that because the federal government retains 
jurisdiction over Indian country generally, the continuing integrity of the exterior boundaries ofindian 
reservations is of "significant import." Br. of the United States at 1, Yankton Sioux v. Southern 
J\1issouri, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). (The United States did not contest the fact that 
federal jurisdiction had not been exercised in this area initially). 
Moreover, the United States argued that it had a strong interest in protecting "the integrity of 
reservation boundaries" because ofits "special relationship with Indian tribes." Id. The strength of this 
interest presumably overpowered any inclination to present, address, explain or defend any of the 
previous United States' cession arguments that were plainly inconsistent with continued reservation· 
status, including the Dion Yankton Sioux Reservation disestablishment concession. The United States 
mentioned none of this and simply noted: "We do not agree with the arguments raised by the County 
in its brief. They are irrelevant to this case." Id at 19 n.11. 10 
10 At oral argument in the companion case of United States v. Greger, 98 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 1996), 
the United States glossed over the 1894 cession act because, unlike the act in Hagen, it did not 
contain probative public domain language on its face. (In Hagen, the premise of the argument of the 
United States was just exactly the reverse: public domain language was meaningless, cession language 
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As a preliminary matter, only two points in the argument advanced by the United States in 
Yankton 1 in support of original reservation boundaries are significant. First, the commendable 
concession that the Court's 1914 Yankton decision in Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914), 
"assumed" disestablishment. Br. of the United States at 19 n. 10, Yankton, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 
1996) (No. 95-2647). 11 And secondly, the United States (and everyone else) continued to make this 
same assumption for quite some time. 
fTlhe United States stated in a footnote in its brief that, based on decisions of state 
courts in South Dakota, the reservation had been diminished by the 1894 treaty. 
Id. at 18 n.8. The Eighth Circuit should have been more reluctant in disregarding this venerable 
precedent. 
Nothing in the Yankton documents indicated that the 1894 Yankton Act was intended to alter 
the fundamental attributes of the Yankton cession. In De Coteau, the United States argued against 
cession disestablishment and lost. As noted supra, after the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in DeCoteau, even the United States initially ack.."1owledged that Congress routinely intended 
cession statutes such as the Yankton cession to disestablish reservation areas. Before Yankton 1, the 
United States did not attempt to circumvent the holding in DeCoteau regarding this type of cession, 
openly acknowledging, as in Hagen, that it would be "rather difficult" to support any other 
construction. Id. 
would have been dispositive.) See text at 23-25, supra. 
11 In Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908), the United States and the United States Supreme 
Court assumed the Nez Perce Reservation was similarly disestablished. 
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In Yankton I, the United States ignored DeCoteau and that traditional cession analysis and 
advocated the "narrower" position ultimately adopted by the court of appeals in Yankton I: 
The key question in interpreting the 1894 statute and agreement is whether Congress 
intended that the tribe's governmental authority be transferred with the land. sale. 
Amicus United States argues that the 1858 treaty gave the tribe governmental 
authority within the treaty boundaries and that Article XVIII r savings clause l requires 
that the agreement be read to preserve that right. Although the cession language in 
Articles I and II could be viewed as describing a transfer of tribal governmental 
authority as well as land, thereby changing the 1858 treaty boundaries, the narrower 
reading is that the 1894 act simply authorized the conveyance ofreal property ... .leads 
· to the conclusion that Congress intended by its 1894 act that the Yankton Sioux sell 
their surplus land to the government, but not their governmental authority over it. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Dist., 99 F.3d 1439, 1448, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996), 
( emphasis added). That narrow position, namely, that an unusually expansive savings clause in 
Yankton Sioux Tribe trumped the otherwise dispositive cession agreement, was erroneous. 
In this new version of the savings clause argument the United States keyed on the fact that for 
some inexplicable reason, the Yankton savings clause did not contain the standard "not inconsistent" 
exception. The stan.dard savings clause only preserved previous treaty provisions "not inconsistent" 
with the subsequent cession. As a result, the United States argued that the Yankton savings clause 
preserved original reservation boundaries because it preserved all treaty provisions, not just those "not 
inconsistent" with the subsequent treaty. In the process, the United States necessarily acknowledged, 
recognized and conceded that standard savings clauses, such as the Nez Perce savings clause (that did 
include the "not inconsistent" exception), could not be construed in this fashion because the United 
States Supreme Court had previously rejected that argument. Br. of the United States, Yankton, 99 
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F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). (The first time the United States advanced the "savings 
clause" argument it was accepted in City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 
(8th Cir. 1972). In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the United States Supreme 
Court squarely rejected the argument. Rosebud, 430 U.S. 584, 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting).) 
Nothing of substance could be cited by either the United States or the panel majority in the 
Eighth Circuit in Yankton 1 to support this anomalous and otherwise "rather difficult" construction. 
Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae, Yankton Sioux Tribe, 99 F.3d 1439 (8 th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-
264 7). Moreover, the prior views of the United States, summarized above, precluded this "narrower" 
view--at least in the absence of some affirmative evidence of congressional intent to the contrary. In 
this respect, generic arguments loosely tied to the unusually expansive savings clause in Yankton Sioux 
Tribe should not have sufficed. Even that unusually expansive savings clause was not intended to alter 
the fundamental attributes of the Yankton cession--and not a single word in any of the Yankton 
documentation supported the position of the United States. Nevertheless, the court of appeals was 
persuaded by the argument of the United States. 
(b) South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (Yankton 1). 
1. The United States Supreme Court in Yankton 1 unanimously rejected the unusually 
expansive savings clause argument of the United States. First, the Court noted that the holding of the 
court of appeals keyed on this circuitous argument: 
The court relied primarily on the savings clause in Article XVIII, reasoning that, 
given its "unusualfy expansive lan~ua~e," other sections of the 1894 Act "should 
be read narrowly to minimize any conflict with the 1858 treaty." Id., at 1447. 
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Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court then disposed of the savings clause argument of the United 
States in no uncertain terms: 
The United States urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the agreement, which 
would presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty only insofar as 
necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without fundamentally altering the 
treaty's terms. 
Such a literal construction of the saving clause, as the South Dakota Supreme Court 
noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (1997), would "impugn the entire 
sale." .... 
Moreover, the Government's contention that the Tribe intended to cede some property 
but maintain the entire reservation as its territory contradicts the common 
understanding of the time: that tribal ownership was a critical component of 
reservation status .... 
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement in which 
it appears, we give it a "sensible construction" that avoids this "absurd conclusion." 
Yankton 1,522 U.S. at 345,346. The sensible constrnction adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Yankton 1 with reference to that "unusually expansive" savings clause is controlling here. 
Moreover, the other concessions of the United States in Yankton 1 with reference to 
disestablished reservation boundaries are also significant here. In the process of advancing the 
unusually expansive savings clause argument, the United States conceded that but for the presence of 
that kind of savings clause, the 1894 Yankton act would have disestablished the 1858 Yankton 
reservation in the traditional sense recognized by the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau. In 
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other words, the United States conceded that a standard savings clause (with the standard "not 
inconsistent" exception) would be probative of nothing. The savings clause in the Nez Perce Act is 
a standard savings clause in every respect (it includes the "not inconsistent" exception). As a result, 
it is too late in the day for this argument of the United States to be persuasive in this case. Br. for 
United States, Yankton, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581). 
2. In oral argument in Yankton 1, the United States, in response to direct questions from the 
Court, described the disestablishment process in the following manner: 
QUESTION: Now, this-this is a totally checker boarded situation? 
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct. And this Court-.... 
MS. MCDOWELL: Well, the Court inDeCoteau, found total diminishment. But that 
was a different case, in several respects, from this one. In the first place, of course, 
there was no [atypical] savings clause preserving rights under an earlier treaty .... 
QUESTION: But do you-do you agree with both counsel, it seemed to me, that the 
choice is either we accept your argument based on Article XVIII or there's a 
diminishment? 
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct. 
QUESTION: That there is no such thing as diminishment applicable on these facts? 
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct. Diminishment seems to be limited to cases such 
as Rosebud, where there was a selling or a ceding of a part of the reservation in so 
many words, as opposed to this sort of situation. 
Tr. Oral Argument at 49-50, Yankton 1 (emphasis added). 
The totally checker boarded situation or "total diminishment" holding of the Court in 
DeCoteau (in the words of the United States), resulted from the extinguishment of the reservation 
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boundaries by the act at issue there. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427 n.2, 446-447. Also, as the United 
States further conceded in response to the last question from the Court, the Yankton cession was not 
a diminishment where there was only a "ceding of a part of the reservation" ("as opposed to this sort 
of situation"). Id. ( emphasis added). The Yankton cession was a cession of all of the resenration that 
was not allotted. On these facts, diminishment in the sense of maintaining any portion of the 185 8 
resenration boundary was not possible. 
For this reason, the entire 1858 resenration boundary was within the scope of the cession in 
Yankton 1. In this respect, the rejection of the unusually expansive savings clause argument of the 
United States by the Court resulted in the standard extinguishment of the 1858 resenration boundary, 
"total diminishment" of the 1858 Yankton resenration. Tr. Oral Argument at 49-50, Yankton 1. 
C. The Remand in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), Confirms the 1863 
Boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation Should Not Be Recognized. 
l. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 
(2000). 
As noted above, over several decades, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
rejected the savings clause arguments advanced by the United States. For example, see Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 623 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Most recently, the Court in 
Yankton 1 emphatically rejected a more sophisticated savings clause argument in Yankton Sioux Tribe 
because it simply did not make any sense. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 345-349 (1998) (No. 96-1581). 
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In this instance, there is nothing in the Nez Perce documents to distinguish the Nez Perce 
argument from the standard savings clause arguments that have been previously rejected. Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe, v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584,623 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact, in Yankton Sioux 
Tribe the parties, amici and the courts expressly singled out the Nez Perce savings clause as a perfect 
example of a standard savings clause provision that everyone, including the United States, conceded 
would not even arguably support an attempt to resurrect Indian reservation boundaries. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe is absolutely controlling in this case. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, a list of dozens of Nez 
Perce-like standard savings clauses in reservation statutes across the United States was compiled to 
distinguish that list (including the Nez Perce savings clause) from the stronger, unusually expansive 
savings clause at issue in Yankton Sioux Tribe. 
The United States Supreme Court made clear that the 1858 Reservation boundaries of the 
Y an..1<.ton Reservation were not maintained. 
The 1894 Act is also readily distin!<uishable from surplus land Acts that the Court has 
interpreted as maintainin~ reservation boundaries .... The Tribe asserts that because 
that clause purported to conserve the provisions of the 185 8 Treaty, the existinf< 
reservation boundaries were maintained. ... fWle conclude that the saving clause 
pertains to the continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders. 
Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 345-347 (emphasis added). 
It is important to focus directly on the Court's discussion of the 1858 Yankton Reservation 
boundaries. The Alliance has specifically addressed the position of the United States with reference 
to that discussion. In addition, a discussion directed to the holding of the district court in Yankton, 
14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998), reinstating the 1858 reservation boundaries follows. 
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(a) As a preliminary matter, it is logical to focus on the 1858 reservation boundaries 
because that is the manner in which cession precedent has been traditionally understood. In other 
words, if a cession removed lands from a reservation, it did so by extinguishing the reservation 
boundaries around the area affected. For decades, every court in every case, every federal Indian law 
text, every historian and every commentator that reviewed this precedent have agreed on this 
fundamental point. 
In this case, the United States can not cite a single example to the contrary. On the other hand, 
references to support this understanding are commonplace. As early as 197 5, even the title of a note 
in the North Dakota Law Review reflected this understanding: INDIANS-RESERVATIONS-
JURISDICTIONAL EFFECT OF SURPLUS LAND STATUTE UPON TRADITIONAL 
BOUNDARIES OF AN INDIAN RESERVATION. James M. Bekken, Comment, 
Indians-Reservations-Jurisdictional Effect of Surplus Land Statute Upon Traditional Boundaries 
of an Indian Reservation, 52 N.D. L. Rev. 411,417 (1975) (emphasis added). 
In the text of the note, the analysis is directed to the effect of surplus land statutes on 
reservation boundaries. For example, in the discussion of DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975) (the cession the Court in Yankton l, 522 U.S. at 344, described as "parallel" to the 
Yankton Act) the law student structured the statement of the issue in boundary terms: 
DeCoteau has clearly shown that to determine the effect a particular statute had on 
reservation boundaries the court must .... 
Bekken, supra at 418 ( emphasis added). 
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This concentration on the extinguislm1ent of reservation boundaries is also routinely 
acknowledged even by tribal advocates who disagree with reservation disestablishment. For example, 
see the "boundaries" discussion throughout Susan D. Campbell, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts 
and the Question of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 57, 58, 63, 64, 71, 75, 96 
(1984). 
(b) With the extinguishment ofreservation boundaries, it has also followed, a fortiori, that 
the Indian country remaining in the affected area, if any, would be either dependent Indian 
communities under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) orindian trust allotments under 18 U.S.C. § l 15l(c). Every 
court in every case, every federal Indian law text, every historian and every commentator are also 
in agreement in this instance. 12 
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court made this point clear in United States v. Pelican, 
232 U.S. 442 (1914) with respect to Indian trust allotments. In this situation, allotments subsequently 
heldinfee(theprimaryissuehere) arenolonger"Indiancountry." Pelican was codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(c).13 
12 In the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), even the United States, in the 
alternative, finally acknowledged the legitimacy of this analysis. Br. of Plaintiff-Intervenor/ Appellee 
United States of America at 26 n. 3, Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-3893, 3894, 
3896, 3900). 
13 The Court recently reaffirmed and explained the analysis and codification of Pelican in Alaska v. 
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 528-529 (1998). See also DeCoteau, 
420 U.S. at 427 n.2, 446-447, Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586,601 n.24, 613-615 n.47, 615-616 n.48. 
35 
Un f 1 (> ','. :·::. ·, UU'-'J .. l 
Moreover, a recognition that the United States Supreme Court expressly held that the 1858 
reservation boundaries were extinguished by the Yankton cession for a sum certain is not in any way 
inconsistent with the fact that the Court specifically reserved the question of whether the reservation 
was disestablished altogether. Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 358. That entirely distinct issue has yet to be 
decided. Yankton, Civ. 98-4042, (Order dated Feb. 12, 2004). 
For these reasons, the Alliance submits that the United States Supreme Court intended that the 
subject of the Yankton remand would be limited to the "reservation status" of only existing trust 
allotments, dependent Indian communities, and other trust lands. When reservation boundaries are 
extinguished, this would ordinarily be the case. See the reference in Yankton 1 to "conflicting 
understandings about the status of the reservation" and the "fact that the tribe continues to own land 
in common." Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 358. These contentions do not directly implicate the status of 
fee lands, which are predominantly owned and populated by non-members. See Yankton 1,522 U.S. 
at 356-357. 
In other words, Yankton 1 clearly resolved the status of the 1858 reservation boundaries. See 
Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 333, 343, 345, 345-346, 347, and 353. Because of the law of the case, the 
1858 boundary issue should not have even been addressed in the remand in Yankton. 
All else aside, the Court made clear in Yankton 1 that the 1858 "reservation boundaries" were 
not "retained" or "maintained "-"we conclude ... continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders." Id. 
at 347 (emphasis added). At the very least, the Court decided that question. The Court stated that 
the "case" presented the question of whether "Congress diminished the boundaries" of the Yankton 
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Sioux Reservation. Id at 333 (emphasis added). The unresoived issue, as the Court also clearly 
stated, was "whether Congress disestablished the reservation altogether." Id. at 358. That issue 
should not have involved resurrecting the status of 1858 reservation boundaries. 
(c). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) rev'd 188 F.3d 1010 
(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000). 
Even after Yankton I, the United States maintained that the 1858 reservation boundaries 
remained in tact. And the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998), squarely held 
that even after Yankton I, the 1858 reservation boundaries were still intact. Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 
at 1143. ("If the original exterior boundaries remain, as it appears they do from the Supreme Court's 
opinion"). See also Yankton, No. 98-4042 (D.S.D. Oct. 5, 1998) (order denying motion for new trial 
at 3) ("The Court has now held that the remaining lands within the 1858 boundaries remain a part of 
the Yankton Sioux Reservation"). The district court was clearly mistaken (for the second time). 14 
In the remand, an initial concession by the United States in June, 1998, undermined the 
strength of the conclusion of the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d. At that time, the United 
States conceded that the United States Supreme Court in Yankton 1 recognized that Congress did not 
intend to maintain the 1858 reservation boundaries: 
14 The district court in United States v. Webb cited this decision with approval. The court of appeals 
in Webb barely mentioned the fact that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d 
1010 (8th Cir. 1999), squarely reversed the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 
1998), on this important point. 
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fTlhe United States Supreme Court found the savings clause insufficient to maintain 
the reservation boundaries o/ the 1858 Treaty here, and thus did not prevent 
diminishment of the Reservation .... 
Summ. J. Br. for the United States at 22 n. 5, Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) (No. 98-
4042) (emphasis added). See also id. at 2, 5, 6. Nevertheless, the United States made other 
arguments in support of the position of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. After the district court recognized 
the 1858 reservation boundaries in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d, the United States never again mentioned 
this concession or the conflict with the express language of the Court in Yankton 1. 
(d). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 
1261 (2000). 
In their brief to the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), the United 
States avoided any discussion of the express conflict between the holding of the district court and the 
conclusion of the Court in Yankton 1 regarding the 1858 reservation boundaries. The court of appeals 
viewed the argument to recognize the Y ank:ton reservation in the form resurrected by the district court 
in light of all of the above. In addition to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, all Yankton 
1 briefs and related documents were made part of the record in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 
1999). Moreover, in oral argumentmembersofthepanelin the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d, 
expressly referenced the transcript of oral argument in the United States Supreme Court in Yankton 
1 directed to the scope of the cession. 
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In this instance, the United States could not convince the court of appeals to affirm the holding 
of the district court. Instead the court of appeals expressly confirmed that the 1858 reservation 
boundaries were extinguished by the 1894 Yankton act. See Yankton, 188 F.3d at 1020-1021, 1030. 
2. United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 53 I U.S. 1200 (2001). 
The court of appeals in Webb should not have ignored the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court that emphatically and repeatedly reject every "savings clause" argument. The court 
of appeals in Yankton further confirms that conclusion. 
At the conclusion of the oral argument in Webb, the United States also told the court of 
appeals that the Nez Perce savings clause "saved this reservation." Tr. Oral Argument, US. v. Webb, 
219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30155). The court in Webb mistakenly adopted the argument 
of the United States ("enforcing the savings clause"). Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1137. This is a nonsense 
argument and the United States knows better. It is truly remarkable that the United States convinced 
the court of appeals in Webb to adopt this position. Clearly, the United States should not have 
repeated this argument in this Court. 
The unprecedented decision of the court of appeals in Webb, unless disputed, will encourage 
the United States to now support others on the standard savings clause list in attempts to resurrect 
additional "Indian country" in Idaho, in the Ninth Circuit and across the United States. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN MINNESOTA v. 
11/1LLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) DOES NOT ADDRESS 
THE "IRREBUTTABLE" PRESUMPTION OF DISESTABLISHMENT. 
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The United States has also argued that the recent decision of the Court in Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), somehow detracts from the force of Yankton 
Sioux Tribe. The court of appeals repeated the reasoning of the United States. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 
1133 n.5. However, nothing in the decision of the Court in Mille Lacs sanctions this result. Afille 
Lacs was not a reservation disestablishment case. Whatever the Court in Mille Lacs said about 
congressional intent with respect to hunting and fishing rights in a case by case approach in those 
cases, is simply not applicable in reservation disestablishment cases dealing with cession language and 
sum certain payments. 
In these reservation disestablishment cases, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly set 
forth and repeatedly reaffirmed a "nearly conclusive," "almost insurmountable" ''presumption". of 
disestablishment. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975), Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U.S. 463,470 (1984), Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329,344. In 1975, DeCoteau established 
that disestablishment presumption as a general rule. In 1984, Solem unanimously recognized the 
presumption and, in 1998, Yankton Sioux Tribe unanimously reaffirmed it. 
The bits and scraps of language that the United States has pieced together to support a 
revisionist's view of the history of the Nez Perce reservation does not answer that "nearly conclusive," 
"almost insurmountable" presumption of disestablishment. The presumption of disestablishment set 
forth in DeCoteau, Solem, and Yankton Sioux Tribe is a rule of law of national application. The 
decision of the court of appeals in Webb conflicts with the Court's decisions and the decisions of all 
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other United States Courts of Appeal. Judge Wood cannot be faulted for adhering to these 
presumptions established by the United States Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States ignored the cession presumption established by the applicable decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court. In Webb, the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation still exists. The decision 
of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and for Twin Falls County, 
correctly resolves the reservation disestablishment issue. That decision should be affirmed. 
Tom D. Tobin 
Tobin Law Offices, P.C. 
422 Main Street 
P.O. Box 730 
Winner, SD 57580 
(605) 842-2500 
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
The question of law addressed in this brief is whether the ceded area of the 
Nez Perce Reservation, 90% owned and populated by non-members of the Nez 
Perce Tribe, was disestablished by the 1894 legislation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondent State of Idaho sets forth the standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PURSUES THE RESURRECTION OF 
ORIGINAL RESERVATION BOUNDARIES. 
Importantly, in both instances, the district court and the court of appeals in 
US. v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho, 
Jan. 12, 1999), ajf'd, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), were persuaded by the 
arguments of the United States. Someone should have been allowed to point out 
that the United States assumes more than one role in this type of litigation. The 
role the United States neglected to mention is important here and bears scrutiny. 
Apart from the interests of justice that the United States rightfully pursues in any 
federal criminal prosecution or in any case supporting tribal claims generally, in 
6 
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· cases of this nature the United States also vigorously pursues the judicial 
resurrection of original Indian reservation boundaries. 
The United States has done so for decades (unsuccessfully in this type of 
cession-related litigation, except in this instance). See generally the position of the 
United States in the United States Supreme Court in the reservation status cases: 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 
(1973); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); 
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); and South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329 (1998) discussed in the Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional 
Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of Idaho. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently rejected the cession related reservation 
status arguments of the United States. Id. 
There is, of course, nothing wrong in serving more than one master in this 
regard or in zealously pursuing a policy goal in the process-as the United States 
has done in this instance. At the same time, however, it should be kept in mind 
that this is the light in which the cession related reservation status arguments of the 




to the insistence of the United States that the historical record be sealed in U.S. v. 
Scott, Case No. CR98-01-N-EJL (D. Idaho, Aug. 12, 1998) and Webb and with 
reference to the United States opposing any amicus curiae participation. 
This advocate overview is important in this case for one additional reason. 
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court considered and rejected, for the third 
time, all the cession arguments of substance that the United States and the Nez 
Perce Tribe have submitted in the instant case. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 
U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581). Moreover, there is no "special" reason for the 
Court to view the Nez Perce issue of statutory construction any differently. The 
law on this question has not been changed in any significant respect since that 
time. The Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in 
Support of Respondent State of Idaho discusses the Mille Lacs case at 39-40. 
Ordinarily, this cession issue would come within the purview of the "almost 
irrebuttable" presumption of disestablishment repeatedly recognized by the Court 
and explicitly set forth again in Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 343-347, 349-
351. Contrary to the position of the United States, the Nez Perce legislation does 
not represent a meaningful distinction. And in Yankton Sioux Tribe, the United 
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States conceded that point with reference to standard savings clauses. On its face, 
Yankton Sioux Tribe supports that conclusion. 
II. 
SPECIFIC NEZ PERCE DOCUMENTATION CONFIRMS DISESTABLISH-
MENT IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. 
As the State has submitted, the transcripts of the tribal negotiations 
contained in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894), are particularly 
telling. In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth, at length, the bou..11dary discussions significant 
there. For example: 
[Y]ou must accept the new life wholly. You must break down the 
barriers and invite the white man with all the elements of 
civilization .... 
Cole's vivid language and entreaty to "break down the barriers" are 
reminiscent of the "picturesque" statement that congress would "pull 
up the nails" holding down the outside boundary of the Uintah 
Reservation, which we viewed as evidence of diminishment in Hagen, 
510 U.S., at 417, 114 S.Ct. at 968-969. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 352-353 (1998) (emphasis added). 
The Nez Perce transcript documents a strikingly similar understanding: 
Salmon River Billy: ... [T]he country had been inclosed according to 
the treaty and prevented the entrance on the reservation of any white 
9 
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man and any who should try to set aside or break down the 
boundaries of that reservation .... Perhaps it may be on account of 
having another President, who is a Democrat; perhaps it is he who has 
made the edict for breaking down the lines of the reservation. 
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 56 (1894) (emphasis added). 
In fact, in this instance, the Nez Perce documentation is more explicit than 
Yankton. Salmon River Billy's "breaking down the boundaries" and "breaking 
down the lines of the reservation" are stronger and more vivid than the Yankton 
reference to '"break down the barriers'" set forth as evidence of diminishment in 
Yankton Sioux Tribe. In Urtited States v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, 
No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho Jan. 12, 1999) ajf'd 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001), the district court and the court of appeals did 
not mention this vivid language. 
In addition, the federal commissioners here also specifically cited the 
DeCoteau example ("the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians have sold their land"), 
among others, in their discussions with the Nez Perce Tribe in an effort to gain 
general support for the Nez Perce Agreement. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 30. In 




The Government has made you the most liberal offer in my 
opinion that has been made to any tribe since Harrison was President. 
The only tribe that I can remember that have received $2.50 per acre 
for any considerable quantity of land is the Sisseton and Wahpeton 
tribe in Dakota. They had a smaller body of land, very little of which 
was waste land not good for agriculture. We paid the same price we 
propose to pay you for all your land .... 
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 45 ( emphasis added). 
Later in the congressional debates, this same disestablishment concept was 
again described, but in different terms. References to "public domain" appear in 
more than one instance. 53 Cong. Rec. 6425, 6426, 8269, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1894). There is little doubt that Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), conclusively 
resolved the significance of that concept in reservation disestablishment cases. 
Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412-414 (1994). Significantly, the United States Supreme 
Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe cited these passages and repeated the point. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 353-354. 
Here, as in Yankton Sioux Tribe, after the passage of the 1894 Nez Perce 
Act, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in his Annual Report, unequivocally 
stated that the Nez Perce lands would be "restored to the public domain." 
11 
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Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at 26 (1894). Again, the 
United States Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe specifically noted this point. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 354. Similarly, the Secretary of Interior's Annual 
Report reflects this same under?tanding for both the Yankton and Nez Perce lands: 
"restoring to the public domain." Report of the Secretary of the Interior, H. Exec. 
Doc. 1, pt. 5, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. (Vol. 14) at IX (1894-95). The Secretary 
included the Yankton and the Nez Perce cession in the same listing. Clearly, the 
evidence to support a contrary conclusion, pales in comparison. 
As provided in the 1894 Act, on November 8, 1895, the President of the 
United States, Grover Cleveland, described the "cession and agreement" and 
proclaimed that the ar_ea "acquired" from the Nez Perce Tribe would be open to 
settlement on November 18, 1895. Proclamation of November 8, 1895, 29 Stat. 
873, 875. The Presidential Proclamations opening the reservations to settlement 
were deemed especially significant in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. at 
602-603 (1977), and Hagen, 510 U.S. at 419-420. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the 
United States Supreme Court repeated the point: 
12 
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This Court has described substantially similar language as "an 
unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement by the Nation's Chief 
Executive of a perceived disestablishment." Rosebud, 430 U.S., at 
602-603, 97 S.Ct. at 1371. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). The cession terminology 
of the Nez Perce Proclamation similarly reflects this same important 
disestablishment construction. The court of appeals mentions none of this. 
At the time, the local press reported the common perception of the event in 
the following manner: 
RESERVATION IS NO l\AORE ... At twelve o'clock l\Aonday the Nez 
Perce reservation passed into history ... heads began bobbing up all 
over the former reservation .... 
Lewiston Tribune (Idaho), November 20, 1895 at I. 
CANNON BOOMED AT NOON ... The cannon was fired in front of 
the land office, at twelve o'clock, Monday. This was the death knell 
of the great Nez Perce reservation, and the introduction of new 
conditions to follow these important changes. 
Lewiston Teller (Idaho), November 21, 1895 at 1. Even the local Indian agent 
recognized that the reservation "formerly embraced" the "ceded lands." H. R. Doc. 
No. 5, Vol. II, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. (Vol. 13) 141 (1897). 
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In terms of solid contemporary historical documentation, the United States 
attempts to counter all of this indicia of disestablishment with one piece of 
informal correspondence ( four sentences) from some acting Commissioner in the 
Indian Affairs Office, in response to some New York map company. See also US. 
v. Webb, 219 F.3d at 1136 n.13 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001). 
In context, even the probative value of this letter is questionable. 
As the State of Idaho points out, the correspondence was written months 
before Congress ratified the Nez Perce Agreement, and it noted this fact ("not yet 
been ratified by Congress"). In fact, the reservation was not formally "opened" 
until seventeen months later. Until the actual opening, ceded areas of all 
reservations continued to be administratively treated as Indian reservations, even 
on official maps. In other words, to the extent that the agreement had not been 
ratified and the area was not yet opened, the agreement itself did not make any 
"change in the boundaries of that reservation." Moreover, a reference in the very 
next sentence to the reservation as "at present existing," arguably supports this 
construction. In any light, this documentation is at least suspect. In the proper 
historical perspective established by the Nez Perce documentation, it means 
nothing. No particular significance should be attributed to this letter. 
14 
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After the opening, the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was treated in the same 
manner as the original Sisseton-Wahpeton and Yankton reservations. It was 
deleted from official reservation maps, and described as a "former" reservation in 
numerous other instances. Frederick W McReynolds, 40 Pub. Lands Dec. 413 
(1912); Lee v. Thomas, 29 Pub. Lands Dec. 251 (1899); Railroad Right of Way-
Special Act; Spokane & Palouse Ry. Co., 22 Pub. Lands Dec. 674 (1896). Even 
after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, the 
Department of the Interior continued to delineate the "FORMER NEZ PERCE 
INDIAN RESERVE" on the Official General Land Office Map of the State of 
Idaho (1939). 
The foregoing is significant because of the contemporaneous understanding 
reflected in the treatment of the Sisseton-Wahpeton, Yankton and Nez Perce 
opemngs. The Nez Perce record confirms the view that Congress, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the local Indian populations and the non-Indian 
populations each perceived that disestablishment was intended by both the 
Yankton and Nez Perce acts. Moreover; your amicus is constrained to point out, in 
response to the court of appeals, that other later generic references to a Nez Perce 
!!reservation" lack significance. 
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First, the Court in Hagen noted that "confusion" in the subsequent legislative 
records did nothing to alter a conclusion firmly grounded upon "textual and 
contemporaneous evidence" of disestablishment. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420. See 
also Pittsburg & Midway Coal Min. Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1416 (10th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990). In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court 
repeated the crucial point: 
We need not linger over whether the many references to the Yankton 
Reservation in legislative and administrative materials utilized a 
convenient geographical description or reflected a considered 
jurisdictional statement. The mixed record we are presented with 
"reveals no consistent, or even dominant, approach to the territory in 
question," and it "carries but little force" in light of the strong textual 
and contemporaneous evidence of diminishment. Rosebud, 430 U.S., 
at 605, n. 27, 97 S.Ct., at 1373, n. 27; see also Solem, 465 U.S., at 
478, 104 S.Ct., at 1170 (finding subsequent treatment that was "rife 
with contradictions and inconsistencies" to be "of no help to either 
side"). 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 355-356 (emphasis added). Importantly, the 
Webb Court ignored this prudential advice. 
Secondly, here, as in Hagen, the subsequent demographics further support a 
conclusion of disestablishment. Within the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation, roughly 
90% of the population is non-Indian and roughly 90% of the lands are non-Indian 




conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectati~ns of the people living 
in the area." Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421. In addition, the Court in Yankton Sioux 
Tribe, reiterated this observation: 
Today, fewer than ten percent of the 1858 reservation lands are in 
Indian hands, non-Indians constitute over two-thirds of the population 
within the 1858 boundaries, and several municipalities inside those 
boundaries have been incorporated under South Dakota law. The 
opening of the tribal casino in 1991 apparently reversed the 
population trend; the tribal presence in the area has steadily increased 
in recent years, and the advent of gaming has stimulated the local 
economy. In addition, some acreage within the 1858 boundaries has 
reverted to tribal or trust land. See H. Hoover, Yankton Sioux Tribal 
Land History (1995), reprinted in App. 545-546. Nonetheless, the 
area remains "predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a 
few surviving pockets of Indian allotments," and those demographics 
signify a diminished reservation. Solem, supra, at 471, n. 12, 104 
S.Ct., at 1167, n. 12. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 356, 357 (emphasis added). 
In this instance, the demographics in the Nez Perce area are even more 
persuasive than those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Yankton 
Sioux Tribe. Amicus submits that the demographics established in the opening of 
the Nez Perce Reservation strongly support the disestablishment of the 1863 Nez 
Perce Reservation. That opening proceeded along the same track as the Yankton 
17 
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opening in every significant respect. In this case, as in Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
neither the ceded land nor the former allotted fee lands are Indian country. 
III. 
THE JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY FURTHER SUPPORTS RESERVATION 
DISESTABLISHMENT. 
Perhaps the Webb court missed its usual way in this instance because of the 
manner in \Vhich the United States recounted the recent jurisdictional history of the 
Nez Perce Reservation. Webb, 219 F.3d at 1136-1137. Because of the argument 
of the United States, the Webb court mistakenly assumed that recent Nez Perce 
Reservation history was of controlling significance, and that it reflected the intent 
of Congress at the time the 1894 Act was passed, as well as the jurisdictional 
history established shortly thereafter. Amicus Curiae participation would have 
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this same 
argument (recent jurisdictional history is of little significance). Yankton Sioux 
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355-56 (1998). 
The importance of the fact that the Nez Perce Reservation is now ninety 
percent (90%) owned and populated by non-members could have also been 




considerable emphasis on similar demographics in each of the last five decisions 
on point. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975); Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 605 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 
480 (1984); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994); South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356-57 (1998). The United States mentioned none of 
this; the opinion of the court of appeals is similarly silent. 
In Vlebb, the court of appeals also failed to mention the substantial conflict 
with the Idaho state courts even though the decision of the court of appeals was 
unprecedented. United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Unlike 
Webb, in In re SRBA, No. 39576 (5th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls) (Jan. 21, 
2000), the decision of the district court correctly reflects the presumptions 
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe and the 
arguments submitted by the State and Amicus Curiae. The 1863 Nez Perce 
Reservation was disestablished. The Response Brief of the State of Idaho details 
the jurisdictional history of the area. Response Brief of State of Idaho, In re: 
Snake River Basin Adjudication, appeal docketed, Nos. 26042 & 26128 (Idaho 




In attempting to limit amicus curiae participation in Webb, the United States 
also stressed the fact that it has exercised some criminal jurisdiction in the area in 
recent years. The United States neglected to mention that the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that such recent jurisdictional history is really 
quite insignificant. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district cou..rt should be affirmed. 
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